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ARTICLE I.

THE FORMATIVE PRINCIPLE OF PROTESTANTISM.

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Professor B. B. Warfield, D.D., LL.D., of the Princeton Theological Seminary, opens an article in the January (1901) number of *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review* with the following affirmations: "What we call the Reformation was fundamentally, when looked at from a spiritual point of view, a great revival of religion; when looked at from the theological point of view, a great revival of Augustinianism. It was the one just because it was the other. Revolting from the domination of ecclesiastical machinery, men found their one haven of rest in the sovereignty of God. *The doctrine of Predestination was therefore the central doctrine of the Reformation*" (italics ours). In a foot note Dr. Warfield has explained this last sentence as follows: "The sole doctrine that from the beginning was common to all the Reformers, and that really constituted the formative principle of Protestantism, was that of Predestination."

In his zeal to uphold his great contention against the *Revision Movement* in the Presbyterian Church, Dr. Warfield has, we think, made a generalization that cannot be sustained by the facts, that is, if *Predestination* is to be taken in its ordinary theological sense. We are perfectly willing that Dr. Warfield should affirm that Predestination was "the central doctrine" of the Zwinglian and Calvinistic Reformation, and that it is "the

formative principle" of the Protestantism of Zwingli and Calvin. In regard to Calvin there will not be two opinions, and we presume that Dr. Warfield will not object to the statements of Drs. Zeller and Sigwart, that according to Zwingli "the election of the individual is the *proper* object of faith," or, "it is *only* election that justifies and blesses."

But Zwingli and Calvin were not "all the Reformers," and their Reformation was not the whole, nay, not, in our opinion, even the larger part of the Reformation. Dr. Warfield has certainly heard of Luther and Melancthon, and of the German Reformation; but he does not seem to have made himself profoundly acquainted with the early Lutheran teaching, for had he done so, he would have refrained, we think, from making his sweeping generalization about "the central doctrine," and about "the formative principle."

LUTHER'S EARLY EXPERIENCE.

Luther's profound conviction of sin and the bitter anguish of his conscience under his sense of personal guilt, led him to inquire the way of salvation with great earnestness. His thoughts about Predestination only deepened his distress. His study of the Scholastics and of the Scriptures brought him no relief. Finally an aged cloister-brother spoke to him about *faith*, and pointed him to that article of the Creed, which says: *Credo remissionem peccatorum*. He interpreted this article for Luther as meaning that we must have *personal* faith, and must believe that *our* sins are forgiven. This interpretation he confirmed by a quotation from St. Bernard's sermon, *De Annuntiatione*: *Sed adde, ut credas et hoc, quod per ipsum peccata Tibi donantur. Hoc est testimonium, quod perhibet Spiritus Sanctus in corde tuo, dicens: Dimissa sunt tibi peccata tua. Sic enim arbitratur Apostolus, gratis justificari hominem per fidem*. Melancthon, who relates this incident in Luther's experience, says that Luther was in the habit of saying that he was not only comforted by these words, but that he learned to know what Paul meant by the declaration: *Fide justificamur*. "Gradually more light came to him as he read and compared the

words and instances contained in the Prophets and Apostles, and stimulated his faith by daily prayer. Then he began to read the works of Augustine, and found in the *Commentary on the Psalms*, and in the book *De Spiritu et Litera*, many perspicuous passages that confirmed the doctrine of faith and the consolation that had been awakened in his heart."*

Here we have in the narrative of Melanchthon the *initium* of Luther's experience of salvation. The process was not rapid. He continued to be troubled with thoughts about "the will of God." Finally he made his distress known to Staupitz, the Prior of his Order, and he himself reports the instruction given by his Superior: "Staupitz comforted me with these words: Why do you torment yourself with such speculations? Look upon the wounds of Christ and his blood shed for you. In these you have the explanation of predestination. Therefore you must hear the Son of God who was sent in the flesh, and was manifest to destroy this work of the devil, and to assure you in regard to predestination. Hence he says to thee: 'Thou art my sheep, because thou hearest my voice. No one shall pluck you out of my hands' (John 10 : 29)."[†]

In this account as well as in that given by Melanchthon we perceive that Christ and faith in him were made the *prius* in Luther's experience of salvation. Predestination was subordinated, and was postponed in the *ordo salutis*, and is to be ex-

**Vita Lutheri*, Cap. V.

[†] *Erl. Ed., Opera Latina*, 6 : 29-7. For a fuller account see Meurer's *Life of Luther*, in loco. As fully illustrative of Luther's entire relations to the subject in hand, we quote from his *Table Talk*, DCLVII., Hazlitt's Translation: "Concerning predestination, it is best to begin below at Christ, as then we both hear and find the Father; for all those that have begun at the top have broken their necks. I have been thoroughly plagued and tormented with such cogitations of predestination; I would needs know how God intended to deal with me, etc. But at last, God be praised! I clean left them; I took hold again on God's revealed Word. Higher I was not able to bring it, for a human creature can never search out the celestial will of God; this God hides, for the sake of the devil, to the end the crafty spirit may be deceived and put to confusion. The revealed will of God the devil has learned from us, but God reserves his secret will to himself. It is sufficient for us to learn and know Christ in his humanity, in which the Father has revealed himself."

plained by reference to the sufferings and death of Christ. That is, in Luther's experience of salvation, Predestination was peripheral, not central. At Rome in 1510, while climbing Pilate's staircase, the passage, *The just shall live by his faith*, burst into his soul with new power. He now had the *full* experience of salvation. But as a simple matter of fact such experience came to him on account of Christ through faith, and not through his thoughts about Predestination and "the will of God." To the question that tortured his conscience, *What must I do to be saved*, he received the answer, *Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved*. It was from this question, and from the answer it received in Luther's experience of salvation, that the Lutheran Church was born, that the Lutheran theology has been developed as from a central principle. On this subject there is no difference of opinion among competent Lutheran writers, who ought to be esteemed the best and wisest judges on this subject. We have room for only two quotations: "The peace that Luther could not obtain by the requirements of the cloister, he experienced in the Pauline doctrine that the sinner is justified by the faith that lays hold on the merits of Christ. In this doctrine, which formed the fixed cardinal point of his deeply agitated soul, lay forever the central point of his theology, the center of gravity of his Reformation work. What the intellectual revolution since the middle of the 13th century had prepared, what Mysticism striving after a living fellowship with God had foreshadowed, what the Reformers before the Reformation had seen from the dim distance, that was the fountain of life for this elect man of God: The conviction that the eternal essence of the Gospel lies in the holy union of the individual with God through justifying faith in Christ. That preparatory feature of the Middle Ages, which in proportion as it broke the power of the Middle Ages over the individual, threw him on his own resources, found its consummation in this one man, who saw in justification by faith the indestructible conviction which the Spirit of God drives into the very center of the soul. The man who in his own person strove for salvation as no one had done in the Middle

Ages, received also the deepest personal answer from God. For the greater the dissonances in a soul struggling for salvation, the greater is the harmony into which God resolves them. The hard discipline through which Luther passed was to him the true guide to justifying faith."*

Thomasius has said: "He (Luther) regarded the Holy Scriptures as the pure source of revealed truth, and as the norm for judging the doctrines of men and of the Church. This may be called the *formal principle* of the Reformation. But as we have seen already, this authority of the Scriptures had been recognized before Luther. But a thorough-going reformation had not resulted from it. The innermost life-root of the Reformation, the central birthground of Protestantism,† is not this fundamental principle, but that of JUSTIFYING FAITH as expressed in the thesis: JUSTIFICATION OUT OF GRACE THROUGH FAITH.

"Not primarily as a dogmatic proposition or as a traditional truth of Scripture—such is no life-creating principle—much rather as a fact of experience, as a deep, inner life-experience, did this principle come to Luther. In his heart was justifying faith born of the Word of God, and it showed itself to him as the power of God which alone can satisfy the deepest need of the human soul, and can re-establish the right relation to God. This is the need of redemption from sin and guilt, and of deliverance from the wrath of God against the sinner and from death. And this relation is that of reconciliation with God, of the assured certainty of grace, of the divine sonship. How profound that need was in Luther we know from his personal history. * * * Even the Holy Scriptures, which he read frequently, gave him no light, no comfort. His eyes rested on those passages which testify of the wrath of God against sin. When he read in Paul of 'the righteousness of God,' he understood by it the judicial punitive righteousness. The distress became worse and worse—he tortured himself with thoughts

* Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, II., 381-2.

† The author means the *Lutheran Reformation* and the *Lutheran Protestantism*, since he is specifically discussing "The Reformation of Luther" and "The Principles of the Lutheran Protestantism."

about God's secret 'predestination,' which appointed some to life, others to destruction. The chasm grew wider and wider. With inner terror, almost in despair, he looked away from doubt, in torment as to whether he should hope that salvation was for him, as to whether he was predestinated. Finally, he cast away everything that came between his conscience and his God, and all barriers that shut him out from free access to Christ, and by a great *act of faith* he betook himself to *the free grace of God* and sunk himself into it, and laid hold of it, and held it fast as the sole, eternal ground of salvation. In child-like, trusting confidence in the grace of God in Christ he found the forgiveness of sins, certainty of justification, the peace of the divine sonship, the power of a new life, the victory over every adversary.

"This is the starting point of the Reformation: *The arising of its Principle, Justifying Faith*, in the heart of Luther. Out of the question of his conscience: 'What must I do to be saved,' and out of the divine word of comfort: 'He that believeth, shall be justified and saved,' it was born."*

LUTHER AS PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY.

With the experience of salvation glowing in his heart, in 1512 Luther began his career as professor of theology by lecturing first on Paul's Epistle to the Romans, and then on the Psalms.

Melanchthon in this connection says that "Luther recalled the minds of men to the Son of God, and, as John the Baptist pointed out the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world, so he (Luther) showed that sins are pardoned freely on account of the Son of God, and that such blessing must be accepted by faith. He also set forth other parts of church doctrine."† If now we turn to Luther's lectures on the Psalms during his formative period (1512-1520), we discover that they are full of Christ, of his passion, his cross, his benefits for us. He finds Christ everywhere in the Psalms, and preaches Christ rather than lectures on the Psalms.

*Thomasius—Seeberg, *Dogmengeschichte*, II., 332-4.

†Melanchthon's *Vita Lutheri*, Cap. VI.

Of Predestination we read only a very little in these lectures,* and that little is suggested *en passant* by his doctrine of the Will and of Grace, and is not made a principal subject of discussion. On the contrary, Predestination is so completely shaded, and kept in the background, that he even forbids the sinner to raise the question as to whether or not he is predestinated, and declares that solicitude about Predestination "is a most perilous temptation caused by the devil and by the wisdom of the flesh," and is displeasing to God, and is to be utterly banished. He declares further that God has not revealed his counsels, but points us to his commands. "Wherefore the object of faith and hope is God *gratuitus Promissor*, or the Word of him who promises, that and nothing else."† Hence the gracious God, Christ and faith in Christ, and in the divine promises, constitute the sum and substance of these lectures.

Other writings of Luther belonging to this period are, as to their chief content and main purpose, identical in character. The Augustinian doctrine of sin, and of grace, and of faith, and of the will, is brought into great prominence. Where the Augustinian doctrine of Predestination appears, it does not appear as the *central* thought. It is made subsidiary to Christ and to faith in him, or is used as an instrument for overthrowing the doctrine of Free-will, that is, the Roman Catholic claim that man can contribute something toward his salvation.

And yet much as Luther was indebted to Augustine as *Praeceptor Theologiae* for some of his deepest and purest views of the Gospel, there were these two points of profound difference, even at this early period, between the Master and the Disciple: The former laid the chief stress on *grace*, and conceived of justification too much as a *making* righteous. The latter laid the chief stress on the justification of the individual, and regarded justification more as a *declaring* righteous.

The logic of these points of difference is that Augustinianism proceeded from above downward. Lutheranism proceeds from below upward. As a consequence of this tendency in

* Weimer Ed., IV., p. 227.

† Erl. Ed. Latin, XIV., 253-9.

Luther to begin with man, with his misery and his need of salvation, and proceed upward until he had found the sovereign remedy in Christ, and since this had been the course of his own life, he could not logically be, or become, centrally, principally, formatively, *predestinarian* in his theological thinking. Again, since he had experienced the misery of sin, and had found salvation from sin, and peace with God, alone *on account of Christ*, apprehended by faith, and not by means of his thoughts on Predestination, it must follow psychologically, that his theological thinking must gather about Christ for him and Christ in him, and not about Predestination.

What the logic and the psychology of the premises lead us to conclude *a priori*, that we find demonstrated as fact by almost every page that Luther wrote, and by all that we know of his life. Even his doctrine of sin and his doctrine of the bondage of the Will, only help to emphasize the *central* significance of justification out of grace alone—not *through* Christ, but *on account of* Christ. Not one line of his works, interpreted in its proper scope and by its context, contradicts this conclusion. Even the thesis: *The best and infallible preparation and only disposition for grace is the eternal election and predestination of God*,* proves nothing to the contrary, since though written by Luther it was not discussed by him. It was meant to be, as the context shows, an antithesis to Pelagianism, and not an affirmation about that divine predestination which unconditionally determines the destiny of each individual. The very terms in which the thesis is stated exclude such a supposition.

The divine election and predestination *prepare* for the reception of grace. There is nothing *in verbis ipsissimis*, nor in the context, that makes them principally the *cause* of salvation, or that *postpones* Christ. Predestination and election strike down Free-will, and exalt the grace of God. But from Luther's standpoint—a standpoint determined by the experience of salvation—the grace of God is not conceived apart from Christ as *causa principalis*. It is not arbitrary in its discriminations.

* Loescher *Reformations-Acta*, I., 541.

This is shown abundantly by his correspondence with his friends, by his sermons, and by his *Commentary on Galatians*. Quite characteristic is his letter of April 8th, 1516, to George Spenlein: "I would like to know what is going on in your soul, whether, disgusted with its own righteousness, it is learning to breathe and confide in the righteousness of Christ. In our times the presumptuous temptation is cherished by many, and especially by those who try to be righteous and good by their own strength, to ignore the righteousness of God that is given us most abundantly and graciously in Christ; and by doing good for a long time they try to have confidence to stand before God adorned in their own virtues and merits—which cannot possibly be done. You and I both erred in this matter. But now I fight against that error, though I have not yet overcome it.

"Therefore, my dear brother, learn Christ and him crucified. Learn to sing to him, and, despairing of thyself, to say to him: Thou, Lord Jesus, art my righteousness, but I am thy sin. Thou hast taken upon thee what was mine, and hast given me what was thine. Thou hast become what thou wast not, and hast made me what I was not. Take care lest thou aspire to so great holiness, as not to wish to appear to thyself a sinner, yea, not to be one. For Christ dwells only with sinners. He came down from heaven where he dwelt with the righteous that he might dwell with sinners. Meditate on that love, and you will experience the most blessed comfort from it. If by our labors and sufferings we ought to seek to quiet the conscience, then why did he die? Therefore only in him, by despairing of thyself and of thy works, and by faith, wilt thou find peace. In addition thou wilt learn that he has adopted thee, and made thy sins his, and his righteousness thine."*

This letter contains an element of mysticism, for at this time Luther was considerably under the influence of the *Theologia Germanica*. But it would take more than mortal ken to discover in it a trace of Predestination. Its central thought is

* Ender's *Luther's Briefwechsel*, I., p. 29. See other letters of the same year.

Christ, his death and righteousness, his substitutionary relation, and confidence in him.

LUTHER'S SERMONS.

In 1515 Luther preached a sermon in which we find the following passage: "Since God would have all men to be saved, and since no man wishes to be damned, it is the will of the flesh alone that causes God now to say, I would, but thou wouldest not. But this is proved by 1 Tim. 2, and by each one's own experience. For he says: God who will have all men to be saved and to come unto the knowledge of the truth. And Ezek. 18: Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die? And Psalm 27 (30): Quoniam ira in indignatione et vita in voluntate ejus (*Vulgate*), and the God of wisdom has not made death, neither does he delight in the destruction of the wicked."*

Surely this is not the language of one whose central thought is Predestination. At least it differs very widely from the Augustinian doctrine that only a "certain number are elected," and that all the rest "are predestinated to eternal destruction."†

On St. Thomas's day, 1516, Luther preached a sermon from the text: *The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handywork*. Here, if anywhere, we might expect some reference to Election and Predestination. But neither the words, nor a trace of the thoughts for which they stand, can be found anywhere in the discourse. From the beginning to the end it is a sermon on the Gospel: "The proper work of God is the resurrection of Christ and justification in spirit, and the vivification of the new man, as in Romans 6: Christ died on account of our sins and rose on account of our justification. These things. This is what I said recently about John and the Gospel, of which he is a figure. For the work of God is twofold, viz., his own and another's. So likewise is the office of the Gospel twofold. The proper office of the Gospel is to declare the proper work of God, that is, the grace by

* *Opera Latina Varii Arg.* I., 58.

† *Tract. in Joann.*, XLVIII., 4.

which the Father of mercies truly gives peace, righteousness, and truth to all, and moderates all his wrath. Hence the Gospel is called *bonum, jucundum, suave, amicum*, and he who does not hear it cannot be happy. For this occurs, when the pardon of sins is declared to anxious consciences, as in Romans 10: How beautiful, that is, how amiable, delightful, desirable—as it sounds in the Hebrew—are the feet of those that bring good tidings and declare peace, that is, not the law, nor the threats of the law, not things to be fulfilled and done, but the pardon of sins, peace of conscience, the law fulfilled, etc., preaching good things, namely, the most sweet mercy of God and the gift of Christ to us.”*

It is easy to see what is the central thought in this extract. It is the grace of God that freely grants remission of sins *on account of* Christ. And if we examine the many sermons preached by Luther in the years 1515–1517, as found in Loescher's *Reformations-Acta*, we find that they are all animated by the spirit that breathes through the sermons from which we have quoted. Traces of the Augustinian Predestination in some of these sermons there may be, but Predestination forms neither the central thought nor the remote foundation of these discourses. Free-will and the ability of man to fit himself for grace, as over against the reigning Pelagianism, are condemned, and the grace of God, as over against the sin and misery of man, is magnified; but it is the grace of God in causal relation to Christ, and as proclaimed by the Gospel. The so-called physical attributes of God are recognized, but preëminent above everything else is God's love.

THE THESES OF 1516.

From the sermons of these formative years we turn to a work of an entirely different character. In 1516 Luther prepared and discussed numerous theses on Free-will.† In these he has closely followed Augustine, *gratiae defensor*. As these theses formed the bases for academic disputations, we should

* Loescher's *Reformations-Acta*, I., 769, *et seq.*

† Loescher, I., 328–348.

naturally expect to find them strongly flavored by Augustine's doctrine of Predestination. But neither the word *Predestination*, nor the doctrine of Predestination, appears in all these twenty quarto pages. The doctrine *de congruo* and *de condigno* are refuted. The proposition that *The Will of man without grace is not free, but bound*, is established by quotations from Paul and Augustine. Christ and the merciful God are associated: "Ye are dead and your life is hid with God. When Christ your life shall appear, then ye shall appear with him. Therefore every saint is consciously a sinner and unconsciously righteous, a sinner as regards his nature, righteous according to hope, a sinner in reality, but just by the imputation of the merciful God." And somewhat remarkable is this passage: "The strength of sin is the law, but the strength of the law is mercy, but the strength of mercy is hope, but the strength of hope is salvation, but the strength of salvation is God through Christ."

Again, as in the sermons, we have grace, Christ, the passion of Christ, faith, hope, constituting the chief substance of this somewhat elaborate and formal discussion of Free-will. Had Predestination been Luther's central doctrine, it would certainly appear in these theses, whose specific purpose is to discuss the question, *Whether man, created in the image of God, can by his natural powers keep the law of God, do or think that which is good, merit grace and comprehend a meritorious work.*

THE COMMENTARY ON GALATIANS.

From letters and sermons and theses we pass to Luther's *Commentary on Galatians*, of the year 1519. This work was published especially as a reply to the calumnies of Luther's enemies. Hence it is of special value in studying the evolution of Luther's theology for the purpose of ascertaining what was his "central doctrine" and what "really constituted the formative principle of Protestantism." Its value for this purpose lies chiefly in the facts, first, that it is a commentary on a portion of Scripture; secondly, that it makes abundant use of Jerome, Augustine and other Fathers; thirdly, that it is so

largely free from controversy. As regards doctrinal content it is not free from predestinarian views, for, as already conceded, Luther was *Augustino-predestinarian* in a part of his theological thinking. Hence that predestinarian views should crop out in some form in this *Commentary*, ought not to surprise us, especially as on almost every page Augustine, or some other Father, is quoted. As a matter of fact, the words, *praedestinatio, electio, praedestinante deo*, appear about half a dozen times in these 175 large quarto pages of Vol. II., Weimar Edition of Luther's Works. But they appear only as *obiter dicta*. A doctrine of Predestination is not developed and discussed. In comments on passages where we might expect to find it, we discover nothing of the kind. This, we think, is strong evidence in support of our contention that the doctrine of Predestination did not occupy the central place in Luther's theological thinking, as we know it did not in his religious experience. On the contrary, or if not on the contrary, yet as a most significant fact, we find a conception of God that brings, not his *rectoral*, but his *moral*, attributes into prominence: *Nomen autem dei misericordia, veritas, iusticia, virtus, sapientia, suique nominis accusatio*. And again: *Sicut ergo nomen domini est purum, sanctum, iustum, verax, bonum, etc., ita si tangat tangaturque corde (quod fit per fidem) omnino facit cor simile sibi*. Equally significant is his explanations of the words *Jesus* and *Christus*: *Audi primum, quod Jesus significet salutem et Christus unctionem misericordiae*; that is, he identifies Jesus Christ immediately with *salvation*, and with the *anointing of mercy*, which is widely different from making him a distant instrument for effecting salvation where Predestination is the central doctrine. And as for the doctrine of *justification by faith alone*, we can say truly that from the beginning to the end of the *Commentary* it appears as the apple of gold in the picture of silver; and so fully does it absorb the thinking of the author that with perfect propriety he might have written in the Preface to this edition what he wrote in the Preface to the edition published in 1535: "I myself can scarcely believe that I was so abundant in words when publicly expounding this Epistle of

Paul to the Galatians, as this book shows me to have been. And yet I perceive that all these cogitations, brought together with so much diligence by the brethren into this book, are mine, so that I must needs confess that all, or even more, was said by me in public lectures. For in my heart this article alone reigns, viz., the faith of Christ, from whom, through whom, and to whom my theological meditations flow and re-flow continually. And yet I perceive that I have not attained to such great height, breadth, depth of wisdom; only certain weak, poor beginnings and, as it were, fragments appear.

"Wherefore I am ashamed to have my poor, frigid commentaries on so great an apostle and elect vessel, published. But I am forced to lay aside modesty and to become impudently bold, when I consider the infinite and horrible profanation and abomination which have always raged in the Church of God, and still rages, against this only solid rock, as we call the article of justification, that is, that not by ourselves (much less by our works, which are less than we ourselves), but by the aid of another, by Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, we are redeemed from sin, death, the devil, and are made partakers of eternal life." And again: "This doctrine can never be taught, urged, and repeated enough. If this be lost, then is also the doctrine of truth, life, and salvation lost and gone. If this flourish, then all good things flourish: religion, true worship, the glory of God, the correct knowledge of all states and things."*

And as a proof that we are not wrong in interpreting the first edition of Luther's *Commentary* in the light of these later deliverances, we now quote what Melancthon wrote in his Preface to the second edition of this *Commentary* (1523): Est enim hic diligentissime excussus locus de *Iustificatione*, cuius rationem nisi e scripturis petis, non video in quem usum sacras literas legas.† It is evident from this that Melancthon regarded *Justification* as the central thought of the book, and that he regarded a proper understanding of this doctrine as

* Erlangen Ed., I., pp. 3, 4, 12.

† Weimer Ed., II., p. 442.

necessary to a profitable reading of the Scriptures. And that Luther allowed the second edition (very little changed) to go out under such a Preface, is good evidence that he accepted Melancthon's interpretation as correct.

LECTURES ON THE PSALMS.

Already have we spoken of Luther's lectures on the Psalms, of how full they are of Christ, of faith in him, and of justification. As further evidence that justification by faith was his central doctrine, and hence the formative principle of his theological thinking, the very life of his spiritual life, we now quote from his *Explanation of the Seven Penitential Psalms*: "Some one might say to me, Why are you forever speaking of the righteousness and grace of God, and harping on one string, and singing only one little song. I answer: Each person must look out for himself. I confess for my part that whenever in the Scriptures I find less than Christ I am not made the poorer. Hence I think that God the Holy Ghost knows and means to know only Christ, as the latter says of him. He will glorify me, for he will not speak of himself, but will take of mine and will show it unto you. Christ is God's grace, mercy, righteousness, truth, wisdom, power, consolation and salvation, given to us of God without any merits of our own—not, as some say, *causaliter* does he impart righteousness, and remain away himself, for that would be a dead righteousness, yea, it would never be given, if Christ were not there himself, as the rays of the sun and the heat of fire cannot exist where the sun and the fire do not exist."*

This is the language both of experience and of doctrinal conception. For this double reason we must regard it as decisive against Dr. Warfield's generalization, as likewise against his declaration (p. 50) that on Predestination as a hinge the whole religious consciousness as well as doctrinal teaching of all the Reformers turned! Luther must be excepted, for as a man thinketh in his heart so is he. And pre-eminently is this true of Luther, who carried his religious experience into all that he

* Erl. Ed., 37 : 441.

wrote. As he had found peace by faith alone in Christ, and not *per viam praedestinationis*, and as he lived in conscious communion with Christ, it must follow, so surely as normal mental action is amenable to the law of cause and effect, that his theological cogitations would gather around Christ, as the center, the heart, the all in all, of the Gospel. Had he found the springs of his religious experience in Predestination, then by the operation of the same psychical law, Predestination would have formed the center of his theological thinking, and would have become the basis of his assurance of salvation. But as it can be demonstrated that, in the representative writings from which we have quoted, Predestination does not receive a hundredth part of the attention that is bestowed upon Christ, upon faith in him, upon justification, we are forced to the conclusion by laws that we cannot ignore, that Predestination was not Luther's central doctrine during the first eight years of his theological teaching.

THE YEAR 1520.

And now we enter the year 1520, in which Luther wrote his *Three Great Reformation Treatises*, known in Germany as *Die Drie Grosse Reformations-Schriften*. There is no difference of opinion among the learned as to the value and significance of these writings. They form the triple program of the Lutheran Reformation. They unfold those great religious, moral and theological principles that for years had been maturing in Luther's soul. They speak the language of conviction at a time when Luther clearly apprehended that reconciliation between him and Rome was impossible.

Of these three Treatises Professor Henry Wace, of London, has written as follows: "In the Treatise on Christian Liberty we have the most vivid embodiment of that life of faith to which the Reformer recalled the Church, and which was the mainspring of the Reformation. In the Appeal to the German Nobility he first asserted those rights of the laity, and of the temporal power, without the admission of which no reformation would have been practicable, and he then denounced with burn-

ing moral indignation the numerous and intolerable abuses which were upheld by Roman authority. In the third Treatise, on the Babylonish captivity of the Church, he applied the same cardinal principles to the elaborate Sacramental system of the Church of Rome, sweeping away by means of them the superstitions with which the original institutions of Christ had been overlaid, and thus releasing men's consciences from a vast network of ceremonial bondage. The rest of the Reformation, it is not too much to say, was but the application of the principles vindicated in these three works. They were applied in different countries with varying wisdom and moderation; but nothing essential was added to them. Luther's genius—if a higher word be not justifiable—brought forth at one birth, 'with hands and feet,' to use his own image, and in full energy, the vital ideas by which Europe was to be regenerated."*

In the *Address to the German Nobility*, and in *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church*, we have the application of the two fundamental principles, that in matters of doctrine, the Word of God must decide; that in matters of Salvation, faith must decide. Of the Treatise on *Christian Liberty* Luther himself says: "It is a small matter, if you look to its exterior, but, unless I mistake, it is a summary of the Christian life put together in small compass, if you apprehend its meaning." To give any adequate description of this Treatise would be to quote it *ab ovo ad malum*.

Of this tractate Dorner has written: "The sermon *On the Freedom of a Christian Man* is pleasant, without polemics, full of the inwardness and of the overflowing power of love to God and man. The Reformation principle is here displayed in its depth, its rich inwardness and religious originality. There is contained in this Treatise, which is animated by the spirit of lofty peace, the noble wine of purest mysticism. It shows how in this genuine mysticism the synthesis of the dogmatical and ethical factors with the religious is found, and how the fulness and inwardness of the original religious perception of Luther

* *Luther's Primary Work*, p. X.

contains also a wealth of new impulses for the intellectual, and indeed the speculative life of the Christian soul. The evangelical principle in relationship to faith, and love, has probably never been developed with such clearness, fulness and depth."*

Thomasius says of it: "In the little book *On the Freedom of a Christian Man* the consciousness of justification pours forth as the jubilation of a soul that has been delivered from the old bondage, and brought into the blessed liberty of the sons of God."† This is literally true. Paeon after paeon does this tractate send forth in praise of justification by faith alone, and of the glorious experiences that it brings to the Christian; but not once does it sound a note to the praise of Predestination.

We add two brief quotations: "And that we may reject everything, neither speculations nor meditations, nor anything else that the soul can do by its own powers, can avail anything. One thing, and one thing alone is necessary for life, righteousness and Christian liberty; and that is the Holy Word of God, the Gospel of Christ, as John says: I am the resurrection and the life. He that believeth on me shall never die. And again: If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed. And Matthew: Ye shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds out of the mouth of God. Therefore let us hold it as certain and as unalterably determined, that the soul can do without everything except the Word of God. Without this it is utterly destitute of everything. But having this, it is rich, and wants nothing, since it is the Word of life, truth, light, peace, salvation, joy, liberty, wisdom, strength, grace, glory, and of every inestimable blessing. It is for this reason that the prophet in an entire Psalm (119) longs for and invokes the Word of God with so many groanings and words."

This is not the language of Predestination. With Luther "the Gospel of Christ" was preëminently the Word of God, so that he even determined the Canonicity of a Biblical book by its relation to Christ. In the Gospels and in the chief Epistles he saw only Christ and the promises about Christ. In the

* *History of Protestant Theology*, I., 106.

† Thomasius-Seeberg, *Dogmengesch.*, II., p. 335.

preached Word and in the administered Sacrament he received Christ, and Christ was to him salvation.

And again: "When by the commandments a man has learned his own impotence, and has become anxious about satisfying the law—since the law must be satisfied so that not one jot or tittle of it perish, otherwise he shall be damned without hope—then he is truly humbled and is reduced to nothing in his own eyes, and does not find anything in himself by which he can be justified and saved. Here comes in that other part of the Scripture, viz., the Promises of God, which declare the glory of God, and say, If thou wouldst keep the law of God and not covet, as the law requires, lo! Believe in Christ in whom is promised you grace, righteousness, peace, liberty, and all things. If thou believest, thou shalt have these things. If thou believest not, thou shalt not have them. For what is impossible to you by all the works of the law, and they are many, and yet unavailing, this you shall fulfill in a summary way by faith. Because God the Father has placed all things in faith, so that if anyone has this he has everything. If he do not have this, he has nothing. For he hath concluded all in unbelief that he might have mercy on all (Rom. 11). Thus the promises of God give that which the commandments require, and they fulfill what the law commands, so that all is of God, both the commandments and the fulfilling of them. He alone commands; he alone also fulfills. Therefore the promises of God pertain to the New Testament, yea, are the New Testament."*

Dr. Karl Müller, Reformed Professor of Theology at Erlangen, writing under the chief heading: *Der lutherische Protestantismus*, and under the specific heading: *Rechtfertigung*, after quoting Article IV. of the *Augustana*, and referring "to the evangelical fundamental experience which was first grasped by Luther," quotes the second of our extracts given above, and then says: "Such is the keynote (*Grundton*), which resounds incessantly in the first Reformation writings, and which was loyally taken up and prolonged by Melancthon."†

* Weimar Ed., VII., 50-51, 52-53.

† *Symbolik*, p. 279.

This is confirmation from an unexpected source, and needs no comment.

SUMMA SUMMARUM.

We may now summarize the results of our investigations. It is, we think, the unanimous conclusion of competent scholars that all the principles of the Lutheran Reformation are seminally involved (though not always adequately expressed) in Luther's writings of the years 1512-1520, and that these principles find fundamental expression in *The Three Great Reformation Treatises* of the year 1520. In the writings of these eight or nine years Luther sometimes expresses himself in a strongly predestinarian way; but so only incidentally, and never, so far as we have been able to discover, in such a way as to hang salvation *absolutely* and *unconditionally* on Predestination, or in such a way as to indicate that Predestination is his "central doctrine," or that it is "the formative principle" in his theological thinking, or in his religious experience, or in his conception of the way of salvation. His God is not *primarily* the God of sovereignty, the God of might, "the concealed God," but pre-eminently the God of compassion, the God of love, who has revealed himself in Christ, and who is to be seen in Christ. The sinner is not encouraged to comfort himself with thoughts about the hidden will and Predestination of God, but with the promises of God in the Gospel, and with the vicarious sufferings of Christ. Reading Luther's works of this period by the hundreds and thousands of pages one receives this *total-impression*, notwithstanding many verbal inconsistencies and apparent, if not real, contradictions.

Now it is true that Luther never gave this "central doctrine" of justification by faith alone, as the subjective fundamental principle of salvation, a dialectical setting in an *order of salvation*. He was a reformer, and not a systematizer. He had no interest in a system of dogmatics. His soul yearned for the salvation of the individual. An article of faith had interest for him only in so far as it brought a sense of the pardon of sin and peace to the troubled conscience. He found all in all in

this article. Hence around this article as a sacred center he gathered all his thinking, out of a purely practical interest in the salvation of individual souls, because in this article he saw the grace of the Father, the righteousness of Christ, and the energy of the Holy Ghost. As compared with this article, namely, *faith in his dear Lord Jesus Christ*, anything else could have only subsidiary value. The "Word of preaching" is indispensable as a *means*, because it shows the *merciful* God, the God *revealed in Christ*, the *promises* of God. The sacraments are useful as signs and testimonies of the *gracious* and revealed will of God, and of the promises contained in the Gospel, but they are not indispensable, because a man can be saved by faith alone in Christ without the sacraments. A doctrine of Predestination might be held as a fit *preparation* for grace, but it is not represented by Luther as having power to quiet the conscience, or as capable of assuring the sinner of his salvation. Hence if one takes a view of the entire field, or even carefully examines large characteristic portions of Luther's writings of this formative period, he will greatly hesitate to say, in the sense manifestly intended by Dr. Warfield, that Predestination was Luther's "central doctrine," and that it "really constituted the formative principle" of the *Lutheran* Protestantism. That Predestination was often present in Luther's mind as a *Theologoumenon* is here freely conceded; but we are confident that it cannot be shown to have dwelt in his mind as the central and determinative content of his thinking; and that it did not have for him a hundredth part of that *practical* interest which he always felt for *justification by faith alone* is demonstrable. He never said that Predestination is the article of a standing or falling Church. But *faith* is his ever-recurring theme. We are warranted, therefore, in assuming that that which absorbs nearly all of a man's thinking, and which alone reigns in a man's heart, is his "central doctrine," his "formative principle." He may not systematize the results of his thinking; he may not speak of a "doctrine;" he may not conceive that he is guided by a principle; but others, who view the facts in the light of cause and effect, and apply the induc-

tive method, will not be long in reaching a correct generalization, that is, in discovering the underlying principle that guided the thinker. It is exactly in this way that we discover the principle, that is, the fundamental thought, the comprehensive law, that lies at the base of the Socrotic, the Kantian, the Hegelian, philosophy.

Besides, if Predestination was Luther's central doctrine, how, when, where did it happen that it was supplanted by Justification, for it is universally conceded that Justification is now the "central doctrine," "the formative principle" of Lutheranism, both as a system of doctrines, and as an ecclesiastical organization? Until this question is demonstratively answered, it must be held that the principle that for nearly four hundred years has informed and animated Lutheranism, informed and animated it from the beginning. If Lutheranism, or the Lutheran Reformation, since the days of Augsburg, be not, in its "central doctrine," in its "formative principle," what it was in the minds and hearts of the Lutheran Reformers prior to that time, then Lutheranism has lost its identity, for that which is *formative* in a movement is essentially the movement itself. But until the proof shall have been made clear and distinct that Lutheranism has changed its formative principle and has therefore lost its identity, we must be allowed to remain in the traditional view—a view incidentally, but nevertheless distinctly, exhibited in the *Form of Concord*—that there has been no change in the "central doctrine," nor in the "formative principle," of Lutheranism from the beginning up to the present hour.

THE DE SERVO ARBITRIO.

Luther's strong emphasis of the bondage of the Will called forth from Erasmus in 1524 a learned defense of Free-will. To this Luther made reply the next year in his *De Servo Arbitrio*. This book (Erlangen Edition, Vol. VII., *Var. Arg.*, pp. 116-372) has always been regarded as one of Luther's most powerful and most useful writings. Any person who wishes to get a comprehensive view of the Lutheran doctrine of the

moral impotence of the human Will, and of the absolute need of divine grace in order to attain to salvation, ought to read this book. But in reading-it, its central thought, foreshadowed already by its title, should be kept clearly before the mind, viz.: *That Free-will is a lie, a word without reality, a name without actuality.* To defend this proposition Luther employed all the resources at his command—Philosophy, the Classics, the Scriptures, sarcasm and ridicule. He tells us in the closing words of the book that he has not reasoned, but has asserted, and does assert, and he advises all men to receive his decree.

A book that is written in this way is not likely to be consistent with itself, nor even with its main purpose, in all of its parts. Indeed logical consistency was not one of Luther's strong mental qualities. In controversy he saw only the present antagonist, and rained titanic blows upon him by the use of the most effective weapons at hand. This was one source of his mighty power for his own times, but a source of weakness, often, for our times, since we must reckon with his manifold inconsistencies and contradictions. But when we take a comprehensive view of his treatment of a subject, and follow it through successive phases of development, we cannot fail to perceive the splendid harmony that rises high above the discord of clashing sentences and bold paradoxes. This is preëminently true of the book now under consideration. Its main purpose is to *annihilate* the doctrine of Free-will, that is, to refute utterly Erasmus's central proposition, viz.: *That the human will has a power by which a man is able to apply himself to those things which lead to eternal salvation, or to turn himself away from them* (185). It is not Luther's purpose, either expressed or implied, to expound and establish a doctrine of Predestination, though he avails himself of numerous Scotistic and Nominalistic conceptions of the power, omniscience and absoluteness of God, for the purpose of establishing his fundamental contention; but it requires only a survey of the entire field of discussion to discover that the Predestination which results from the metaphysical postulates, is the necessary correlate of the *Servum Arbitrium*, rather than the

positive support of saving faith; hence not a real coördinate subject of discussion, and that for the reason that Predestination did not stand, as faith did, in the depths of the Author's experience of salvation. Rather might we say that it is a foreign element, or if not entirely a foreign element, at least a subordinate element introduced temporarily, and unduly exalted, so as to be the more effective foil to the Semi-Pelagianism of Erasmus, and to the Roman Catholic repudiation of the doctrine of divine grace.

We believe that the following passages, the strongest of their kind in the book, will fully sustain this view: "It is most necessary and most salutary then, for a Christian to know this also, that God foreknows nothing contingently, but foresees, purposes and accomplishes everything by an eternal, unchangeable and infallible will. But by this thunderbolt Free-will is struck to the earth and utterly annihilated. Those who would assert Free-will must therefore either deny, or disguise, or by some other means repel this thunderbolt from them" (p. 133). It is easy to see why this thunderbolt was introduced.

Again: "Hence it follows irresistibly that all that we do, and all that happens, although it seems to happen mutably and contingently, does in reality happen necessarily and unalterably insofar as it respects the will of God, for the will of God is efficacious, so that it cannot be thwarted, since it is the natural potency of God" (p. 134). "We have need to know that the foreknowledge of God is absolute, and that all events are necessary" (p. 138). "When I say necessarily, I do not mean by compulsion, but, as it is said, by a necessity of immutability; not by compulsion; that is, when a man is destitute of the Spirit of God, he does not work evil against his will through a violence put upon him, as if some one should seize him by the throat, and twist him round, just as a thief or highwayman is carried, against his will, to the gallows; but he works it of his own accord, and with a willing will" (p. 156). "Free-will is a title that belongs altogether to God, and cannot join with any other being, save the Divine Majesty only. For that Divine Majesty, as the Psalmist sings, can and does effect

all that he wills in heaven and on earth. But if this title be ascribed to men, you might as well ascribe divinity itself to them, a sacrilege that can not be exceeded" (p. 158).

These and other assertions of identical import are used at the beginning of the essay in overthrowing Erasmus's Preface. They are derived almost entirely from the speculative philosophy of Scholasticism, remnants of which still clung to Luther's mind. To establish these assertions by clear ratiocination, or by the Scriptures, as he goes on, he makes very little effort. His object here is to overthrow what he conceives to be a false philosophy, by what he conceives to be a true philosophy. And on the supposition that Luther's philosophy is the true philosophy, he does his work in masterly style. For these assertions of his, considered in and by themselves, are *metaphysically deterministic*. They leave absolutely no place for creatural freedom.

In some of his assertions of the omnipotence and alone-activity of God Luther even surpasses Augustine. But it is easy to perceive, as we read *in extensio*, and survey the entire field before us, that it is not his purpose to build up an argument in support of Predestination as a *theological principle*, but to prove Free-will *a lie* in fact, that is: *Liberum arbitrium nihil est*. His aim and end are purely practical. He has no ultimate interest in Metaphysics. And yet he here seizes on certain borrowed metaphysical conceptions about God, including Predestination as a corollary, and wields them with terrific energy as implements of defence and attack, without pausing to consider whether they can be reconciled with his primary principle of faith, and with the significance, the verity, and the power, which he evermore assigns to the means of grace. In this way it occurs that Predestination becomes a *Lemma*, demonstrated and used temporarily as a *gradus* in advancing to the ultimate demonstration. But for the Divine Predestination, in itself considered, the author manifests only a relatively small interest. The omniscience, the omnipotence, and the freedom of God, which are here lifted into prominence, are made to stand over against the ignorance, the weakness, and the moral bondage of man,

who, unless God interpose with his grace in Christ, can in no way please God, and can do nothing that will promote his salvation. Or as Luther himself outlines the discussion: "I will first confute the arguments adduced in behalf of Free-will; secondly, defend our own confuted ones; and at last make my stand for the grace of God, in direct conflict with Free-will" (p. 188).

On the vantage ground gained by bold and daring assertions Luther advances to the overthrow of his antagonist. The chief weapon used now is the Scripture, which is made to defend the main proposition with great vigor. "Free-will is an empty name, and all things that occur, are of pure necessity. * * * When it has been conceded and settled that Free-will, having lost her liberty, is forced in the service of sin, and cannot will anything good, I can not conceive anything else from such expressions, except that Free-will is an empty sound, that has lost its meaning. Lost liberty my grammar calls no liberty at all; and to attribute the name of liberty to that which has no liberty at all, is to attribute to it a bare name" (p. 200). "Since then God moves and executes all things in all, he necessarily acts in Satan and in the impious. But he acts in them according to what they are, and as he finds them; that is, when they are perverse and wicked they are carried along by this impulse of the divine omnipotence, so that they do perverse and wicked things, just as a horseman who drives a horse that is lame in one or two feet, drives him just as he is; that is, the horse goes badly. He drives him just as he is along with the sound horses. He goes badly, and they go well, and he cannot go differently until he be healed. Thus you see that when God works in the bad and through the bad, the bad is done. Though God cannot do the bad, nevertheless he works the bad through the bad. Because he himself is good he cannot do evil, yet he uses the wicked as instruments" (p. 255).

He goes on to say that the fault is in the instrument, just as when the carpenter does bad work with a dull hatchet. Also, that the will of God is absolute, and is without cause and reason for its operations.

Many similar assertions might be quoted. But they all appear as the speculative background to the author's doctrine of the Will. They do not by any means form the very substance of the treatment, and they are more than overcome by the emphasis that the author lays on "the proclaimed God" in distinction from "the hidden God." It is to the former, and not to the latter, that we must look for salvation. This is a distinction of fundamental significance; and Luther blames Erasmus for "making no distinction between the proclaimed God and the hidden God; that is, between the Word of God and God himself. God does many things which he has not shown us in his Word. He also wills many things which he has not shown us in his Word that he wills. For instance, he wills not the death of a sinner—according to his Word, forsooth—but he wills it according to that inscrutable will of his. Now our business is to look at his Word, and to leave that inscrutable will of his to himself; for we must be directed in our path by that Word, and not by that inscrutable will. Nay, who could direct himself by that inscrutable and inaccessible will? It is enough for us to know that there is a certain inscrutable will in God. What that will is, why it so wills, and how far it so wills, are matters which it is altogether unlawful for us to inquire into, to wish for information about, to trouble ourselves with, or to approach even with our touch. In these matters we have only to adore and to fear.

"So then, it is rightly said: 'If God wills not death, we must impute it to our own will that we perish.' Rightly, I say, if you speak of the proclaimed God. For he would have all men to be saved, coming as he does with his Word of salvation to all men; and the fault is in our own will, which does not admit him as he says, Matt. 23, 'How would I have gathered thy children, but ye would not'" (p. 222-3).

This passage shows to a demonstration that Luther had little or no *practical* interest in his own speculations about the sovereignty of God, and about a doctrine of Predestination. It is enough to know simply that there is an absolutely sovereign will in God, and that there is such a thing as the Divine Pre-

destination. But we are not to trouble ourselves about these things; we are to look to the Divine Word. That is, Predestination is not the central thought, the formative principle, even in this most speculative and most theological of all of Luther's writings. It is the Gospel, the God of promises, the revelation of grace, that have deepest hold on Luther's heart. In harmony with the prevailing habit of his life, we hear him say: "It is a gospel word, and a word of sweetest consolation to poor, miserable sinners, when Ezekiel says: 'I would not the death of a sinner, but rather that he should be converted and live, by all means.' As is that of the thirtieth Psalm also: 'For his wrath is but for a moment, and his will towards us life rather than death.' And that of the thirty-sixth Psalm, 'How Sweet is thy mercy, Lord.' Also: 'Because I am merciful.' And that saying of Christ in Matt. 11: 'Come unto me all ye that labor, and I will refresh you.' Also that of Exodus: 'I do mercy unto them that love me, unto many thousands.' Nay, what is almost more than half of the Scripture, but mere promises of grace, by which mercy, life, peace, and salvation are offered to men. And what other import have words of promise than this: 'I will not the death of the sinner?' Is it not the same as to say: 'I am merciful,' 'I am not angry,' 'I do not wish to punish,' 'I do not wish you to die,' 'I wish to pardon you,' 'I wish to spare you'? Now, if these divine promises did not stand in the Word, to raise up those whose consciences have been wounded with the sense of sin, and terrified with the fear of death and judgment, what place would there be for pardon or for hope? What sinner would not despair?" (pp. 218, 219).

Many other quotations of similar import might be made; but the question at issue cannot be settled by isolated quotations. Rather must we keep before us the real subject of discussion, the use that is made of the speculative affirmations, the whole conduct of the discussion, and especially the place of the accent. To this must be added the fact that, while Luther never abandoned his doctrine of Predestination, he did let it drop more and more into the background through his ever-growing recognition of God's revealed will of love and salva-

tion, and through the emphasis that he placed on the significance and effective power of the means of grace. And it is exactly at this point that we find the key to the solution of the antithesis of Luther's "proclaimed God" and his "hidden God." To Luther the Divine Word was real, living, objective Truth. It meant just what it said. In that Word he had found the *merciful* God, Christ, the God-man, the will of love to save sinners. By faith in that Word he had found peace of soul. That was enough, for that was salvation, and salvation is offered by the Word to all men. Reason speaks of the secret counsels of God. But "Reason is Frau Hulda, the devil's harlot, and can only defame what God says and does;" "a vain, quarrelsome termagant;" "in things pertaining to salvation is stone-blind."* Consequently, Reason must be banished from the sphere of religious knowledge.

From such principles, fixed firmly in Luther's mind, it followed by the law of natural sequence that Predestination, for the threefold reason that it had never been central in his own experience, that it did not represent "the proclaimed God," that it could not be used for the comfort of distressed souls, came to have less and less practical significance for Luther. He had not found, and could not find, in it the *essence of the Gospel*. He did not, and could not, employ it pastorally. On the contrary he declares: "I always follow this rule, namely, that as far as in me lies, I avoid those questions which lead us to the throne of the Supreme Majesty. Better and safer is it to sit at the crib of Christ the Man. There is the greatest peril in involving yourself in those labyrinths of Deity."†

In his *Trostschrift*, of the year 1528, while affirming the omniscience and the active agency of God in all things, he declares that it is "his (God's) earnest will, purpose, command and eternal resolve, to save all men, and to make them partakers of eternal joy, as it is distinctly proclaimed in Ezekiel 18 : 23 : God wills not the death of the sinner, but that he should return and live;" and in quoting Rom. 3 : 22, he lays special stress

* See Erl. Ed., 67, p. 284.

† *Opera Latina*, Vol. 2, p. 470.

on "unto all and upon all."* And in his *Confession of Faith* of the year 1528, written when he was "neither drunk nor inconsiderate," he says not one word about Predestination and Election, but has much to say about Christ, and about the means of grace. This *Confession* is proof positive that Luther did not wish to go on record as holding Predestination to be a necessary article of faith."

And while it is true that in the year 1537 he expressed to Capito a desire to destroy all his books, except perchance the *De Servo Arbitrio* and the Catechism,† it is also true, and true with a significance that is overwhelming and decisive, that in 1536 he wrote: "The article of Justification, and it alone, makes real theologians. Therefore it is necessary in the Church, and is often to be repeated and frequently discussed."‡ And again, two years later: "Beyond all controversy the Article of Justification is the head and sum of Christian doctrine. When this is properly comprehended there is no danger either upon the right hand or upon the left. For this it is that bruises the serpent's head and overthrows whatever is opposed to Christ. Therefore this article, most of all, is exposed to the bite of the serpent, and to every kind of attack, in order that it may be overthrown and perverted. Satan perceives that so long as this article remains intact, he labors in vain."§

If perchance in the heat of controversy, and in his gigantic effort to repel Semi-Pelagianism, the common foe of the Reformers, he lifted the pendulum abnormally high, this he did only theoretically, temporarily, phenomenally. When the impetus was removed, the pendulum resumed its normal relations, and Justification by Faith alone took undisputed place at the

* Erl. Ed., 54, 22.

† DeWette, V. 70.

‡ *Dissertationen Dr. Martin Luther's*. Von Paul Drews, 1895, p. 39.

§ *Ibid*, p. 436. This octavo volume of 999 pages contains a large amount of Luther matter never before published. It is invaluable for obtaining in brief compass Luther's views on many points of doctrine. It contains matter that belongs to the years 1535-1545. If any one wishes to observe the prominence given by Luther to *Justification* as compared with *Predestination*, let him consult the index of this volume under the respective words.

center. Hence we must read the *De Servo Arbitrio*, not only in its own light, but also in the light that went before, and in the light that followed after. Doing this we will find Luther consistent by the way of that higher consistency which results from the larger survey. And in this judgment we find ourself fully sustained by Köstlin, whose summing-up in the premises we read only after we had reached our own conclusions. This master in the interpretation of Luther's theology says:*

"Finally, in all his utterances concerning the entrance of the first sin through Adam, Luther carefully refrains from the suggestion of any question which might lead to the tracing of this sin to the divine will. In view of all the above, we must regard the opinion of his *De servo arbitrio*, expressed by Luther in his letter to Capito, as referring only to the vigorous denunciation of human power and human merit which it contains, and not to its further and positive declarations concerning the hidden will of God.

We detect thus a difference between the earlier and the later doctrinal utterances of Luther, only relative, it is true, and somewhat wavering, yet deeply rooted in the peculiar course through which his doctrinal views in general attained their maturity, and in their inmost character. Luther had previously, controlled entirely by his thoroughgoing antagonism to the Pelagianism of the Romish Church, without any hesitancy adopted, as the basis of such antagonism, metaphysical statements concerning God and the divine agency, which were manifestly derived, not from the revealed Word, but from the fundamental conceptions of omnipotence and absolute will as inherent in the nature of the absolute God. Now, the same conception of the reality of the proffer of salvation in the *means of grace* which he exalted in his controversy with the Fanatics made itself felt in connection with his own doctrine of the divine being and attributes to such an extent that he no longer, as formerly, looked beyond it to scrutinize the inscrutable will of God and its relation to the plan of salvation. Now the distinguishing central point of his Christian faith, namely, *Christ and the sincere love of God manifested in Him*, so completely dominated his entire personal apprehension and presentation of doctrine that the inferences formerly deduced from the divine power, lying as they do beyond the sphere of the general religious consciousness and the natural reason, were driven into the background—not, indeed, reconciled to the satisfaction of our weak powers of apprehension, but at least put to silence—and the eyes were turned, with a determined persistence not before manifested, away from the dark abyss of mystery to the blessed light emanating from the great central truth. He now, whenever our own speculations show a tendency to dwell upon the questions beyond our grasp, applies with greater logical consistency than heretofore

* *Theology of Luther*, II., 308-10.

the principle, that we must abide simply by the *Word of Scripture*. And although he yet speaks most decidedly of the pure and free exercise of the divine power in the imparting of salvation, and that in such a way that the earlier positions now no longer avowed may to us appear to be necessary inferences or premises, although no longer so deduced by him; yet it must now be evident to all that the controlling thought here is not the metaphysical idea of absolute power or divine foreknowledge, but an antagonism to all human merit which is based upon practical religious interest, and a longing desire for a deliverance proceeding entirely from God and thus bearing with it a positive assurance for our faith."

(*To be continued.*)

ARTICLE II.

THE MOELLER-KAWERAU CHURCH HISTORY.

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There is nothing more obvious to the student of Church History than the revolution which has taken place in the conception of its purpose and in the method of its development. Time was when it was considered the work of the historian to act as special pleader for the cause with which he was identified. The result was the industrious collection of facts, it is true, and for this we acknowledge our obligation; but the facts were rarely allowed to speak for themselves. They were too often metamorphosed by the dominating thought of a school, or of a sect, or of an individual. They rivalled the ancient oracles by the variety of constructions they would bear. Church History was, in fact, a species of dogmatic theology, an apology for various phases of thought. By the very multitude of its details it afforded a facile medium of expression for every vagary of doctrine.

But times have changed since Leopold von Ranke and Gieseler, in their separate fields, began to develop independently what has been called the "critical method" of writing history. This method consists in the careful examination and criticism of all the known material of the period under review.

The spirit of Ranke's motto, "I will not write what everybody knows," animated them both; and their method of writ-

ing history approved itself so thoroughly to scholars that there arose what has been called "the School of Ranke."

The object of both these writers was to present the documents themselves, and thus express the truth in the completest manner possible—an object so manifestly just and fair as to have won universal approbation. No one but the rankest partisan would now think of writing history without the fullest possible use of original sources and authoritative monographs. To do otherwise, in the interest of a party or for the establishment of a theory, is to degrade oneself mentally and morally.

The application of such a method has modified or reversed many of the former conceptions of past events, and hence changed the conclusions drawn from them; but it has brought us nearer the truth, and commended to our confidence the histories governed by it.

The influence of this method has been increasingly manifest in the later historians of the Church. A comparison of the first and last editions of Schaff's *History of the Christian Church*, or the earlier and later editions of Kurtz's *Church History*, will afford ample proof of this. Even Roman Catholic historians have felt the influence of this method, *e. g.*, Möhler, Döllinger, Hefele, and lately Pastor, whose *History of the Popes* has called forth high praise from Protestant and Catholic scholars alike.

Among the latest and best results of this critical method is the Moeller-Kawerau HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. It is the joint work of two eminent German scholars, though Professor Kawerau cannot be said to have any part in the first two volumes.

Dr. Wilhelm Moeller became professor of Church History in the Lutheran University of Kiel in 1873, having previously served as *Privat-Docent* in the University of Halle. In 1891 he published Vol. I. of the work under review, and in 1892 Vol. II. was issued. These were quickly translated into English, and published by the Macmillan Company. The author had prepared numerous sketches for the third volume, which was to begin with the Reformation and end with the Peace of Westphalia, when his work was interrupted by death.

The purpose of the author in the first two volumes is best described in his own words: "It was my wish so far as possible to exhibit the course of the historical movement as a whole in a continuous representation. * * * In the second place it was my desire to facilitate, to some extent, access to the sources. * * * Finally, questions which at the present time are still unsettled, and which occupy research, required to be stated; but it appeared to me to be the duty of a text book to exercise reserve in relation to hypotheses which are as yet uncertain, and to adhere strictly to the already assured ground of what is generally recognized."

It is sufficient to add that Prof. Moeller succeeded completely in his purpose.

VOLUME I.—A. D. 1-600.

It would be impossible to set forth in detail the excellent treatment of this difficult period. In every division there is much to challenge admiration. The extended array of sources and literature at the head of each division, and even of each section, is a powerful stimulus to further study of the subjects presented. The "prefatory remarks" and the discussion of the "sources" at the beginning of Vol. I. are likewise luminous to the reader in the subsequent pages of the volume.

The first subject that is likely to attract the student by the thoroughness and lucidity of its treatment is the exceedingly difficult subject of Gnosticism. The strange and fantastic views presented; the exuberance of variation in this once menacing heresy; the confusing mixture of deep and subtle speculations in philosophic dress with Eastern mysticism and superstition, make it one of the most perplexing and unsatisfactory topics of Church History to the student.

But Dr. Moeller has wrought a brilliant and pleasing discussion out of the stubborn material; and, what is more, he has obviated some of the difficulties of the ordinary reader by his simple, rational treatment of the facts. It is not pretended that he has made all the phenomena of Gnosticism explicable

to us. The modern mind cannot enter into the vagaries of that time and condition. But the thorough presentation of the facts, together with their historic cause and effect, gives Gnosticism a living interest for us, and commends the problem it sought to solve to our earnest attention.

The transition period, when Christianity, grown formidable in organization and numbers, came gradually into favor in the Empire, is admirably depicted. The variations in the treatment of the Church, the reasons for it in the changing conditions of the empire, and the individual attitude of the rulers, are presented in helpful detail.

The dispassionate exposition of this period will be found to modify in many minor points the general conception of the relations within the Church, as well as toward paganism. The growing unity of the organization is perceived to have disadvantages, and to contain trouble for the future. The schisms and heresies of the time were not always treated wisely, and in their forced retirement developed into modified and more formidable antagonism that is to tax the strength and ability of subsequent times. The evil as well as the good of the apologists is presented; their mistakes and limitations are made manifest. The good as well as the evil of their scholarly opponents is recognized.*

The presentation of the Councils of this period is not particularly new, but it is sane. Like other modern historians, Dr. Moeller has learned to consider the Councils at their true value. The old conception of the decrees of the Councils as unvarying in their dogmatic meaning is quietly recognized to be worthless. The orthodoxy that was read into them in later times is seen to have been frequently absent from the Councils during their sessions, and from the decrees set forth by them. The inspiration and infallibility that were supposed to be the *res* too often emanated from the palaces of kings and bishops—the

* In Sec. 4, p. 311, the representation of Themistius, Libanius and others is surprising, and contrasts them favorably with some of the Christian leaders and writers, who, formerly in the heat of conflict and now in the glow of victory, were not as fair as the principles they professed.

product of the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye and the pride of life.

Likewise the Church Fathers do not all appear as heroic as once they did to a worshipful Church. The halo of orthodoxy that once encircled some is seen to have been more truly the right of others who have been for centuries classed among the heretics. The orthodoxy of others is discovered to be largely an accident of circumstance and good fortune. Moreover, the lives of many of these honored rulers of the Church are distressingly contradictory to the spirit of the One they profess to serve; and we are perplexed when we realize that they have advanced their so-called orthodoxy by means of intrigue, tumult, violence and murder.

On the other hand, the truly heroic figures of that early age of the Church stand forth in grander proportions. It must not be supposed that our author has dealt with apologists, councils, decrees, creeds and bishops in the spirit of iconoclasm. The revolution that has taken place in our conception of them has come through the plain realization of incontrovertible facts, presented for their own sake and for their own purpose. The lasting value of the creeds is recognized; the significance of the Councils is appreciated; the grand labors of earnest, honest men are commended; but the factitious accretions of time and unreasoning ecclesiasticism are eliminated.

VOL. II.—THE MIDDLE AGES.

Dr. Moeller places the history of Pope Gregory the Great at the head of the period with which this volume begins. The choice is significant and apt, because the period to which the entire volume is devoted is filled from beginning to end with the growth, power, glory, degradation and final humiliation of the Papacy.

It is manifest in the aggressive claims made during the endless heresies and controversies. It is put forward in the fictions of concessions and donations. It is prominent in the difficulties and conflicts which arise between East and West. It plays the dictator where it can in the Councils, and the diplomat in

others. It concentrates its power by the development of a hierarchical system which is gradually perfected in the progress of time. It extends this organization by means of devoted servants in every direction, and gains the ascendancy everywhere because of its superior system. It holds the spiritual sword over the heads of ignorant men who dread the unknown powers of a ghostly world. It becomes at length a tyrant and a monster.

But it is not always such a picture that our author paints for us. The position of the Papacy in its relations with heresies and Councils is, in the main, a sensible and practical one, which generally commends itself to us. Its attitude toward the East is frequently dictated by political considerations which make the course pursued inevitable. There is much to deplore, but our sympathies must in the end remain with the Papacy.

There are more positive elements of good, however. Take as an instance the missionary labors of the Church. In spite of any faults and limitations that may be pointed out, these achievements are worthy of the highest praise. Dr. Moeller by his appreciative treatment makes us realize the high order of courage and devotion displayed in this gigantic task. Much is accomplished by individuals impelled by consuming zeal. But far more is due to the unflinching purpose, intelligent foresight and admirable plans of the popes. There are intermissions of conflicting counsels and of inertia; but in the end the plans are carried through, and the Papacy must have the honor.

The preservative value of the monastic system is also presented to us. It is enough to make us ponder, to have set before us the wealth of proof concerning the salvation and continuance of many of the elements of civilization and culture. To realize that agriculture, trades, professions, arts and science found their ark of refuge in the monastery through the Dark Ages, is enough to modify very materially our former conceptions. And yet we must recognize all these to have been preserved and advanced by monastic foundations and by their travelling brethren, encouraged and supported by the authority of the Church.

The power of the hierarchy is felt likewise in the development of theology and philosophy. This cannot be called an unmixed good, though it was inevitable. The superintendence of the Church over all doctrines would naturally lead to the development of the same according to party lines. Nevertheless there was freedom enough in the West—far more than in the East—to encourage a high order of dogmatic and philosophic thought. And though it was wielded almost entirely in the interests of the hierarchy to support its claims, dogmatic and ecclesiastical, it armed critics not a few, and was gradually perfected into a weapon of amazing power and flexibility. There is much among its results that is ridiculous, but there is more that is fundamental to our thought to-day.

Finally, the Church did much for the establishment of government. Though the tribes that developed into the nations of Europe did so along lines of racial genius, yet the influence of the Church is everywhere manifest in the direction, acceleration and codification of the native principles of law and government. Priests were prime ministers, chancellors, judges. Bishops were often enough regents and princes. Besides, the Church by its preservation and development of Roman law modified the practice of even the most advanced national codes.

If the Church had been more spiritual in the use of its power, it might, through all these forms of activity so successfully carried on, have advanced both itself and the nations far beyond the condition in which the Reformation found them. But arrogance and the love of power come to be substituted for service and humility. Conflicts arise, the Church is victorious. Nations and their rulers are humbled by the terrors of a world to come. Men who dare to question are silenced; until, with the too frequent use of spiritual agents, glaringly at variance with the character of their wielders, increasing numbers brave the fulminations of the Church; nations defy it; common people criticize it, and doubt the power of its priests; culture despises it, and with the sharp steel of knowledge applies heroic surgery.

So the preparation is completed for the Reformation, and we

are led to see in all this turmoil and confusion the ploughing and the seedtime of the future harvest.

The presentation of this by Dr. Moeller, of which the foregoing is but the barest abstract, offers an introduction in many ways new, and in every way thorough, to the great modern period which begins with the Reformation.

VOL. III.—REFORMATION TO 1648.

When Dr. Moeller died, the task of completing the work was committed to his colleague, Prof. Gustav Kawerau, since 1893 transferred to the University of Breslau. The choice was admirable in every respect, since he possesses exceptional fitness for writing a history of the Reformation, having already distinguished himself by various contributions to this department of Church History.* He is described as *verdienter Lutherforscher*.

His ecclesiastical position, and his conception of his duty as historian, are best expressed in the following extract from the preface to Vol. III. of this history:

"A History of the Reformation is essentially influenced by its author's position. I gladly acknowledge myself a disciple of Luther. But for that very reason I have always kept before my eyes his exhortation to every historian, 'intrepidly to write what is true' and I have endeavored not to forget this duty. The cause of truth can be served only if we keep inviolate the *prima lex historiae, ne quid falsi dicere audeat, deinde NE QUID VERI NON AUDEAT, ne qua suspicis gratiae sit in scribendo, ne qua simultatis* (Cicero, *De Oratore*, II, 15)."

We learn also from this preface that the entire Div. I (p. 1 to p. 162), which covers the most interesting period of the Reformation for us—the Reformation in Germany up to 1555—is from the pen of Prof. Kawerau. Hence it is he who sets forth

* In 1881 he published *John Agricola of Eisleben*; in 1882 *Caspar Güttel*; in 1884-85 *The Correspondence of Justus Jonas*, 2 vols. 8vo; in 1889 *Liturgical Studies in Luther's Taufbüchlein of 1523*; and for years he has assisted in preparing the magnificent (Weimar) *Critical Edition of Luther's Works*. He is also the author of numerous articles, chiefly on Reformation subjects, in the *Real-encyclopedia* which is now being published under the editorial direction of Prof. A. Hauck.

that which will attract us most in this volume. And we can scarcely follow a safer guide.

He speaks as a Lutheran, and draws his facts from the original sources, as both the text and the notes show. No one can accuse him of *Tendenz*, or of writing the history of the Reformation in the spirit of antipathy, or with inadequate preparation. If some of the facts surprise us, and some of the characters stand out in a new light, we must remember that in the last few decades many new documents have been made accessible, and the older ones have been subjected to a more critical examination. Under the guidance of the principles adopted by the author, the results could not be different.

There is nothing particularly new about the discussion of Luther's early life, and the first years of the Reformation; but everywhere the thorough examination of all the evidence is plainly manifest. The characters are in general familiar, but there are numerous changes in detail that follow inevitably in the wake of impartial treatment. This is noticeable in the presentation of Tetzel and Eck; likewise, in the account of the Debate at Leipzig:

"Here Eck succeeded in exposing Luther as a heretic. In Constance, the view that subordination to the Pope was not necessary to salvation, had already been condemned as a heresy of Huss. Thereupon Luther replied: *Certum est, inter articulos J. Hus vel Bohemorum multos esse plane Christianissimos et evangelicos, quos non possit universalis ecclesia damnare* (W. A., II, 279). Terrified at the conclusions which Eck at once drew from this, Luther endeavored to move back a step, and suggested that perhaps those articles were only foisted in the acts of the Council; but that only the Word of God, not a council, was infallible; and then, in order partly to withdraw this proposition from Eck's attack, and to make a concession, that resolutions of the Council were certainly binding in matters of belief (W. A., II, 303). * * * Both parties claimed the victory; however, Luther himself looked back with uneasiness upon a struggle in which cleverness, not truth, had gained the day" (p. 19).

The first character that attracts attention especially, however, aside from the ubiquitous presences of Luther and Melancthon, is Zwingli. The peculiar genius of the man, and not less his limitations, are discriminately set forth. The beginnings of the Swiss Reformation, and the subsequent conflicts with the Lutheran reformers, are easily understood in the light of the knowledge Prof. Kawerau's description affords us. And yet, withal, our author proves that Zwingli was appreciably dependent on the previous work of Luther. The following quotation is significant in view of the frequent statements of Reformed theologians:

"In Switzerland, a combination of Zwingli's activity with the cause of Luther (whose works were much pirated and read) had already begun; he was already reckoned as the foremost amongst Luther's adherents in that country. Nevertheless he always vigorously denied that he had been influenced by Luther. 'Before any man in our land knew anything of Luther's name, I had already begun to preach the Gospel of Christ in the year 1516' (I, 253). This was undoubtedly in part self-deception; he even asserts that he scarcely knew anything of Luther's writings, whereas it can be proved against him, with how large a portion of them he was really acquainted before 1522, so that his reformatory ideas *in the matter of religion* were at least strongly influenced by Luther" (p. 52). There are some elements here that will account in part for the continued antagonism of Luther and Zwingli, and Luther's distrust of him.

The fundamental difference between the two men first displayed itself openly in the literary struggle over the Eucharist (1522-28). Begun by Cornelis Hoen of the Hague, and extended by the messenger between him and Luther, Hinne Rode, it gradually involved the chief men of both sides. It was at the end of this controversy that Luther developed the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ in a thoroughly Scholastic manner. "Luther had previously declined to listen to the idea how 'Christ was brought into the Sacrament,' and had made it a reproach against Scholasticism that, by means of speculations

and distinctions, it endeavored to render comprehensible the judgment of faith, that Christ is here present, and now he himself puts his hand upon the armoury of the 'Sophists' (E. A. 30, 207)."* Now "he combats the objection of the *absurditas* of the presence of the body and blood of Christ asserted by him by a doctrine of omnipresence. * * * Christ's body has a share in the properties of the Deity. Locally, certainly, he is only in *one* place, but repletively in *all places*, and definitively *where he pleases* (*Multivoli praesentia*). * * * Zwingli now again confronts the *communicatio idiomatum* with a doctrine of *ἀλλοίωσις*, according to which all the passages of Scripture, which Luther brought forward in defence of the former doctrine, are interpreted as figures of speech; the tendency is towards the separation of the two natures in Christ" (pp. 85-6).

The result, of course, was a split with attendant bad results in that critical time for Protestantism. Kawerau records as one good result that "it saved the Lutherans from giving their adherence to Zwingli's lofty political plans." But he also notes that the "controversy divided the evangelical ranks into two camps and thereby weakened their capacity for action." * * * "But the most serious result was, that the Eucharistic controversy obscured the evangelical idea of faith. Henceforth Luther speaks of 'points' of Christian belief, and makes the membership of the Christian Church dependent upon the acceptance of the same in a definite theological coinage; as the result of this view, he declared all his life long that Zwingli was a non-Christian, whose errors were accounted him a 'sin.' The latter, in his turn, regards Luther and his followers as hardened heretics: *stultitia Fabrum superat, impuritate Eccium, audacia Cocleum!*" (p. 87).

When they met later at the Marburg Colloquy, the spirit of distrust awakened in earlier days had much to do with the failure of the attempt made there.

"Luther, however, had acquired the belief in a reconciliation as a result of the personal meeting. His opinion was on the

* *Revocavit nos Lutherus ad Scotica et Thomistica*, writes Zwingli, August 30, 1528.

whole friendly, he only saw a *dissensus* still existing *de peccato originis* and in regard to the bodily presence of Christ. Nevertheless, 'the position of the matter is a hopeful one. I do not say that there exists a brotherly unity, but a kindly, friendly agreement,' yet he hoped that the prayer of Christians would also render it 'brotherly' (E. A., 36, 321 f). In Zwingli's repeated entreaties for recognition as a brother he saw the admission that he really felt himself overcome, and only declined to submit completely out of regard for his party; this was a grievous error, for Zwingli had rather left Marburg in the proud consciousness of having gained a manifest victory over Luther's 'shamelessness and conceit' " (pp. 100-101).

Luther's position at this Colloquy has often been censured as rude and arbitrary. Viewed alone, it might seem unnecessarily harsh, though "the Strasburgers took away the impression that their really irreconcilable opponent was Melanchthon." But understood in the light of the facts our author has given us, Luther's position is incomparably nobler than that of Zwingli. His distrust is explicable.

The next subject that appeals to us is one which has been much discussed lately. It is with respect to the Augsburg Confession and its authorship. It is noticeable that Prof. Kawerau does not regard it a matter of debate, but as assuredly proved that Melanchthon, not Luther, is the author of the Augsburg Confession. He does not consider the antiquated contentions of a second and third sending. A full and true reading of the sources renders that impossible. But the author shall speak for himself:

"As early as the 14th of March, the Elector had summoned Luther, Jonas, Bugenhagen and Melanchthon to Torgau; he declared that it would be necessary, before the diet commenced, to come to a decision upon all points, in regard to which there existed disagreement in matters of belief and ecclesiastical usages, as to whether and how far they might form the subject of compromise and negotiation between the contending parties. Chancellor Brück had made the practical proposal, that the opinion of the evangelicals 'should be regularly collected together in writing,

together with well-grounded justification of the same from Holy Scripture, since it was hardly likely that the preachers, but only the princes and councillors would be allowed to speak' (CR II 15 ff.). The common efforts of the theologians in that direction may be seen in CR 26, 172-182,* a collective opinion, drawn up as an apologia against the reproach, that it was unfairly said of the Elector that 'he did away with all service of God and set up a godless, dissolute life and disobedience.' Against this it is set forth in ten articles, that he rather established, in all seriousness, a right and true service of God, and also what induced him to drop certain abuses. The second part of the CA is modelled upon these Torgau Articles (CR II 47). The theologians, who had been summoned by a second note from the Elector (March 21st, CR II 33), repaired with these to Torgau. In addition to the order of visitation (see above, p. 78), they took with them the Marburg and Schwabach Articles. Luther, Melanchthon and Jonas accompanied the Elector on his journey, being joined on the way by Spalatin, Joh. Agricola, and Casp. Aquila. At Coburg, it was decided that Luther could not be taken further, since not only was Augsburg closed to the outlaw, but Nuremberg also, out of respect for the Emperor, refused him safe conduct.† During a stay of several days at Coburg, Melanchthon had already commenced the composition of the 'Saxon counsel,' which he himself designated as an *Apologia*, for it was at first intended as a justification of the deviations, which the ecclesiastical system of the evangelicals exhibited in contrast to Catholic tradition and practice. But, in the further course of the work, Melanchthon was obliged to recast it in two directions: he was obliged to abbreviate, *neque enim vacat Caesari audire prolixas disputationes* (CR II 45), and he was obliged to change the *Apologia* into the *Confessio*, in order to parry an attack made by Eck upon the Evangelicals, which he had put into the Em-

* Cp. especially Engelhardt in ZhTh 1865, 550 ff. and Brieger in *Kirchengesch. Studien*. Leipz., 1888.

† Burckhardt in ZkW X 97 f. Kolde in *Kirchengesch. Studien.*, p. 251 ff.

peror's hands on the 14th of March. In 404 propositions, in which Luther, Zwingli and the Anabaptists were wilfully confused, he had denounced Luther to the Emperor as the man to whom the Church owed the 'Iconoclasts, Sacramentarians,' yea, even '*Anabaptistas, novos Epicureos, qui animam mortalem assererent* * * *novos item Cerinthianos, qui Christum deum negarent.*'* Now, the Emperor's standpoint was, that, amidst the manifold reports as to what was really the doctrine of the Evangelicals, he wanted above all to assure himself whether the doctrine of these people was in harmony with the 'Twelve Articles of the Christian Faith' or not. Only in the first case did he consider an attempt at agreement or reunion possible.† Thus it was clearly necessary to touch upon *omnes fere articulos fidei* in the *Apologia*, as a *remedium* against Eck's insinuations (CR II 45). The Marburg and Schwabach Articles served as models in this case. On the 11th of May the draft of the CA was presented to Luther: he gave his assent with the characteristic remark: 'for I cannot tread so softly and gently' (de Wette IV 17). But, from this time forth, Melanchthon altered and revised his work unceasingly (the German text more than the Latin), and, the longer he worked, the more anxiously he strove to soften all acerbities against Rome (CR II 57, 60, 140)—and, the more he softened, the more he found that he had still written far too severely: '*satis est meo iudicio vehemens*' (CR II 142); he would gladly have toned it down still more, but the more evangelical theologians who were gathered together with him at Augsburg put their veto upon it (CR II 140). Chancellor Brück, who was familiar with the curialistic style, wrote the introduction and conclusion: Jonas prepared the Latin translation from these materials. It was not until shortly before its presentation, that the other Evangelical States, which had in part already prepared confessions of their own, made the 'Saxon counsel' their collective confession. But it was of special importance that the

* Wiedemann, *Eck*, p. 580 ff. Plitt I 526 ff. CR II 45. De Wette IV, 27.

† G. Kawerau, *Agricola*, p. 100. Maurenbrecher, *Kath. Reformation*, I 299.

Landgrave Philip, although undoubtedly under the influence of the Zwinglian doctrine of the Eucharist, and in spite of his earnest efforts to restore the 'brotherhood' between the contending evangelical camps, was sufficiently politic not to isolate himself from Saxony.* Thus, in addition to the Elector John, the Confession was also signed by the Margrave George of Anspach, Duke Ernest of Brunswick-Lüneburg, the Landgrave Philip, Prince Wolfgang of Anhalt [the Latin copy also by the Electoral Prince John Frederick and Duke Francis of Brunswick-Lüneburg]† and the cities of Nuremberg and Reutlingen. During the session of the Diet, Weissenburg (in Franconia), Heilbronn, Kempten and Windsheim followed their example. The Latin original (Melanchthon's rough copy) made its way into the imperial archives at Brussels: King Philip II. demanded (in 1569) that it should be sent thence to Spain, that 'so damnable a work might be for ever destroyed.'‡ The German version was sent to the archives of Mainz, whence (in 1546) it was taken to the Council of Trent. Since then it has disappeared, although Mainz for a long time duped the Protestants by the pretence of possessing it, and thereby sadly confused the textual history of the CA.

"Melanchthon himself had almost frustrated the presentation of the CA: for, since the arrival of the Emperor, he had, with incredibly blind confidence, sought to come to an agreement with the imperial party. He had declared to Alf. Valdés, the

* His opinion must not be judged according to Kolde, *Anal.*, p. 125 (*non sentit cum Zwinglio*): Lambert's testimony in Fueslin, *Epist. Ref. Cent.*, I 71, and his own statements (CR II 97, 100), are much more important. He relies upon the agreement laid down in the 15th Marburg article on the doctrine of the Eucharist (see above p. 101): this agreement is so close that it renders brotherhood and mutual tolerance possible. But, in the controversial question, Zwingli teaches him 'in accordance with faith and the Scriptures,' while Luther's doctrine 'cannot be made certain from the plain text, without a gloss.' He signed the CA, but at the same time declared *sibi de sacramento a nostris non satisfieri* (CR II 155).

† Cp. Köllner, *Symbolik* I 201 ff.—EA 48, 128. ZKG XI 216.

‡ Döllinger, *Beiträge zur polit., kirchl. u. Culturgesch.*, I 648. Köllner, I 312.

imperial secretary, that reunion was possible, provided only the cup, the marriage of priests and the abolition of the *missa privata* were agreed to, and the settlement of other disputed points was left to the Council (CR II 122 f. Lämmer, *Monum. Vatic.*, 43 f.). The Emperor and the legate Campeggi were ready to agree, only the abolition of the private mass was rejected by the latter. Melanchthon received a commission, and was ready to formulate these conditions of arrangement in writing: but Nuremberg and the Princes insisted upon the presentation of their Confession.*

"The CA claims to be estimated historically as a proof that the protesting States, in spite of their innovations, belonged to the Catholic Church.† They meet their opponents as a party struggling for its right of existence on the territory of this Church, anxious to show their agreement with the recognized articles of faith of the Church (*nos nihil docere contra ullum fidei articulum*, de Wette II 190), to defend their special form of doctrine not only by the Scripture but also by the testimony of recognized Catholic authorities, and to prove that all their innovations were the abolition of abuses that had crept in, and, consequently, that there is nothing in their doctrine *quod discrepet a Scripturis vel ab ecclesia catholica vel ab ecclesia romana, quatenus ex scriptoribus nota est* * * * *Tota dissensio est de paucis quibusdam abusibus* (CR XXVI, 290).‡ They distinguish as sharply as possible their position from that of the Zwinglians and Anabaptists: they accommodate their doctrine of the Eucharist as closely as possible to that of the Catholics, without expressing dissent in the matter of transubstantiation.

* Virck in ZKG IX 92 f.

† The Evangelicals, in 1546, still advocated this view: *nostri* * * * *affirmant* * * * *confessionis Augustanae doctrinam* * * * *esse consensum catholicae Ecclesiae Dei*: hence they protest against the reproach *quod ab Ecclesia defecerint*. CR VI 35. At Wittenberg also ordination testimonials were drawn up, in which the *doctrina catholicae ecclesiae Christi* was acknowledged: e.g., de Wette, V 78.

‡ Such was the wording of the document as handed to the Emperor, which was subsequently toned down by Melanchthon in the second edition of the *editio princeps*.

The papacy is not even mentioned, 'for certain reasons.' Conformably to this, their articles of doctrine are set forth in accordance with the scheme of Catholic dogmatics; important elements of the Lutheran gospel (*e. g.*, the priesthood of the faithful) are not mentioned. Nevertheless, Melancthon succeeded in giving classical expression to the reformation doctrine of salvation and in bringing out its importance with telling effect in crucial points (especially in Article 20), and, in fact, in spite of his harking back to ecclesiastical authorities, the normative authority of the Scriptures turns the scale. Formally, the preface of these articles as a whole offers material for negotiations for an arrangement together with the offer of sacrificing *quae utrinque in scripturis secus tractata aut intellecta sunt*, but, of course, materially, from the certainty that, if it came to such negotiations, the rights of their position would be clearly revealed. Luther on the one hand always joyfully recognized the CA (de Wette IV 71, 82 and often); on the other hand, he blamed Melancthon's optimistic judgment of their opponents (de Wette IV 68) and his intentional silence (*dissimulatio*) upon important points in the contrary propositions (*de purgatorio, de sanctorum cultu* [he also considers Article 21 too feeble] and *maxime de Antichristo Papa*, de Wette IV 110).^{*} But the attempt to discover in the CA a specifically Melancthonian method of teaching, deviating from Luther's, was distinctly perverse: Melancthon himself subsequently made the striking remark that 'he had been drawn to the Confession as a poor pupil' (of Luther) (CR XXII 46).[†]

^{*} Cp. also de Wette, IV 52: '*Plus satis cessum est in ista Apologia.*' Luther's own 'Augsburg Confession' is before us in his severely worded pamphlet 'Vermahnung an die Geistlichen, versammelt auf dem Reichstag zu Augsburg' [An exhortation to the clergy assembled at the diet of Augsburg] (EA 24† 356 ff.): he declares that not he, but the opposite party, is responsible for all the harm suffered by Germany during the last ten years. He accordingly delivers a singularly sharp penitential sermon to the Romanists: 'We and you know, that you live without God's word, but we possess God's word.' At the beginning of June the pamphlet was published: the Emperor prohibited its being sold at Augsburg.

[†] His later complaint is valueless: *Lutherus ipse non voluit scribere talem aliquam confessionem, cujus tamen erat scribere*, and, therefore, he

"[The CA became henceforth at first the federal charter of the Schmalkaldic League; but very soon found employment as the rule of instruction for the Lutheran national churches, for instance, in 1530, in the Duchy of Prussia (Tschackert I 172); the Saxon Articles of Visitation of 1533 ordered that the CA and Apologia must be provided in all parishes (Richter, KOO I. 228): a vow of adherence to the CA was introduced at Wittenberg in the same year as necessary for theological degrees (CR XII. 6 ff): the same obligation for pastors in the matter of teaching was insisted upon in the Pomeranian liturgy (Richter I. 248)—since that time the treatment of the CA as a symbol became more and more general. The diet of Schmalkalden in 1534 required of all members of the league who were to be newly admitted, 'that they would cause instruction to be given and sermons to be preached in conformity with the word of God and the pure doctrine of our confession, and should and would firmly abide by this (Strassb. *Pol. Corresp.* II. 322).*

"As the efforts of the Landgrave to obtain for the Upper German cities a union with the Lutherans failed, and the request of the Strasburgers to be allowed to sign the CA without Article 10, was refused by the Princes (CR II 155), the Strasburg deputies caused a confession of the four cities, Strasburg, Constance, Memmingen and Lindau (Tetrapolitana)† to be drawn up by Bucer and Capito. The Emperor decidedly refused to have it read aloud to him, but it was presented to him on the 11th of July. Ulm completely isolated itself and refused to join the four cities. More violent in its attacks upon Romish

himself was obliged to (Sachs. *K.-u. Schulbl.*) The letter to his brother, in which he exclaims, 'other theologians wanted to write the book and would to God they had been allowed to!' is foisted in. Hartfelder, *Me-lanchthoniana paed.*, p. 38.

* Cp. K. Müller in *Pr Jb LXIII* 124 ff. Strobel, *Beitr. zur Lit.* II. 192 ff.

† Niemeyer, *Collectio Confessionum* 740 ff. Salig I 387 ff. Schelhorn *Amoenitates litt.* VI. (1727) p. 305 ff.

VOL. XXXII. No. 1. 7

doctrine and practice (violent also in its attack upon the use of images), more decided in the importance it attached to the authority of the Scriptures, but also broader than the CA, it endeavors, in the eighteenth article (on the Eucharist), to bring forward a middle theory, expressed in extremely Lutheran language, which shares Zwingli's protest against the *manducatio oralis*, but at the same time asserts something more than a commemoration meal. (They consistently evaded the question subsequently put to them by the Emperor, whether they were Zwinglians or Lutherans, by referring to the confession handed in by them). Zwingli, however, forwarded to the Emperor at Augsburg a confession dated July 3d (*Fidei ratio ad Carolum Imperatorem*: Opp. IV. I. ff., Niemeyer 16 ff., Schaff, Bibl. symb. I. 366 ff.)."

Of course, as an argument, the preceding cannot be called convincing, because the question is not argued. But the conclusion is all the more overwhelming because no question presents itself. It furnishes conclusive proof that no problem remains to be settled, so far as accomplished scholars of that period are concerned. Prof. Kawerau gives us what the scholarly world accepts as true, and to contend for something else, which is superseded by superior knowledge, is folly.

Surely the author cannot be accused of special pleading. The presentation of Melanchthon as given above is not that of an advocate. There are many who would think the characterizations unduly harsh, in view even of the circumstances given. But that only makes his results with respect to the CA the more convincing.

Another topic which almost equals the foregoing in the interest it arouses is the unhappy incident of Philip of Hesse's bigamy, together with its results. Much has been made of the parts Luther and Melanchthon played in this. Enemies have exulted over them; friends have sought to hide the facts with excuses, and have but made the matter worse. The simple facts seem to have been the last things in the minds of the latter. Almost invariably, historical writing on this incident has developed into a polemic or an apology. It is a relief, after

the past, to turn to the eminently impartial account on pages 144-5.*

The facts as they are recorded may occasion much surprise, and give rise to the wish that the truth had never been set forth. Staunch Lutherans may think that Prof. Kawerau has dishonored the great leaders of our church by such an unpromising statement of the facts. The dishonor, however, is not in the presentation, but in the facts themselves. Moreover, the author, as a true historian, could do nothing less than tell the whole truth without fear or favor. It is not pleasant to read such things, especially when they have to do with one whose name we are proud to bear; but truth is better than hero-worship.

There is little else of special interest to us as Lutherans in the rest of the volume, except the Fourth Division, dealing with "The Disruption and Confessional Separation of German Protestantism," and Chapters 5 and 6 in the Fifth Division, "The Condition of Germany after the Religious Peace of Augsburg," and "The Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia." If

* Following are a few of the most important passages of reference on this subject.

Opinion of Luther and other theologians on the bigamy, as requested by Philip:

"In our opinion, it would come to pass that the rumor could be diminished and finally averted by this means, namely, that his Grace arrange his person in such a way that people may not so easily recognize him, and, according to his Grace's pleasure, ride secretly to her, and permit his Grace's wife to be about him somewhat oftener and longer," etc.—(*Analecta, Bedenken Luthers*, etc., p. 363).

"Therefore the best course will be for the matter to remain *in terminis quaestionis facti* * * * saying 'that the church does not judge secret things,' especially 'as long as they remain hidden, without confession or proof,' or, as another text says, 'hidden things do not have public punishment!'"

By this means, they concluded that "the affair would easily and soon bleed to death."—(*Ibid*, p. 365).

"They added, moreover, if the Landgrave could not restrain himself, and was determined to take another wife, this must take place only in secret, with the witness of some trusty persons, since before the world the second wife must be esteemed a concubine. This, especially as it was often done by princes, would arouse less scandal than his former life. At

space allowed, much that is valuable in the author's treatment could be considered with profit. But it must suffice to say that the presentation is as thorough and fair as that which has already been discussed.

Prof. Kawerau has made that dreary time of controversies, conventions, colloquies, debates and diets assume more of living interest than is usual. If his sympathy inclines at all, it is toward the uncompromising Gnesio-Lutherans who, in spite of their arrogance, intolerance, narrowness, deserve great praise for their brave stand against the weakness of fatal compromise, and the menace of Papal aggression. Their faults are recognized, and their virtues applauded.

In the rest of the field covered by the volume, the commanding figure of Calvin is easily first. His training and work are set forth in ample detail; his peculiar fitness for the task allotted him is pointed out. The mighty labor accomplished by him is conscientiously presented in its true proportions. One follows the advance of Calvinism, as pictured by our author, and its marvellous success, with unstinted admiration, yet in the end

the same time, they yet decidedly dissuaded him, pointed out the great scandal which must arise from it, etc. But was it a wonder that the Landgrave saw in it merely a fulfilment of his desire?"—(*Kolde's Martin Luther*, p. 488).

In the *Briefwechsel Landgraf Philips von Hessen mit Bucer*, edited by Lenz, is given Luther's express personal answer to Philip's inquiry, in which occurs this startling passage:

"What (harm) would it be, if one should make a good stout lie, merely for the best, and for the sake of the Christian church?" (p. 373).

This shocked even the Landgrave, who replied,

"If any one speaks to me about it, I will give an evasive answer, but I will not lie; for lying sounds bad, and no Apostle or Christian has taught it, indeed Christ most strictly forbade it, and said one ought to abide by Yea and Nay."—(*Lenz*, p. 383).

Luther's own conscience troubled him, for he fell into a panic at the idea of having his advice to Philip made public.

"The Landgrave was constantly threatening to go to the Emperor, while Luther, now as before, refused an open acknowledgment of the confessional advice, indeed, declared he would rather say that he had made a fool of the Landgrave."—(*Kolde*, p. 494).

The Landgrave would not hear of such "*narrheit*," and would have preferred a complete confession.—(*Lenz*, p. 381).

is saddened to think how much of it was gained through the follies of those who represented the gentler doctrine of Luther.

A pleasanter bit of reading awaits the one who follows Prof. Kawerau in his description of the Anabaptists. It has been the standing complaint of their spiritual descendants that the sins of aliens have been laid upon their shoulders. Their contention has the merit of truthfulness; and our author has recognized it by his sharp distinction between the handful of antinomian, revolutionary fanatics and "the great multitude of 'simple, pious people' who could only be reproached with 'error in belief,'" (p. 437.) Nothing could be fairer than the treatment which is accorded the Baptist activities throughout this record of the Reformation.

Much more might be said in detail concerning the virtues of this masterly history. Its sustained excellence in such varied fields of unequal interest; its scope and proportion in dealing with minutiae; its clearness of plan, and constant progress of thought, are far in advance of any of its predecessors.

One point of special value is the constant use of quotations from all available sources and authoritative literature. There are words, clauses, even sentences, from histories, letters, commentaries, systems of theology, sermons, philosophies, hymns, songs, poems, decrees, canons, bulls, satires—in short, every form of literary activity that has embodied thoughts concerning the problems and events of the Church during all the centuries of its existence. They clothe the dry bones of a dead past with pulsing life, and speak with myriad voices out of the silence of by-gone ages.

ARTICLE III.

THE SCHISM BETWEEN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN CHURCHES.

BY REV. J. H. RICHARD, A.M., B.D.

The Greek Church and Latin Church are agreed in their belief in the great majority of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. They alike accept the unaltered Nicene or Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Creed, together with the decisions of the seven œcumenical councils. In opposition to Protestantism, the equality of tradition with Scripture, the worship of the virgin, saints, relics and images, the coördination of faith and works in justification, the merit of good works, the absolute necessity of baptism conditioning salvation, baptismal regeneration, transubstantiation with slight divergences, adoration of the host, masses for the living and dead, private confession and absolution, and different grades in the ministry, are all held in common by both the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox Greek Church.*

With such unanimity, it is scarcely conceivable how such a wide chasm has so separated the two churches, as to make reunion, if not hopeless, at least a mere figment of the mind.

The endless stream of controversy during the Middle Ages, which widened and deepened the separation, was in large measure due to the difference of temperament between the Oriental and the Occidental mind. Peoples are reflected in their thought. The Greeks surpassed all other peoples in their acute logic, in literary culture, and in philosophic speculation. Theirs was the mission of theorizing. Hence it is on their territory that we should expect that the great Christological controversies would be carried on. And that is just what is presented by history. The battles with Arianism, Nestorianism, Eutychianism, were all fought out in the East. These contests nearly

* Schaff's *History Christian Church*, Vol. IV., p. 307.

crushed the life out of Christianity, and had a hardening and petrifying effect on the Church.*

In the West conditions were quite changed. Rome could not boast of her intellectual power, but prided herself on being "Mistress of the World." Her province was to administer law, to command, and to rule men. What she did had a direct bearing on practical life, irrespective of fine theories. It is here one would expect to find a discussion of the anthropological questions. And history again confirms the expectation, locating in the West the battles between Pelagianism and Augustinianism, faith and works, free-will and predestination. Thus while the very nature of Greek thought much impeded progress, and produced a lifeless orthodoxy, the case was wholly different at Rome where intensely practical subjects engaged the minds of Western theologians, and constant agitation on these vital topics precluded stagnation.

The Greek Church, it is true, far surpassed the Roman during the first six centuries in learning, and the latter depended upon the former for her material. In speaking of the Greek Church which was continuing during the fifth century the work which had been begun by Eusebius, Bishop of Cæsarea, Kurtz † says: "The Western Church did not so soon engage upon undertakings of that sort, and was contented with translations and reproductions of the materials that had come down from the Greeks instead of entering upon original investigations." Still the Eastern Church cannot make any claim to an advance in new life or progress during the past twelve or thirteen centuries. It cannot be denied that she has produced many able scholars in this interval; but they have chiefly contented themselves in recapitulating, analyzing, and systematizing the old arguments which were promulgated on the various doctrines by the first œcumenical councils, as though all wisdom were reposed in and formulated by the members of the councils. Origen, the Cappadocian clover-leaf—Basil the Great, Gregory Nyssa, and Gregory Nazianzen—Athanasius, and Chrysostom

* Kerr, *History Preaching*, p. 80.

† Vol. I., p. 11.

do not find their peers in such men as Theodoret, Maximus, John of Damascus, Photius, Œcumenicus, and Theophylact.

On the contrary in the Latin Church, along with Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose and Augustine, may be ranked Leo the Great, Gregory the Great, Hilary of Poitiers, and the Venerable Bede. Moreover, Rome was constantly adding to her dominion new nations. Fresh blood was supplied by the Franks. This called forth a missionary spirit and kept Rome active, aggressive and energetic, while Greece was suffering from indolence and apathy. "When the Greek Church became stationary, the Latin Church began to develop her greatest energy; she became the fruitful mother of new and vigorous nations of the North and West of Europe, produced scholastic and mystic theology and a new order of civilization, built magnificent cathedrals, discovered a new continent, invented the art of printing, and with the revival of learning prepared the way for a new era in the history of the world. Thus the Latin daughter outgrew the Greek mother, and is numerically twice as strong without counting the Protestant secession."*

Concerning the check which was placed on the free mental development in the East, Neander observes: "In the Greek Church, the cultivation of letters had been preserved to a far greater extent than in the Latin; though all true intellectual progress had long since been suppressed by a political and spiritual dogmatism. There was the want of a living, self-moving, creative spirit to animate the inert mass of collected materials. In interpreting the sacred writings, the chief object was to bring together the expositions of the older fathers and arrange them in the order of the several books of the Bible—out of which collections afterward arose the so-called *Catenæ* on the Holy Scriptures."†

One of the natural causes, then, underlying the schism between the East and the West, and aiding in a clear apprehension of the same, is the stationary character of the Oriental civilization as opposed to the activity and progressiveness which char-

* Schaff, Vol. IV., p. 311.

† Vol. III., p. 169, also 553.

acterize the Occident. There was also an unwillingness between the two churches to understand each other. Neither party was ready to surrender any controverted point, and an uncharitable spirit was fostered by the bigotry which often obtained during the long series of controversies.

In addition to the dissent of the two churches on such subjects as withholding the cup from the laity, trine immersion, infant communion, and celibacy of the clergy, all of which might have been harmonized, there were two other questions—the one doctrinal, the other constitutional—which furnished fuel for the flame of debate which was steadily carried on, barring a few years of suppressed silence, from the *Concilium Quinisextum* in the year 692 to the fall of Constantinople, A. D. 1453.*

The only doctrinal question of any consequence was with reference to the *Filioque*. The West said: The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and only on this ground can the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son be fully maintained. The East thus formulated her doctrine: The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, for thus alone can the monarchy in God be saved; the addition of the *Filioque* to the Creed was unauthorized.†

The second and chief cause of the schism, in comparison with which all others vanish into insignificance, was the rivalry between the East and the West, New Rome and Old Rome, the patriarch of Constantinople and the successor of St. Peter. Byzantium from the time of the fourth œcumenical council claimed equality with Rome without making any pretense to superiority. Rome, on the other hand, owing to her hoary prestige and pristine glory, interpreted her rich history and unique inheritance as plainly indicating that to her belonged all claim to the primacy, and with nothing short of this would she be satisfied.‡ While Constantinople was willing to grant Rome an equal place, she would not submit to her absolute authority. Thus whereas the contention on the procession of the Holy

* Schaff, Vol. IV., p. 308; Kurtz, Vol. I., p. 406.

† *Hist. Ch. Church in Chron. Tables*, H. B. Smith, D.D.

‡ Kurtz, Vol. I., p. 203.

Spirit may be considered the entering wedge of the division on the doctrinal side, their reconciliation was prevented by the "ecclesiastical and political conflict between the patriarch and the pope, between Constantinople and Rome."

It is our purpose then to trace briefly the history of the procession of the Holy Spirit and the rivalry between the patriarch and the pope, and to note how these two factors precipitated and concluded "*The Schism between the Eastern and Western Churches.*"

I.

THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

1. The East advocated the doctrine of the procession from the Father alone, or from the Father through the Son. The West adhered to the doctrine of the procession from the Father and the Son. At the Council of Nicaea in 325, the procession of the Holy Spirit was not mentioned; nor was the doctrine of the Spirit at all elaborated. Following the articles on God, the Father, and on Christ, the Creed closed: "And [we believe] in the Holy Ghost." In the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Creed of 381, however, the doctrine of the Spirit and of his procession from the Father is fully elaborated: "And [we believe] in the Holy Ghost, who is the Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father, who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, etc." Kurtz says that this definition was so incomplete that even 500 years afterward the great schism that rent the Church into an Eastern and a Western division, found in this its doctrinal basis.* The same form is found in Epiphanius, in 337, in Cyril of Jerusalem, in 362, was reaffirmed at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, and remains unaltered in the Eastern Church until this day.† The doctrine of the single procession was the decision of a general council, and the subsequent as well as the preceding Greek theologians were almost unanimous in their concurrence in this belief.

Justin Martyr gives one of the earliest testimonies on the

* Kurtz, Vol. I., p. 325.

† Schaff, Vol. IV., pp. 489.

Greek side: "Thus, therefore, we understand that the Son is begotten of the Father as of light shining from light. We hold also the same belief concerning the Holy Spirit."* Athanasius refers to the Father as the source of all things. "There is one God and Father from whom are all things; for the Word is from him generatively and the Holy Ghost processively." The testimony of Basil runs thus: "The Father who hath one essence, perfect and needing nothing, is the existent root and fountain of the Son and Holy Ghost." And in another connection: "For as there are many sons, but one is the true Son; so, although all things be said to be of God; because both the Son hath come forth from the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father."

Gregory, the theologian, in his sermon on the true faith refers the Son and the Spirit to a common source. "It is necessary to preserve the unity of the Godhead, and to confess the three hypostases, that is, three persons; and each with its property, The unity of the Godhead will in my judgment be preserved, if we refer the Son and the Holy Ghost to one cause, and neither confound nor commingle them." Gregory Nyssa subscribes to the same view. About the only quotation bearing on this subject from John of Antioch is found in his homily on the *Incomprehensible Nature of God*: "I know that God hath begotten the Son; but in what manner I am ignorant. I know that the Spirit is of him; but how of him, I know not."

The doctrine is fully elaborated by John of Damascus, and in the main outline is adhered to as formulated by him. He made the concession, which is generally admitted by the Greeks, that the Holy Spirit is *manifested* by the Son.

After having spoken of the relation of the Father and the Son, he continues: "We affirm in the next place that the Holy Spirit is both from the Father and the Spirit of the Father. But of a truth we declare that he is not from the Son. 'For if any man has not the Spirit of Christ,' as the divine apostle says, 'he is not his.' Nay rather we even confess and avow that he

* See Neale's, *History of the Holy Eastern Church*, Vol. II., 1095-1168.

is manifested and declared to us through the Son."* "The Father is the spring and author, now of the Son, now of the Holy Spirit. * * * The Holy Spirit is not the Son of the Father; but the Spirit of the Father, because he proceeds from the Father (*ex Patre procedat*), for no one is moved without the Spirit. Yea, rather, he is said to be the Spirit of the Son also, not as proceeding from him, but through him from the Father (*non velut ex ipso, sed per ipsum ex parte procedens*).† In his discussion of the Trinity and the hypostatic relation, John of Damascus continues: "The Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father through the Son and Word, though not in the manner of filiation. For if the Son is a son of the Father, and the Spirit likewise a son, then he will have other sons also, *idque in infinitum*." "Again, if the Spirit is a son, he also will have another son *et sic infinitum*."

The Spirit proceeds and emanates from the Father, indeed, and is truly of the Son, but not from the Son (*ex Patre quidem, Filii vero, sed non ex Filio*).‡

From these references, which are representative, it is patent that the doctrine of the single procession recommended itself to Greek thinking.

2. On the contrary the theologians of the Roman Church were almost as decided in their advocacy of the double procession, as is manifest from the following references.

Peter Lombard quotes from Ambrose: "That which is of any one, is of his substance, or of his power. Of his substance as the Son is of the Father; and the Holy Ghost who proceeds from the Father and the Son." In his sermon on *Pentecost*, Ambrose says: "Who (the Holy Spirit) not in time but from eternity inseparably proceeds from the Father and the

*Migne, *Patrol*, Tom. XLVII., 142, "Denique Spiritum Sanctum, et ex Patre esse, et Patris Spiritum nominamus. At vero eum ex Filio esse non dicimus, Filii tamen Spiritum vocamus. Si quis enim Spiritum Christi non habet, ait divinus Apostolus, hic non est ejus. Quin ut eum nobis Fer Filium manifestum esse et impertiri profiteamus et agnoscimus."

† Migne, *Patrol*, Tom. XLVII., 148.

‡ Migne, *Patrol*, Tom. XLVII., 497.

Son."* In his notes on Rev. 21 : 10, 11, he says, *Filius a Patre est, Spiritus vero Sanctus ab utroque procedit.*†

Commenting on the Trinity as hinted at in Gen. 1 : 261, Ambrose remarks: "For just as the Son is begotten of the Father, so from both Father and Son the Holy Spirit proceeds."‡

Augustine was equally as firmly attached to the doctrine of the *Filioque*, though he taught the procession *mainly* from the Father. His exposition was held as standard—*De Trinitate*: "And yet not without reason in this Trinity none is called the Word of God except the Son; nor the gift of God except the Holy Ghost; nor He of whom the Word is begotten, nor He of whom the Holy Ghost *principally* proceeds, except God the Father. I have therefore added 'principally' because the Holy Ghost is also found to proceed from the Son." One of the strongest passages which can be quoted from Augustine is found in his sermon *On Time*. Here he is evidently combating the Greeks: "The Holy Ghost is neither unbegotten nor begotten, but can only be said, without violating the faith, to proceed from the Father and the Son; since He proceedeth not from the Father to the Son, and from the Son to sanctify his creatures, as some wrongly believe, but He proceedeth together from both."

This consensus of Western theologians on the double procession had as yet never been embodied in any Symbol of faith. It was the understanding of the Roman Church that the addition "from the Father" in the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Symbol was not used in an exclusive § sense, but rather in opposition to the Pneumatomachians, giving the Spirit the same relation to the Father which was affirmed of the Son.

* Migne, *Patrol.*, Tom. XVII., 438, "a Patre Filioque inseparabiliter procedit."

† *Ib.*, 579.

‡ Migne, *Patrol.*, Tom. XVII., 611, Nam sicut ex Patre generatur Filius, et ex Patre Filioque procedit Spiritus Sanctus.

§ Schaff, Vol. IV, p. 481.

It was not, however, out of any opposition to the Greeks, but against the Asians that at the first council of Toledo* (A. D. 400), in Spain, the *Filioque* was added to the Creed and was thus gradually adopted throughout the Western Church, but was first used by the Franks. At the third council of Toledo, in the year 589, it was ordered that the *Filioque* should be sung in connection with the divine mysteries, and the anathema was pronounced against its opponents. This command was repeated at many succeeding synods. "Thus," according to Bishop Pearson, "began and continued the schism between the Greek and Latin Churches never thenceforth to be reconciled, till the word *Filioque* be omitted from the Creed."

The question of the propriety of such an insertion does not properly fall within the scope of this discussion, yet without questioning the correctness of the doctrine promulgated by it, it is not possible for us to justify the action of a provincial synod in altering the decrees of an œcumenical council.†

The *Filioque*, nevertheless, continued to grow in favor in the West, while the East looked upon this addition with much suspicion and regarded the single procession as the very foundation of all true teaching. It continued the schism between the two oldest, largest, and most closely related churches.‡ Though concessions were sometimes made, they were almost without exception on the Greek side. It is true that Hadrian I. did

* Alzog, *Univ. Ch. Hist.*, Vol. II., p. 326; Döllinger, *Hist. Ch.*, Vol. III., p. 91, *Credimus et in Spiritum Sanctum, Dominum et vivificatorem, ex Patre et Filio procedentem.*

† Neale's *Hist. Holy E. Ch.*, Vol. II., p. 1168: "Let the dogma of the double procession be never so true, its insertion in the inviolable Creed was an act utterly unjustifiable, and throws on the Roman Church the chief guilt of the horrible schism of 1054. It was done in the teeth of the veto passed in the sixth session of the Council of Ephesus, in the fifth of Chalcedon, in the sixth collation of the second of Constantinople, and in the seventeenth of the third of Constantinople. It was done against the express command of a most holy pope, himself a believer in the double procession, who is now with God. No true union—experience has shown it—can take place between the churches till the *Filioque* be omitted from the Creed, even if a truly Œcumenical Synod should afterwards proclaim the truth of the doctrine."

‡ Schaff, Vol. IV., p. 476; Neale, Vol. II., p. 1153.

express his approval of the view of John of Damascus, but or this he was condemned by his successors. The next landmark which we notice after Toledo was at Gentilly. The synod which met there on Christmas Day (A. D. 787) discussed this question, but fortunately the result is not known.* Charlemagne was a staunch supporter of the Western doctrine, and found two able defendants of his position in Alcuin and Theodulf of Orleans. At Forum Julium in 781, as well as at Aachen in the year 809, the decision was made in favor of the West. From the last named place an embassy was sent to Leo III., bearing the decisions of the synod together with a letter from Charles, proving, by excerpts from the fathers, the double procession, and asking for papal sanction. Leo was favorable to the doctrine, but would not consent to its insertion in the symbol. In the last part of the seventy-first question of the Orthodox Confession of Faith,† Peter Mogilas refers to this fact: The Church re-affirms her adherence to the decisions of the second œcumenical council and adds that the Creed is correct without the addition: *Kαὶ ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος*, censuring the Roman Church for making the addition. This is testified to by two silver tablets upon which is written the sacred symbol of faith, in Latin on the one and on the other in Greek, without the addition of his part: "And from the Son."—*Kαὶ ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος*. By the order of the pope of Rome, Leo III., these were hung in the Church of St. Peter in the year of Christ 809, according to Baronius.

The Athanasian Creed which appeared in France about the time of Charlemagne reads in *Ver. 23*: "The Holy Ghost is of the Father and Son." This Creed did not appear in the Greek Church until much later, and then this quotation is either omitted or modified.

The real clash between the churches came when Nicholas I. was pope and Photius was patriarch of Constantinople. The Greeks first preached the Gospel to the Bulgarians. But under Nicholas I. the Roman legates introduced the *Filioque* into this

* Gieseler's *Ch. Hist.*, Vol. II., p. 73; Neander, Vol. III., p. 555.

† Schaff's *Creeds of Christendom*, Vol. II., p. 349 sq.

country in addition to certain practices censured by the East. This was made the subject of a lively controversy between the emperor and patriarch on the one side and the pope on the other. Nicholas had Gallican synods convoked, and the *Filioque* was everywhere inserted in the Creed. Huicmar, Odo of Beauvais, and Aeneas of Paris, assailed the "errors" of the Greeks.* "Photius roused the suspicions of the Greeks by representing to them that the Latins were favoring the Manichæan heresy by admitting *two* principles in the Deity. It was this misrepresentation of facts that constituted the greatest obstacle to the success of the subsequent endeavors to unite the two churches at the *Fourth (Ecumenical) Council of Lateran*, and at the Councils of Lyons and Florence."†

3. Here we shall briefly note these efforts at union. At the Fourth Lateran Council (A. D. 1215) in the interest of a new crusade, it was enacted that the *Peace of God* should be observed for five years. In harmony with this the subject of union with the Greeks was discussed. The Greeks agreed to accept this formula:‡ "The Father from nothing, but the Son from the Father only, and the Holy Spirit from both alike, always without beginning and without end."

At the 14th Ecumenical Council at Lyons (A. D. 1274), the Greeks recognized the Primacy of the Roman Church and addressed the pope as "First and Sovereign Pontiff, Ecumenical Pope and Common Father of all Christendom." Of the thirty-one canons there enacted the following heads the list: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from eternity from the Father and the Son, but not as from two principles and not through two spirations. So the Romish Church has constantly taught, and this is the unchangable opinion of all orthodox fathers and teachers, Latin and Greek."§ The union which was here consummated, like all the previous ones, was simply a paper union, and the

* Neale, Vol. II., p. 167.

† Alzog, Vol. II., p. 327.

‡ Alzog, Vol. 2, p. 419. *Pater a nullo, Filius autem a solo Patre ac Spiritus St. ab utroque pariter absque initio semper ac sine fine.*

§ Hefele, *Hist. Councils*, Vol. VI., p. 145 sq.

council was poorly rewarded for all the care it had taken to remove all obstacles which had hitherto perpetuated the schism.

The final attempt at union before the fall of Constantinople was made at the Council at Ferrara—Florence. Here there were several doctrinal questions to be discussed, but the time was "chiefly devoted to the inquiry as to whether the addition of the '*Filioque*' to the symbol was lawful and capable of defense."* The discussion was long and tedious.† The scholars on the Greek side were Marcus Eugenius, Anthony, and especially Bessarion, who paved the way to a reconciliation. On the Latin side were Andrew and Julian Cesarini, who endeavored to show that the *Filioque* was neither a change nor an addition, but merely an explanatory clause, and further, as to changing the phraseology, precedent was found in the Council of Constantinople (A. D. 381) when several important additions were made to the original Creed of 325. It was agreed, however, that the *ex Patre Filioque* of the Latins and the *ἐκ πατρὸς δι' τοῦ* of the Greeks were synonymous, so the following formula was adopted: "Since the Latin Fathers teach that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and Son as from one sole principle, and by one sole production, called spiration; and since their meaning is the same as that of the Greek fathers, who teach that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, therefore every obstacle to union is removed."

This union met with the fate of those which preceded it. The fanatical populace accused their representatives of weakly submitting to the Latins. The ratification of the Florentine decrees was successfully defeated until the 12th of December (A. D. 1452), when they were adopted and the "Feast of the Union" celebrated in St. Sophia.

The fall of Constantinople on the 29th of May, 1453, put an end to the long and acrimonious controversies which had been carried on between the East and the West. The Latins are as firm in their adherence to the *Filioque* as the Greeks are in their

* Alzog, Vol. III., p. 85.

† Hefele, *Hist. Councils*, Vol. VII., pp. 659-761.

rejection of it. It is inconceivable that the Latin Doctrine will ever be altered; nor is it probable that the Greeks will ever surrender the teaching of their ancient fathers. The eighth article of the Longer Catechism of the Eastern Church, question 242, as well as the Confession drawn up by Peter Mogilas, reflects the conservative and stationary character of Greek thought on the single procession.* So long as this doctrine is insisted upon, the schism must be perpetuated, and union even in a spirit of brotherly feeling is a variable quantity.

II.

A STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY BETWEEN POPE AND PATRIARCH.

We now examine the bearing which the rivalry between the pope and the patriarch had on the schism. This was the perplexing question on which no agreement could be reached. "New Rome is the home of the Emperor, and why shall not I have equal rights with the pope?" contended the patriarch of Constantinople. The pope answered, "Old Rome is the home of St. Peter; and as he was, so am I the Vicar of Christ on earth, and supreme judge in all matters both spiritual and temporal."

Before examining the collision between the pope and the patriarch and emperor, the second Trullum Council requires attention. In its acts are found the germs of the great schism. Among the many (102) decrees which were there enacted, most of which were in entire harmony with the papal see, some were smuggled in to which Rome could not give her signature. These were evidently intended on the part of the Greeks as a polemic against Rome. In the second canon they declared that the 85 apostolic canons as received by the fathers should remain in force instead of only 50 which Rome received as valid. In connection with this, there were many things in these last 35 canons distasteful to the West, but palatable to the East. Thus in the 55th canon, the 66th apostolic canon was mentioned

* Schaff's *Creeeds of Christendom*, Vol. II., p. 481 sq.

as condemning the Roman custom of fasting on Saturdays in Quadragesima. The decrees of the Apostles at Jerusalem were given perpetual validity. The 67th canon declares the eating of the blood of animals is forbidden in Holy Scripture. The human figure of Christ is to supplant the lamb. According to the 13th canon, deacons and presbyters, contrary to the Roman prohibition, are not only permitted to continue in matrimony but also are forbidden to annul the marriage relation on pain of deposition. None of the canons met with a tithe of the disapproval from Rome that was attached to the 36th. Renewing the decree of the third canon of the Council of Constantinople (A. D. 381) as well as the 28th canon of the Council of Chalcedon (A. D. 451), they decided that the see of Constantinople should enjoy the same rights as that of Old Rome; in ecclesiastical affairs the two shall be equal.*

Justinian II. sent the acts of this Council to Rome with the request that Pope Sergius would write his signature in the place left vacant for him. Sergius refused with the declaration that he would die rather than give currency to these new errors. The emperor did not intend to be outwitted so easily; but the power and authority of the pope are seen when the exarchate of Ravenna and the duchy of Pentapolis arose in arms to prevent Sergius' abduction by the Protospathae, Zacharias, whom the emperor had commissioned to capture the pope. Zacharias, creeping under the pope's bed, begged his mercy and was dismissed from Rome in shame.

Justinian, after he was deposed and again dethroned, sent to Pope John VII. requesting him to call a council which would so modify the decisions of the second Trullum Council as to suit Rome. John did not comply with this request. Justinian and Pope Constantine came to an agreement; and, though we do not know by what means, it is supposed that the latter closely followed the middle path afterward adhered to by John VIII. when the latter said that "he accepted all those canons which did not contradict the true faith, good morals and the

* This canon decided that the Bishop of Constantinople should rank next after the Roman bishop, since Constantinople was New Rome.

decrees of Rome."* Such an agreement amounts to the complete submission of the emperor, and the triumph of the pope.

On the side of church constitution and worship, the second Trullum Council was the first occasion of the great schism. In themselves none of the decrees there set forth would have completed or even perpetuated the schism; but, when more important subjects of dispute arose, then the primary causes of difference assumed greater prominence and tended to irritate and to embitter the succeeding controversies.

The schism assumed definite character while Photius was patriarch of Constantinople, and Nicholas I. was pope of Rome. It was the result of a rivalry for power on the part of the two highest spiritual sovereigns of Christendom. The contest was intensified by the quality of the men engaged in it. They were both men of strong personality, neither of whom was willing to surrender a single point in the other's favor. The *Catholic Encyclopaedia* characterizes Nicholas as a man of noble and commanding frame, tall in figure and persuasive in speech, pious, severe in morals, beneficent. In his character the strength and thoughtfulness of the statesman were coupled in perfect symmetry with the mild fire of the high-priestly soul. His rival was not less distinguished. Photius was by all means the most scholarly man of his time. In civil and political affairs, in science, grammar, letters, oratory, philosophy, medicine, and with the sole exception of poetry, in every other branch of knowledge, he stood alone, *ut aevi sui facile princeps haberetur*.†

When such men, not wholly free from traditional bigotry, come into conflict, little yielding is to be expected. Yet their intercourse at first was friendly, especially on the part of Photius, for after all he was desirous of securing the favor of the pope. The occasion of their intercourse was as follows: Ignatius Michaelis Curopalatae, son of the emperor of Constantinople and heir to the throne, wronged by Leo the Armenian,

* Kurtz, Vol. I., pp. 275, 407; Neander, Vol. III., p. 557; Hefele, *Hist. Councils*, Vol. V., pp. 221-242.

† Migne, *Patrol.* Tom. LII. III., *Praefatio*, opera Photii.

gave up the throne to enter a monastery. In the year 846 he was chosen patriarch of New Rome, and adorned his office with every priestly virtue. Caesar Bardas, the uncle of Michael III., wished Ignatius to persuade the emperor's mother, Theodora, and her daughters, to take the veil. This he refused to do. In addition to this affront, Bardas was angered because Ignatius refused to admit him, on account of his immoral life, to the communion. Michael, the emperor, was also offended at the sternness of the just and pious patriarch, and on the 23d of December (A. D. 837) expelled Ignatius from the patriarchal chair and banished him to the island Terebinthus. Accomplices in this crime were Photius, a layman, and Gregory of Syracuse, whom Ignatius had deposed on account of his villainy. In six successive days Photius passed through all the inferior orders and on December 25th, 850, in contempt of the ecclesiastical canons (Pseudo-Isidorian), ascended the patriarchal throne. All the bishops under the jurisdiction of Constantinople, save twenty-one, denounced this procedure, deposed Photius as a usurper and pronounced the anathema against him. At the instigation of Bardas and Michael, Photius convened the twenty-one bishops who still adhered to him, deposed Ignatius for fictitious crimes, and anathematized him. There were now two strongly opposing parties in Constantinople, and both Photius and Michael, wishing the approval of the pope, addressed letters to Nicholas I. Photius did not represent matters in their true color; barely mentioned that Ignatius had retired from his office, and elaborated on his own reluctance in accepting the patriarchate. In answer to his request that the pope send letters to reconcile the bishops, Nicholas commissioned Rhodanold and Zacharias. Photius, in the year 860, convoked a council composed of the boasted number of 318 bishops. Here the legates, who before they reached Constantinople were met with presents, frightened and bribed, confirmed the deposition of Ignatius.* Ignatius at once made an appeal to the pope which was communicated by the abbot, Theognis. The pope, informed of the true state of affairs, con-

*Migne, *Patrol*, Tom. LIII., *Praef.*

vened a council in Rome in the year 863, repealed all charges of which Ignatius had been falsely accused, declared Photius a usurper, denied the two legates further episcopal and ecclesiastical fellowship, and recognized Ignatius as patriarch.*

Michael was exasperated by these decrees, and wrote the pope an abusive letter. He said that the pope was not to judge, but to arbitrate; that the decisions of the council would not injure Photius, nor assist Ignatius; that the emperor had demanded legates; and finally that the Latins were barbarians. Nicholas' answer was in harmony with the dignity of his office. He reproached the emperor that he as a layman should take part in a council, and calls attention to the fact that the emperor had *petitioned* legates.

Photius decided to pay the pope in his own coin, and at a so-called general council in the year 867, excommunicated Nicholas (*Nicolaum I. excommunicaret*), and preferred grave charges against the Latin Church.

Of far greater importance was the Encyclical† which Photius sent to the Eastern archbishops. It is an invective against the whole Western Church. In it he accuses Rome of spreading false doctrines among the Bulgarians, specifying double procession of the Holy Spirit, abridgment of Lent by fasting on Saturdays, use of milk on fast days, contempt for priests who were married, etc. This called forth two refutations on the part of the Roman Catholic Church—one by Aeneas of Paris, another by the Monk, Ratramnus. The latter displayed an ability and Christian temper which are rarely found coupled in a controversial treatise. It was an easy matter for him to disprove all the accusations of Photius. In eight separate chapters he discussed the various phases of Church discipline and doctrine.‡

There is but one tendency which we should expect to manifest itself during these long and sickening disputes. Along with them grew up a spirit of bitterness; the feeble tie which

* Alzog, Vol. II., p. 324; Neander, Vol. III., p. 535.

† Migne, *Patrol.*, Tom. LIII., *Praef.*

‡ Migne, *Patrol.*, Tom. CXXI., 303-346.

formerly united the two churches in mutual interests was weakened by each succeeding contention. The letters, which at first were at least respectful, became personal, and an uncharitable spirit was expressed.

The contention still continued with undiminished virulence. Photius was again excommunicated by Adrian II. in 869. Adrian also sent legates to Constantinople, who deposed Photius with this terrific anathema: * *Photio invasori. Photio saeculari et forensi, Photio neophyto et tyranno, Photio schismatico et damnato, Photio moeche et parricidae, Photio fabricatori mendaciorum, Photio adultero et interfectori, Photio inventori pervasorum dogmatum, Photio novo Dioscuro, Photio novo Judae, Anathema!*

Nevertheless, Photius retained his position until the accession of Basil the Macedonian, who for political reasons banished Photius and restored Ignatius. The latter addressed the pope in terms of submission unemployed by any previous patriarch. The pope recognized Ignatius as lawful patriarch, and thus the appearance, but not the results of the first schism, was eradicated.

At the end of ten years, when Ignatius was on his death-bed, he commended his friends to the rival patriarch; † and the emperor considered it policy to restore Photius. To this Pope John VIII. gave his consent in a Roman synod, and absolved Photius from ecclesiastical censure. ‡ His ten years' imprisonment did not make Photius a pliable instrument in the hands of John. In restoring him to the patriarchate certain conditions must be complied with: No layman should again be chosen bishop who had not passed through the ecclesiastical ranks; the patriarch of Constantinople must surrender to Rome jurisdiction over Bulgaria; those who had been ordained by Methodius and Ignatius should continue; those who refused to hold fellowship with Photius should be excommunicated. § Photius presented his own edition || of the pope's letter to the

* Migne, *Patrol.*, Tom. LII., II., *Praef.*

† Neander, Vol. III., p. 573.

‡ Migne, *Patrol.*, Tom. CXXVI., 867.

§ Migne, *Patrol.*, Tom. CXXVI., 853-7; Döllinger, Vol. III., p. 99.

|| Migne, *Patrol.*, Tom. CXXVI., 857-863.

council in 879, and by uniting his scholarship with the most consummate fraud and artifice, so altered the pope's letter as to give it entirely a Greek cast. The council closed with continued shouts: "Many years to the patriarchs, Photius and John." We are not surprised that Döllinger calls this synod a worthy sister of the "Council of Robbers." John was horrified that not only the phraseology but also the meaning of his letter should be so distorted; and "when the knowledge of this outrage came to Rome, Pope John, placing his hands upon the Book of Gospels, solemnly excommunicated Photius and all who advocated his cause, or recognized the late council held under his presidency. This sentence was repeated by the successors of John VIII., Marius I., and Hadrian III. But it was not till Leo VI., the Philosopher, the son of Basil, came to the throne (A. D. 886), that Photius was obliged to relinquish the patriarchate.* Photius was succeeded by Stephen, the emperor's brother; but, while Pope Stephen IV. was deferring his sanction to Stephen's ordination, owing to conflicting reports about Photius' deposition, the young patriarch died.†

The first schism between the East and the West was completed. The bond which existed between the Roman and Constantinopolitan sees continued to grow weaker, and would have been entirely severed, had it not been that for political reasons the emperor was compelled to solicit the friendship of the pope. The little communication which was carried on during the tenth century did not fail to manifest a spirit of hostility.‡ The Roman Church had on several occasions arrogated to herself the possession of such power as was calculated to arouse the Greeks to indignation. All that was now needed was a leader.

This want was supplied in the imperious, bigoted patriarch, Michael Cerularius. The emperor could not afford to lose the good will of the pope, but his efforts in this direction were

* Alzog, *Univ. Ch. Hist.*, Vol. II., p. 331.

† Döllinger, *Hist. Ch.*, Vol. III., p. 102.

‡ Gieseler, *Ch. Hist.*, Vol. II., p. 221.

thwarted by Michael.* To him belongs the notorious fame of completing "the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches." Prior to this the anathemas had been hurled against only the leaders in the disputes. Now the Churches excommunicated each other.

In the year 1053, just four hundred years before the fall of Constantinople, the East, unable any longer to suppress the provocations which had been accumulating between the two Churches, found worthy exponents in Michael and Leo of Achrida, who, in a circular letter addressed to John, Bishop of Trani and through him to the bishops of France and to the pope, made a formal statement of their grievances, and, among other things, accused Rome of clinging to Jewish practices. The principal ones mentioned are these: The use of unleavened bread† in the eucharist, for which the name *Azymites* was invented; fasting on Saturdays in Lent;‡ eating blood and things strangled;§ omission of the Allulua during the Lenten fast.||

This letter was translated into Latin by Cardinal Humbert, and a copy sent to Leo IX. The pope considered it his duty to reply, and did so in a long letter, without entering into the field of polemics. Among many other things, he contrasted the unquestioned authority of the Church of St. Peter, to whom had been committed the truth on all important subjects, with Constantinople, which was always contending with heresies and schisms.¶ The pope likewise calls the patriarch's attention to the fact that Rome had exercised toward the Greeks a moderation which was not reciprocated; that whereas Cerularius had closed the Latin Churches which did not conform to the East-

* Schaff, Vol. IV., p. 318.

† Etenim azyma et Sabbata ipsi custodire a Moyse jussi sunt. (Migne, *Patrol.*, Tom. CXLIII., 793-794.)

‡ At Sabbata vero quomodo in Quadragesima Judaice observatis? (Id. 796).

§ Quomodo autem et suffocata hi tales comedunt in quibus sanguis tenetur. (Migne, *Patrol.*, Tom. CXLIII., 796.)

|| Alleluia in Quadragesima non psallitis. (Id. 796.)

¶ Abscissi estis, putrescitis, et velut palmas praecisas de vite foras missi estis, et arescitis, ut in ignem mittamini, et audeatis quod divina pietas longe faciat a vobis. (Id. 768).

ern Ritual, the Greek Churches in Rome were permitted to retain their own religious customs.* The friendly spirit which pervaded this letter produced such a favorable impression on the emperor that he compelled the patriarch to become reconciled with Rome, and requested the pope to send legates to Constantinople in the interest of peace. The pope commissioned Cardinal Humbert, Peter, Archbishop of Amalfi, and Chancellor Frederick, and made them the bearers of a letter to Constantine IX., in which the pope praised the emperor for his efforts to secure peace. *Laudat eum quod pacem inter Latinos et Graecos conciliare curet.* The letter is chiefly a polemic† directed against the arrogance of Michael, especially with reference to his assuming the title of "Ecumenical patriarch." The emperor received the legates with kindness, lodging them in the palace. But it was impossible to come to any terms with Michael, and on the 16th day of July, 1054, the legates placed upon the altar of Hagia Sophia the solemn writ of excommunication‡ against him. They deposited it, repeating these words: *Videat Deus et judicet.*

Michael followed this with a counter anathema. To the people he accused the emperor of disloyalty to the Greek Church. The emperor was, this time, forced to submit to the patriarch. Thus, instead of securing peace, the result of the legates' mission served rather to intensify the already exasperated feeling of the Greek Church toward the Roman.

* Migne, CXLIII., 763, 764, Omnes Latinorum basilicas penes vos clausitis, monachis monasteria et abbatibus tulistis donec vestris viverunt institutis. Ecce in hac parte, Romana Ecclesia quanto discretior, moderatior et clementior vobis est! Siquidem cum intra et extra Romam plurima Graecorum reperiantur monasteria sive ecclesiae, nullum eorum adhuc perterbatur vel prohibetur a paterna traditione, sive sua consuetudine; quin potius suadetur et admonetur eam observare.

† Migne, *Patrol.*, Tom. CXLIII., 777-781.

‡ The act of excommunication concludes with this tremendous anathema: Michael—et Leo Achridanus Episcopus dictus, et sacellarius ipsius Michaelis Constantinus, qui Latinorum sacrificium profanis conculcavit pedibus, et omnes sequaces eorum in praefatis erroribus et praesumptionibus, sint Anathema Maranatha, cum Simoniacis, Valesiis, etc., et cum omnibus haereticis, imo cum Diabolo et Angelis ejus nisi forte resipuerint. Amen, amen, amen. (Gieseler, Vol. II., pp. 225, 226).

Cerularius wrote a letter to Peter, patriarch of Antioch, in which he arrays against the Western Church a larger number of scandals, both true and false, than had been contained in any previous letter,* viz.: The addition to the Symbol of the double procession; two brothers married two sisters; in mass one ecclesiastic embraced the others; bishops wore rings and waged war; baptism by single immersion; salt was put into the mouths of the baptized; relics and images of saints were not honored; Gregory Nazianzum, Basil and Chrysostom were omitted from the roll of the saints.† Döllinger says: "Amongst these objections there was one, the martial spirit of many bishops, which was correct; one, the addition of the word *Filioque*, which was of importance; of the others many were totally false, trifling and futile."‡

Cerularius gave the finishing stroke to his work by inducing the other Eastern patriarchs to separate from Rome and join the see of Constantinople; "and thus the Christian East separated from the West forever."§ Peter of Antioch and Theophylactus endeavored to avert the schism, but their efforts were to no effect. Cerularius died in A. D. 1059. "His death did not, however, change the relations of the two Churches. They regarded each other with suspicion and mutual distrust, and the schism though not yet formal was irreparable."||

The Latin Church tried during the crusades to unite with the Greeks, or rather to bring Greece under her sway; but the Eastern Church was unwilling to surrender, as it would have been required to do, every disputed point to the Latins. The hate of the Greeks was again increased during the establishment

* Döllinger, Vol. III., p. 107.

† In sancto Symbolo, tale additamentum recitant, * * * *Et in Spiritum* * * * *qui ex Patre Filioque procedit*, * * * Duo fratres duas sorores ducent. In missa * * * unus ministrantium * * * reliquos salutatur; Annulos in manibus ferentes episcopi, * * * et ad bellum progressi, * * * una immersione baptizant, * * * sale eorum quos baptizant ora implent, etc. Migne, *Patrol.*, Tom. LXL., 1049, 1050.

‡ *Ch. Hist.*, Vol. III., p. 107.

§ Gieseler, Vol. II., p. 227.

|| Alzog, Vol. II., p. 334.

of the Latin empire in Constantinople (1204-1261). The innumerable insults and outrages committed against the East could not easily be forgotten. The attempts at union, made at the fourth Lateran Council, at Lyons, and at Ferrara-Florence, which have already been treated, were fruitless.

Döllinger* thinks there are movements on foot in the Russian Church which point to hopeful grounds of reunion, but also affirms that "the great stumbling-block and real hindrance to any understanding in the eyes of all the Easterns is papacy." Not until the chief doctrinal, and especially the constitutional difficulties are removed, can there be any rational hope for reunion. Besides, since the two Churches are so widely separated in thought and in feeling that true sympathy is impossible, reunion under such circumstances would not be desirable, for it could at best be only nominal, not real and permanent.

The history of the schism at any particular time reflects the thought of the Churches at that time. Greek thought early became stationary while the Roman was constantly progressing. This made the schism a psychological certainty. The wall of separation between the East and West was a natural one. From little misunderstandings at first, the friction was increased as the centuries rolled by; friendly relations were supplanted by antagonisms, until finally, when all available means to understand each other had proved ineffectual, the complete schism became inevitable.

We conclude with an apt quotation from Schaff:† "The Greeks hate the pope and the *Filioque* as much as they hate the false prophet of Mecca; while the pope loves his own power more than the common cause of Christianity, and would rather see the sultan rule in the city of Constantine than a rival patriarch or the Czar of schismatic Russia. During the nineteenth century the schism has been intensified by the creation of two new dogmas—the immaculate conception of Mary (1854) and the infallibility of the pope (1870). When Pius IX.

* *The Reunion of the Churches*, pp. 54; 66-67.

† Vol. IV., pp. 224, 225.

invited the Eastern patriarchs to attend the Vatican Council, they indignantly refused, and revived their old protest against the anti-Christian usurpation of the papacy and the heretical *Filioque*. They could not submit to the Vatican decrees without stultifying their whole history and committing moral suicide. Papal absolutism and Eastern stagnation are insuperable barriers to the reunion of the divided Churches, which can only be brought about by great events and by the wonder-working power of the Spirit of God."

ARTICLE IV.

JUSTIFICATION.

BY REV. HIRAM KING, A.M.

Justification is forensic and declaratory, and is, therefore, instantaneous in effect. It is, moreover, a complete act, since it involves the removal of sin as guilt. Justification differs, thus, from sanctification, which develops with the Christian life, and is, accordingly, progressive. Its climax of perfect holiness is, moreover, attained to only in the world to come.

THE ATONEMENT THE GROUND OF JUSTIFICATION.

Man could not hope to extricate himself from the unholy and deadly environments, consequent on the fall; nor could he possibly reconcile himself to God by making amends for the crime of implicating himself in the general rebellion of all wicked beings against the divine government. Should he, indeed, strive to the utmost of his abilities after moral integrity, he would still fail to gain the divine favor, since he could not possibly attain to moral perfection. From the standpoint of God, moreover, man's manifold crime is guilt, and men confessedly lack personal means for its removal.

Justification, on the contrary, must proceed, wholly, from the unique death at Calvary, as the Scriptures fully attest: "Much

more then," writes St. Paul, "being now justified by (*ἐν*) his blood, shall we be saved from the wrath of God through him" (Rom. 5 : 9). The word, "blood," signifies the death of Christ, and implies the atoning efficacy of his passion. For man's justification, the blood of Christ is therefore *instrumental*. He is justified "by" (*ἐν*) his blood.

It is plain, however, that the blood of Christ possesses such justifying virtue solely because it removes sin: "And the blood of Jesus his Son cleanseth us from all sin" (1 John 1 : 7). And specifically: "Who was delivered up for our trespasses, and was raised for our justification" (Rom. 4 : 25). The atoning efficacy of the death of Christ is here evidently made to depend on Easter, as having necessarily followed Good Friday, and the justification of man is declared to have been consequent on the resurrection of Christ. Without a risen Christ there could, accordingly, be no justification for those for whom a dead Redeemer gave his life, although the expiatory offering was, in itself, entirely sufficient: "And if Christ hath not been raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins" (1 Cor. 15 : 17), is the negative testimony of St. Paul.

That justification does thus proceed from the atonement, is exemplified, with highly dramatic effect, in the ninth and tenth chapters of Hebrews. The Jewish high priest enters the most holy place of the earthly temple with an offering of blood for himself and for the people (9 : 7). It is, however, distinctly taught that such a sacrifice could not really "take away sins" (10 : 4), but that it was a "parable" (ver. 9), prefiguring their removal at "a time of reformation" (9 : 10). The priest at the Jewish mercy-seat was thus only a prophetic similitude, fore-showing the appearance of his sacerdotal Antitype, to minister in the heavenly temple. In fulfillment, accordingly, of this typical prophecy, the Lord, in his high-priestly character, entered "through the greater and more perfect tabernacle" (p. 11) and "through his own blood, once for all, into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption" (9 : 12).

FAITH THE SUBJECTIVE CONDITION OF JUSTIFICATION.

Faith is much more than the personal acknowledgment of Christ as the Son of God and the Saviour of man. Satan and the demons thus acknowledged him at his advent, but they, nevertheless, employed all available agencies for his destruction, and the defeat of his mission. Many men, too, yield a ready assent to the claim for his divinity and Messiahship without a show of interest in either. Such acknowledgment of Christ, it is plain, cannot be faith in him, in any true sense, because it involves nothing but the intellect. It certainly does not bring peace and comfort to men; and as for demons, they believe and shudder (James 2 : 19). The mental action here called into play, differs, indeed, in no essential particular from that involved in the acceptance, as true, of any event of history. Such acknowledgment of Christ is therefore very properly called "historic faith," and it leaves men where it finds them—with the added responsibility of knowledge.

The faith which ultimates in justification is known in theology as "saving faith," and involves the entire mental, moral and religious being of the believer. It is faith as thus fundamental to the being, that is implied in the Lord's soteriological statement: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth hath eternal life" (John 6 : 47). St. Paul and Silas assumed the same quality of faith in their instructions to the prison warden: "Believe on the Lord Jesus, and thou shalt be saved, and thy house" (Acts 16 : 3).

Does faith, however, establish a *direct* relation between man and God? and is it on merely *subjective* grounds that man has "access by faith into this grace" (Rom. 5 : 2) and is saved by grace "through faith"? (Ep. 2 : 8). No. Nor did the Lord so affirm when he said: "He that believeth hath eternal life" (John 6 : 4). Instead of saying that "eternal life" depended on man's mere *mental* acceptance of himself, he really affirmed the contrary, since he used a pregnant expression (*constructio pignans*) in which certain *unexpressed* conditions to the gift were implied. Later he said: "He that believeth and is baptized shall

be saved" (Mark 16 : 16). The addition of baptism to "believeth" (faith) is an evident expansion of the earlier statement, in which this initiatory ordinance was not designated but implied. At Pentecost, the first inquirers after the conditions of the gospel received the following instructions: "Repent ye, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ unto the remission of your sins; and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost" (Acts 2 : 38). This also is an evident amplification of the Lord's first statement, both repentance and baptism being designated as additional soteriological conditions.

The practice, therefore, of making the relation of the believer to God merely subjective and *immediate*, really eviscerates faith, and is to be deplored equally with the exaggerated ecclesiasticism, which kills the spirit in the letter. No one, certainly, would deny the subjective element in the relation of man to God in saving faith, since Christ cannot possibly be accepted, and self and the world renounced *without* the exercise of the will and the play of the emotions. Inasmuch, however, as the Lord and his apostles made submission to baptism mandatory, it clearly follows that they meant the rite to be an *objective* means (Titus 3 : 5) to the new birth (John 3 : 5), just as the Lord's Supper and the Lord's Day worship are formal means of spiritual nourishment and edification.

The believer's approach to God is most real *because* it is thus mediated, since the means used are divine ordinances. The rite of baptism is performed, once for all, and is of *standing* force, like the atonement itself. The "living bread" (John 6 : 51) is really broken in the Lord's Supper for the spiritual sustenance of the communicant, under the material elements of bread and wine. The formal Church service conducts the discriminating worshipper to the foot of the throne. To deny the true believer's access to God in the ordinances of the gospel, would, indeed, impugn the sincerity of their Author.

Saving faith, then, involves submission to all soteriological conditions on the part of the believer. He accepts Christ in his Messianic character, and observes the ordinances of the

gospel. He, moreover, abnegates self and trusts in the expiatory virtue of the atonement for justification.

It thus appears conclusively from the Scriptures themselves that faith, *as involving the observance of the ordinances of the gospel by the believer*, is the subjective condition of justification. And yet, that great division of the Church, whose seat is in the west of Europe, is practicing a directly opposite theory of justification. Not content with the relation of the believer to God as established in the appointed means of grace, the papacy has actually interposed the intercession of saints and the Virgin Mary, on the one hand, and good works and penance, on the other. As these observances are not included in the means of grace, as designated in the gospels, it would really seem that they are very properly denounced by Protestants as Catholic inventions, pure and simple. As they are, moreover, out of harmony with the gospel itself, it is plain that they are not helpful but obstructive. Nor is Protestantism itself loyal, above criticism, to the grace-bearing conditions of the gospel, any more than Catholicism. As if in exemplification of the adage that "one extreme begets another," there was promptly inaugurated, among Protestants, an evangelistic practice, which virtually eliminates the evangelistic ordinance of baptism itself from the designated means of grace. The innovation (New Measures) is a matter of grave concern to Protestants, since it tends, alarmingly, to dissipate the substantial results of the great religious revival of the sixteenth century. All Protestantism accepts of "justification by faith" as the material principle of the Reformation. But when those who shout this war-cry of the Reformers the fiercest of all into the face of Rome, deliberately seek to establish a direct, or purely *subjective* relation between the believer and God, by virtually ignoring an essential ordinance of the gospel, it becomes somewhat uncertain to what extent the Vatican ought to be censured above the Anxious Bench, on the score of innovations. It is equally a crime to *take from*, and to *add to*, the Scriptures.

THE PERSON OF CHRIST THE KEY TO JUSTIFICATION.

The justification of the sinner is not an abstraction, but a fact in concrete relations. Negatively, justification involves the forgiveness of sin; positively, it involves the imputation of righteousness. The true believer is righteous before God, but his righteousness is *by faith* (Gal. 3 : 9). The source of his righteousness is, therefore, *extra-personal*. The fountain of his righteousness is, moreover, not doubtful, for Christ "was made unto us righteousness" as well as "sanctification and redemption" (1 Cor. 1 : 30).

What, however, is the exegetical value of imputation itself? and in what sense is the righteousness of Christ attributed to man in the order of grace? Is it simply *set down to his account* (*λογιζεται*) of the sinner (Rom. 4 : 6)? and are his sins simply *covered* (*επεκαλυφθησαν*) from the eye of God (ver. 7) on the condition of his repentance and faith? Such an imputation of the righteousness of Christ to the sinner would not only be its purely *external* application to him, but his *personal responsibility* for sin would be ignored in the transaction. This, it is plain, would directly contravene all ethical principles underlying justification. If, indeed, the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the sinner were thus merely mechanical, then might even the sale of indulgences itself be advocated with some show of plausibility, since, in either case, there would be a purchase made. The price of priestly absolution is gold; that of justification would be penitential tears.

Imputation, on quite the contrary, involves the moral transformation of the sinner (Isa. 1 : 18), who, by faith, appropriates the righteousness of Christ in such sense as to become righteous *in person* (Ep. 4 : 24). Indeed, nothing short of personal righteousness could possibly satisfy the ethical conditions of justification in any proper sense.

What relation, then, does Christ sustain to the world that his righteousness is thus imputed to men? *The two-fold relation of Redeemer and Spiritual Head of the race*, it is answered. In the former character, "he offered himself without blemish unto God"

(Heb. 4 : 14), and "suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God" (1 Peter 3 : 18). Christ thus became, not only priest and sacrificial victim in one, but, as he suffered for the "unrighteous," it is plain that the sins of those, whom he meant to endow with his righteousness were imputed to himself in some sense. It is, indeed, distinctly declared that he was "made to be sin on our behalf" (2 Cor. 5 : 21).

Was, however, the imputation of man's sin to Christ possible without the violation of ethical law? and can the righteousness of Christ be imparted to man in harmony with ethical principle? In the sphere of morals, purely, one man cannot be made responsible for the evil life of another; nor can good qualities be imparted by one individual to another. Could not, however, the Son of God have made himself answerable for mankind, so as to remove their guilt and become the fountain of righteousness for them? Certainly not by offering himself as a vicarious sacrifice for the race, simply in his personal distinction in the Godhead. An atonement made by a person of the Trinity, simply, could have been nothing more, at best, than a phantasm, because it could not possibly have been made in any moral relation to man, and could not, therefore, have affected, in the least, his moral condition. Could not, however, the Son of God have assumed, in a human birth, the moral responsibility of man, so as to take away the sin of the world and renew its righteousness? Not if he should have become but a *descendant* of Adam. As such, with both the divine and human natures in his Person, his character would, indeed, have been lofty beyond comparison, and his influence might have become cosmopolitan. He might even have founded a religion among men, but he could not possibly have made satisfaction for man's sin. The exigencies of the situation required, indeed, that the natural man should be "born again" (John 3 : 5), and the old man "crucified" (Rom. 6 : 6), and it was necessary that the Son of God, in the assumption of the moral responsibility involved in the mission of a Saviour, should be in position to consummate both. Such status must, in fact, be accorded to him. His ad-

vent is much more than a birth. And as to his manhood, he is more than an ordinary man. The incarnation is the union of God with man, in such sense, that Christ, even in respect to his human nature, is not just a numerical addition to the posterity of Adam. It is true, that in relation to his mother, he is a descendant of Adam, but on the higher plane of the incarnation, which is his *generic* assumption of human nature, he is the Second Founder (Head) of the race (1 Cor. 15 : 45). From the Person of Christ, constituted thus by the union of the divine and human factors, proceed, therefore, the generations of mankind in a spiritual birth as real as their natural generation itself.

It was in his assumption of the spiritual Headship of man, that Christ was made responsible for the sin of the world, and became the source of its righteousness. As all the race receive sin-tainted human nature, by entail, from Adam (Rom. 5 : 19), and as Christ was as truly "born of the Virgin Mary" as other men are born of their mothers, the conclusion is entirely warranted, that the Lord's assumption of man's spiritual Headship must necessarily have involved him in the common depravity—not indeed as implicating him in personal sin (1 Peter 2 : 22), but as subjecting him to the penal consequences of the fall (Isa 53 : 5). So also, Christ, as the spiritual Progenitor of the race, is the fountain of righteousness for man.

Inasmuch, then, as Christ and believers are related, not as co-ordinates, but as *progenitor* and *progeny*, there can be no violation of ethical law, either in the assumption of sin by the former, or in the imputation of his righteousness to the latter. On the contrary, it is, in fact, by the *operation* of ethical law that the moral integrity of the "last Adam" (1 Cor. 15 : 45) is transmitted in man's new birth, just as the moral deformity of the first Adam is transmitted in his natural birth. Imputation, in connection with righteousness, is, therefore, equivalent to *transmission*, and the righteousness of Christ is imputed to the sinner in the sense of its being transmitted to him in his spiritual generation from the Person of Christ.

It is now, indeed, plain that Christ is not directly related to *individuals* at all, any more than Adam is directly related to

individual members of his race. As Christ is the spiritual Progenitor of believers, they are necessarily his spiritual *posterity*. Not one of them was, therefore, in existence, as a child of God, at his passion, just as the generations of Adam were *prospective* at his fall. It is, accordingly, plain that Christ, as the "Lamb of God" (John 1 : 29), took away, not the sins of individual men, but the "sin of the world" (human nature), just as Adam, in his fall, introduced sin, not among individuals, but into the "world." Men are, therefore, baptized "in the name of Jesus Christ unto the remission of their sins" (Acts 2 : 38), not because Christ assumed their sins in a personal relation to them, but because it was in his Person, as *generic for spiritual humanity*, that the "sin of the world" was taken away.

Christ being thus *indirectly* related to men, as individuals, it is quite evident that an outward, or legal imputation of his righteousness to the sinner, as from one man to another, is not even possible.

Does it, however, appear from the Scriptures that the sinner, in his new birth, becomes righteous in his own person? Yes. "For as through one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, even so through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous" (Rom. 5 : 19), affirms St. Paul. The same verb (*καθίστημι*) is used in both members of the parallel statement to express the action. The many "were made" (*κατεστάθησαν*) sinners; the many "shall be made" (*κατασταθσονται*) righteous. The sinner is thus "made," or *constituted* a saint "through the obedience of the one (Christ), and is, therefore, righteous, not by proxy but in person.

Then, again, the believer is righteous in person, because he is "born of God" (John 1 : 13) and partakes of the divine nature (2 Peter 1 : 4). The law of heredity prevails as much in the sphere of regeneration as it does in that of natural generation. The righteousness of God is, therefore, transmitted to his children in their new birth, not as something in the abstract but as an essential quality of their spiritual being.

Cannot, then, the true Christian claim the favor of God on the ground of his personal righteousness? If he were perfectly

sanctified, and not still a sinner, he might, indeed, seek divine acceptance on personal grounds. But as such freedom from moral taint is clearly impossible under present conditions, he can only be "justified freely by his (God's) grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus" (Rom. 3 : 24). St. John's testimony on the point in question is equally conclusive : "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us, but if we confess our sins, God is faithful and just to forgive our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness" (1 John 1 : 8, 9).

It is thus made plain that the believer cannot possibly be justified on the ground of his personal righteousness, although this is perpetually renewed at its source in the Person of Christ, but that, on the contrary, his appeal for justification must be made, wholly, on the basis of the atonement, substantially in the formula : "For Christ's sake" (John 16 : 16).

ARTICLE V.

RELIGION : SUBJECTIVELY CONSIDERED.

BY REV. T. B. THOMAS, A.M.

The two great controlling instrumentalities in the making of a people are language and religion. And in this work the latter is more powerful than the former. Man, being spiritual as well as material in his being, it is not to be wondered at that he is continually seeking to transcend himself and to get beyond the narrow bounds of his individuality; to enter into fellowship with other being, never resting satisfied until he rests in God, his Creator, Sustainer and Redeemer. And the sorrowful part of it all to a follower of the Christ is that multitudes of human-kind die daily without having this longing after God satisfied. Religion being as necessary to man's spiritual nature as food and drink are to his material nature, and it being true that man's outward life is directed by his inner life, the observation of the philosopher Hegel is pertinent : "The idea of God con-

stitutes the general foundation of a people. Whatever is the form of a religion the same is the form of a state and its constitution : it springs from religion ; so much so that the Athenian and the Roman States were possible only with the peculiar heathendom of those people, and that even now a Roman Catholic State has a different genius and a different constitution from a Protestant State."*

Time spent, therefore, in the consideration of the various parts of the subject of Religion, *e. g.*, its scientific, historical, and philosophic aspects, its mode of expression, its classification, the individualistic forms which it assumes among the various peoples of the earth, and its subjectivity, is time well spent, in that it furnishes the student with data necessary to the understanding and the solving of many of the problems which present themselves to the Church in bringing the world to Christ ; data which cannot be gained in any other line of study.

This paper has to do with the subjective part of religion, and that only so far as it concerns the following points : 1. Man, a religious being ; 2. The content of religion ; 3. The generic forms in which it manifests itself. The space allowed us permits of but little more than an outline study of the subject.

I. MAN A RELIGIOUS BEING.

I. *Man has a Religious Constitution.* According to the Biblical account of man's creation, his body was formed from the dust of the earth, but the "living soul" came from the in-breathing of the Almighty Creator. As the former fact unites man to the earth, so the latter fact unites him with God and constitutes him a free, intelligent and moral personality, a being in whom there is an attribute of divinity : "the breath of life." It is this divine factor in his constitution which enables him to enter into fellowship with God, and through which he possesses capacities of knowing Him and of enjoying Him forever. His being made in "the image of God and in His likeness" distinguishes him from

* *Philosophy of History.*

the brute creation as such, and gives him a vision for the inner and spiritual world as well as for the outer and material world. Hence, as man's body is connected and rooted in the physical world, so his soul is connected and rooted in the psychical or spiritual world. The body has its material senses, wants and pleasures; and the soul its spiritual aspirations, needs and enjoyments. It is as natural for the soul, in its original and healthy state, to crave and enjoy God and holy things as it is for the body to crave and enjoy food and drink. Man, therefore, as a psychical-physical being, capable of fellowship with God and related to God through "the breath of life" is religiously constituted.

Again, the soul of man, wherever man is found, whether in the highest degree of civilization or in the lowest degree of degradation, is conscious of a constant sense of its dependence upon a higher power than itself; and constantly, in its inmost nature, aspires and craves for a communion with that power. Man seeks to know that power, feels after it and bows before it in worship. To this activity of the soul various terms have been applied. Some writers and philosophers call it the "religious faculty," others, the "religious instinct," "religious sentiment," "spiritual intuition," "religious feeling," "religious consciousness," etc., etc. But call it whatever name we may, this ray of divinity in man, showing itself in religious feeling and acts of worship, is proof positive of his religious constitution. His moral, rational being and religion are inseparable. And, in some form or other, religion is the controlling force in his life. He will have, must have, a God. For it belongs to his nature to worship, if not the true and eternal God, then a tangible or ideal conception of deity, or an evil spirit, or himself. This sense of the divine in man is a force through which he is either elevated or becomes degraded; is either richly blessed or subjects himself to untold evil. He cannot get away from it. He cannot be indifferent to it. It goes with him through life, from the cradle to the grave. Dr. George P. Fisher has well said, therefore: "To pray to God for help, to lean upon him for support, to worship him, are native and spontaneous move-

ments of the human spirit."* Because of this religious inherency men "seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him."† And it is also true that this religious principle with which the divine Creator has endowed man is the condition of apprehending Him when He makes Himself known to the soul, whether it be in nature, in providence, or in the divine revelation of the Word.

The history of Christian missions proves conclusively that the foregoing is true. And the most remarkable fact of all religious facts concerning this proof is that the soul in its normal condition longs for the only true God, and if freed from all prejudice and left to act in accord with its true and noble religious principle, will embrace the religion of Christ and find in it alone that light and rest and peace which no other religion can give.‡

2. *The Universality of Religion.*— If man is a religious being, and if religion is an element in his constitution, it should be common to mankind. And so it is. Well has it been called, "A universal phenomenon of humanity."§ Travelers and explorers of all ages agree in the main with the assertion of the Platonic heathen philosopher, Plutarch: "There has never been a state of Atheists. You may travel the world over and you may find cities without walls, without kings, without mint, without theatre or gymnasium; but you will never find a city without God, without prayer, without oracle, without sacrifice. Sooner may a city stand without foundations, than a state without belief in the gods. This is the bond of all society and the pillar of all legislation."||

Every individual has a god; if not the true God to lead him in the way of truth, to bless and sustain him, then some false god to delude and betray him. There has never been found, and, we are safe in making the assertion, there never will be

* *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief*, p. 33.

† Acts 17 : 27.

‡ Comp. *Grant's Religions of the World*, p. 88.

§ C. P. Tiele in *Outlines of the History of Religion*.

|| Quoted from Dr. Schaff's *Theol. Prop.*, p. 64.

found, a people without some conception and worship of deity; without desire to establish relations and communion with a Being or beings more perfect than self. Historical and ethnological investigation bears ample proof to this remarkable and now incontrovertible fact: "The religious principle or consciousness in man has tintured every phase of human society and life; and has colored every system of philosophy and thought, from the lowest to the highest forms. The literature of every people, where a literature has been found to exist, is highly colored with religious sentiments."*

Religion, therefore, is not an accident in human life. Nor is its origin to be looked for in any inventive genius of statesmen, nor to the ideas of beauty or sublimity, nor in the feeling of fear or hope, of pain or joy which are experienced by the soul. Neither is its origin to be found in the all-pervading dread and terror of the overwhelming and mysterious phenomena of nature. Nor has it evolved itself from the myths or fetich-worship of savage ancestors; theories which have been put forth by philosophers of the past years. It belongs to his human nature, co-eval with man's creation, rooted in his very being and given to him by God, his Creator and life. Its origin is divine, therefore, a constituent of "the breath of life," which God breathed into man when he became a "living soul," and giving him the power or capacity to enter into fellowship and living relation with his Maker. He is a religious being.

II.—THE CONTENT OF RELIGION.

Religion being an inborn principle of human nature, the question: "To what faculty or power of the soul does it belong?" needs to be answered. Is it identical or commensurate with any or all of the three faculties which may be said to constitute the trinity of man? Or is it primarily and solely a state of knowing, or of feeling, or of willing? The answer to these questions has given rise to various theories concerning the content of religion.

* Comp. Dr. Valentine's *Natural Theology*, p. 31.

1. There are those who hold that religion is simply knowledge of divine things; an element of the intellect. Max Müller defines religion as "The perception of the infinite." Alfred Cave says: "Religion, in its widest sense, is the perception of the supernal together with the effects of that perception on the complex nature of man."* And so others, especially the advocates of the various schools of Gnosticism, both ancient and modern, consider the essence of religion to be "the cognition of truth."

It is true that the basis of religion lies in the very essence of man's nature as a self-conscious, thinking being;† but this is not equivalent to its being simply intellection. If religion consisted alone in mere knowledge, then it certainly would be strongest and purest in the most intellectual of mankind, and when the intellect is in its prime; and most erroneous in the illiterate, in times of sickness, and in old age. But all experience disproves this to be the case.

The intellect is not sufficient to make us religious. A man may understand all mysteries, as Paul says, and be able to speak with the tongues of angels, and yet be "as sounding brass or a clanging cymbal;" in other words, simply a knower of religious truth, and not a doer of it. We do not ignore the fact that religion includes knowledge. But it is not all knowledge. The presentative, representative, reflective and intuitive powers of the intellect may be, and undoubtedly are, aids in man's religious development, but to make the fact of intellection and religion identical is to impede that development, and ends in spurious intellectualism and dead orthodoxism, the result of which is nothing less than cold, barren rationalism.

2. Again, there are those who maintain that religion is exclusively a matter of feeling. The theory is called The Emotional Theory, and is held by the various schools of mysticism. The renowned Schleiermacher gave to it its scientific form. "Religion," he says, "is constituted of feeling;

* *Intro. to Theol.*, 2d. ed., p. 51.

† So Principal Caird, *Intro. to the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. 1894, p. 151.

the absolute feeling of dependence upon God."* So Hagenbach.†

Now, it is true that religion involves certain states of feeling and affection as well as the fact of intellection; feelings of faith, hope, love, joy, grief and of absolute dependence upon God. Religion must certainly be experienced as a matter personally our own. Speaking from the Christian standpoint, man must first feel his need of salvation before he can obtain the blessed state of holy communion with God. Moreover, the Word of God lays emphasis on the fact that it is the heart, the great center and seat of the emotions and affections, which gives rise to all good and evil thoughts, and also actions. (See Prov. 4 : 23; Matt. 15 : 19). 'Tis true, religion cannot exist apart from feeling; but it must be a feeling which is inseparably connected with knowledge and action. "The mere feeling of absolute dependence without regard to the nature and the character of the object upon which we depend, is not the true religious feeling."‡

The depth of one's emotions, the liveliness of one's feelings of joy or grief, of trust or love, are not the sure tests of our religious life. If this were the case, then emotional and excitable people would be more religious than those of opposite dispositions. But this is not the case in the majority of instances. Now, "inasmuch as intensity of feeling is determined as much by individual character and temperament as by the nature of the object"§ which calls forth the feeling, it is very readily seen that the purest Christian faith will have no advantage whatever over any other religious faith, from the grossest fetichism to the highest form of religious cult. Feeling-religion generally ends in "extreme sentimentalism, doctrinal indifference" (Schaff), and the vilest fanaticism. Justification by the emotions is not justification by faith. The vilest sinner can *feel holy* sometimes.

If our religion is to rest on an immovable foundation, it must not rely upon feeling as being *all* of its content. This is but

* Quoted from Cave's *Intro. to Theol.*, p. 47.

† See *Encl. Theol.*, Hurst and Crook's trans., pp. 33-37.

‡ Speecher.

§ Principal Caird.

shifting sand. Something else than the transient impressions of cheerfulness, joy, sympathy, satisfaction in view of right conduct, hope and fear which sweep over the soul are needed by us if our religion is to be an anchor to our souls. No; religion is not superinscribed by, nor identical with, that power of the soul by which it is capable of experiencing dependence upon God. It may be a part of the distinctive essence of religion. But the part is never equal to the whole.

3. There is another theory prevalent in the writings of men, which considers religion to be mere volition or action; the doing of the will of Deity. This, in other words, is morality. They who hold this idea consider religion and morality identical. The theory finds examples in Confucianism, the Stoicism of the Greeks and Romans, the legalism of Judaism and Christianity, in Deism and Unitarianism.

Now, we do not deny that religion includes in it an element of morality; but it is not simply morality. They go hand in hand; but they are not one and the same thing; else the self-righteous Pharisees and haughty Stoics would be the highest type of religious life, but Christ said that "even the publicans and harlots go into the kingdom before them." Better is it to say that morality is the fruit of religion than to say the two are identical. The Word of God, it is true, commands men to "do the will of God in order to enter into the kingdom," "faith without works is dead." "Be ye holy as I am holy," etc.* But all this is not religion nor religious faith; simply the fruit thereof. The outward life of morality is simply the expression of the inward life of love towards God and of communion with God.

Consequently there is a vital distinction between religion and volitional activity. Mere formal morality is nothing else than legalism, resting on the ideas of independence and self-determination; indifferent alike to faith in and love for God. Whereas, true religion rests upon the ideas of dependence and direction from above,† and is constantly supported by faith and love. "Morality without religion is either an idle abstraction, or a life-

* Comp. Matt. 7 : 2, 24; John 13 : 17; James 1 : 22, 25, 27; Matt. 5 : 38.

† Comp. Hagenbach, *C. and H. tr.*, p. 33.

less legality, a selfish virtue, which is indeed far better for society than immortality, and has its uses for this world, but has no value before God" (Schaff).

But where the will-power is quickened by the religious sense, rests its volitions and actions in the enlightenment of the truth as it is in Christ, and manifests them in love to God and man; and where the words and actions are directed towards the glory of God and the welfare of men, there the outward morality is the expression of the subjective religion of the soul. Though a constituent part of religion, obedience to the will of God is not all of religion. The content of religion is far more inclusive. It cannot wholly reside in the executive power of the soul, but neither can it live apart from it, any more than it can exist without knowledge or feeling. As it, objectively speaking, is as wide as the race, so subjectively, it is as extensive as the human soul.

4. What, then, is the content of religion? Knowledge, but not mere knowledge; feeling, but not mere feeling; volition, but not mere volition. It involves all three, though not commensurate with any of them. Religion is a matter of the whole soul, and comprises spiritual knowledge, spiritual feeling, and spiritual action. It has its substance in the force which we call spiritual life. And this spiritual life permeates every faculty and power of the soul; manifesting itself now in the field of knowledge, now in the field of feeling and now in the field of volition. And yet "there is no feeling or volition which does not contain in it implicitly an element of knowledge, nor any kind of knowledge which does not presuppose feeling, or in which the mind is in an attitude simply passive and receptive, without an element of activity."* There is, therefore, a synthesis of reason and faith and activity in religious life.

This life-principle, lying back of our faculties and working in and through them to the development of our religious life, finds the goal of all its searchings in the vital union of man with God through Jesus Christ; and reaches its highest state in

* See Principal Caird, *Intro. to Phil. of Religion*, p. 153. Comp. also Schaff's *Theol. Propædæutic*, pp. 69-70.

the life of Christ implanted in the soul by the agency of the Holy Spirit; purifying, transforming, and sanctifying the whole inner man; lifting the intellect into the realm of truth, bringing the will-power into harmony with the divine will, giving peace and joy of heart, and righteousness in word and act. The Scriptures speak of this union with Christ as the union of the branch with the vine (John 15 : 1 f); "a new creature in Christ" (2 Cor. 5 : 17); "Christ liveth in me" (Gal. 2 : 20), etc.

The twofold manifestation of this spiritual life, which lies at the basis of religion, is faith and love; by the first of which we appropriate the divine life of our own, and by the second of which we let the light of that life shine before men to the glory of the Father in heaven. But faith is not simply intellectual or theoretic assent, nor a simple matter of the feeling, but a movement of the volition as well. The whole life is active in believing; working the will of God in love, which has been well called "the fruit of faith." For it is only as "faith worketh by love" (Gal. 2 : 6)—love supreme towards God and towards man equal to love of self—that Christ is known to dwell in the soul. "By their fruits ye shall know them."

The content of true religion, therefore, is "heavenly *knowledge* applied by the Holy Ghost to the renewal of the *affections* and the producing of an earnest spirit, whose fruits are *deeds* of love"* as living proof of the eternal life of Christ dwelling within the soul.

III.—THE GENERIC FORMS IN WHICH RELIGION MANIFESTS ITSELF.

The careful study of the legends, the traditions, the mythologies and the sacred books of the various races of the world, ancient and modern, reveal to us that religion manifests itself in three generic forms. These are Law, Art, and Doctrine. Generally speaking, legislators and artists were regarded by ancient peoples to be co-equal with priests in religious jurisdiction. Every religious system, then, may be said to have its legal, its aesthetic or artistic, and its doctrinal elements. And, while

* Rev. Dr. Weidner, *Theol. Encycl.*, Vol. I, p. 19.

there are religions in which one or the other of these elements predominates, yet it is to be observed that in one and every religious system with which we are acquainted there is a varying proportionate and combinative inter-relation between these elements. A brief consideration of these elements is here given.

1. *Law* is a principle or a system of principles imposed by competent authority, divine or human, and recognized by men or nations as controlling their intercourse one with another, and defining and enforcing duty. In itself it can only determine the outward character of human conduct; its conditions and states being modified and limited by existing circumstances, which, changing, however, cause the law in such cases to become a dead statute.

Why then is man so bound to the law? Why has it been, and why is it still, such a mighty force in controlling the actions of men and of nations? The answer is evident: Because in the human constitution God has placed an unwritten *ought* which urges man to choose the right, and an *ought not* which impels him to reject the wrong—in accord with the knowledge he has of the right and of the wrong. This in a word is "obligation;" the correlative of law. Now in seeking to conform their characters and actions in accord with obligation, rational beings act according to the law as they conceive of it.* By habit and custom this power of law is enabled to penetrate into the depths of man's religious being, and his moral disposition, and so man is led to give unconditional obedience to the rigid commandments which define what man as a religious being ought to do and what he ought not to do. However, obedience is only a single phase of religion. Law, therefore, cannot be the whole of religion. For religion also includes love and faith. And while law may define duty it cannot inspire the love nor create the faith which impels man to obey the voice of duty.

2. *Art* has a place in religion as one of the forms of its manifestations because it discloses the ideas which men have of Deity. Being the embodiment of beautiful thought in sensuous

* Compare Harris' *Philosophic Basis of Theism*, Chap. IX.

forms, concerning the divine, whether in marble or speech; revelation of an ideal within the soul, and the manifestation of the invisible reality through the senses, it has ever been made use of in religion to symbolize or to describe religious conceptions and to move men to worship. Images, pictures, symbols, the various phenomena of nature, etc., used by men in religious observances may well be considered "the mysterious ladder which enables the soul to mount from the finite to the infinite."*

While 'tis true that art may inspire a vague form of love for the infinite, and so be a step in advance of law, in that it makes the infinite its object, the artistic element in religion, since, on the one hand, it does not provide for the exercise of the religious instincts of the soul, and, on the other, tends to illusive-ness and often to immorality, is quite as deficient to bring about man's true communion with God as a mere legal religion.†

3. The other generic form in which religion manifests itself is *Doctrine*. This form supplies what the others lack. Art may arouse the emotions, and law impel the will to perform duty, but doctrine, which is but another name for teaching, excites the whole man into action; moulds the intellect, arouses the emotions and directs the volition. It instructs in the truth—and "law is truth considered as that to which rational beings are under obligation to conform their characters and actions;"‡ inspires faith and love, and becomes in man the "fountain of life, to depart from the snares of death."§ It, therefore, is useful in directing law and art to their highest end, supplying what is wanting in them and in revealing to the soul of man the personality, attributes, and nature of the divine Lord in whom we move and have our being.

A religion, therefore, may have its legal elements and also its artistic elements, but unless it has a body of doctrine and an order of teachers, it comes far short of being the highest type of religion. Again, the religion in which this last element has the

* Cousin.

Hagenbach, Crook and Hurst translation.

† Harris' *Phil. Bas. of Theism*.

§ Prov. 13 : 14.

dominant place, not as an abstract system, but as a living principle ruling in the lives of its adherents, can be well considered the true and best of all religions. This is the case with Christianity.

4. Historical illustration of the foregoing statements are furnished in Judaism, in which the element of law predominates; heathenism, in which the element of art occupies the controlling place; and Christianity, in which the element of doctrine stands out in characteristic prominence.

Judaism is pre-eminently a religion of law; not that the other elements are wanting—for the artistic element is to be seen in her ritual, and the doctrinal in her prophetic order—but that "the law," "the torah" stands out as characteristic of her development. The Hebrew "torah" had a three-fold character: it was judicial, ceremonial and moral, each part having its special function in the formation of the theocracy. "The law was given by Moses" (John 1 : 17), and its office was to be a school-master "to bring men to Christ" (Gal. 3 : 24), who himself was made subject to it, who came not to destroy it, but to fulfill it and to redeem us from its curse. Our Lord recognized it as a divine institution, regarded it as the revelation of God's will, and was loyal to its true requirements. And in him, his teachings and life, its principles and aim can alone be comprehended.

Ancient heathenism is the chief exponent of the art element in religion. Not that law and teaching are wanting, but the leading characteristic of all heathen religions is art.

The Egyptian religion had its elaborate moral code—the burden of nine-tenths of the Egyptian texts being the triumph of right over wrong—but that which looms up on the sky-line of the religion of ancient Egypt above all else is the artistic element.

The same can be said of the religions of the ancient Assyrian and Babylonian nations, of the Romans and the Greeks—in the latter of which the art element attained its highest development.* Instead of doctrine, heathenism cultivates a mighty symbolism, "which," as Rust says, "has emanated from its own

* Renouf's *Egypt* and Rawlinson's *Religions of the Ancient World*.

being, a concrete representation of its religious spirit to the senses. The pagan systems of religion exhaust their strength in the effort to construct a thoughtful and frequently artistic symbolism. They are extravagant in ceremonial manifestations and changeless customs, but indifferent about moral manifestations and unconcerned about the eternal nature of things."*

All this is likewise true of the oriental heathen religions in existence to-day. The art element is there and predominant, even though it may not be seen in visible images and colossal architecture.

But it is in Christianity that "the truth" is brought to light. In the development of a system of doctrine it must be given the first and highest place of honor among the religions of the world. What Judaism sought to obtain in and by means of its law, and heathenism in and by means of its art, the doctrines of Christianity bear to man. Its founder was the great Teacher come from God, "the Humanized-Divine Doctrine, the Logos, the Word from heaven that was made flesh, in whom alone a new life could be obtained." His great commandment to the Church is "Teach all nations."* And it is through the preaching of the Truth, the dissemination of the doctrine of Christ, that faith is begotten in the soul. And as men know, believe and accept the Truth they receive power to become free from sin and to stand before God, justified.

In Christianity law and art are only handmaids of Doctrine in the promulgation of the truth and the worship of God. It is the living Word within the soul which, on the one hand, is a deeper, higher, more powerful law to develop pure and noble character than the legalism of Judaism, and, on the other hand, has given rise to the noblest conceptions which the artistic sense of man is capable of producing. In Christianity legalism gives way to a spirituality which makes the soul free in Christ. Law and art are no longer the means to be used in obtaining salvation; but the believer, having received salvation, the keeping of

* See foot note in Crook and Hurst's *Theol. Encycl.*, p. 22.

† Matt. 29 : 19.

the law and the bringing forth of spiritual fruit (art) will inevitably result.

5. The history of Christianity reveals a vacillating tendency with respect to these generic forms of religion. Even during the Apostolic age, while the Apostles gave doctrine its rightful first place, the legal character of Christianity was unduly emphasized by Ebonitism and Gnosticism. The followers of these heresies sought to tear away the doctrinal foundation of Christianity and to give it a mythological (art) coloring. Later on speculative legalism and work-righteousness, united with an abundance of artistic element, and Judaism and Heathenism, joined hands with Christian truth in the formation and developing of the Roman Catholic Church. The righteousness by faith, the perfect law of spiritual liberty and the religious idealism of Paul were circumscribed in, bound by, and hid under a marvelously strict legalism; the deplorable condition which reached its high water-mark in the Medieval period of the Church's history. Gradually, however, men were beginning to realize that something was radically wrong in the teaching of the Church of Rome. And now and then spasmodic efforts were made towards the bringing up of the truth from the pit into which it had been cast. But it was not until the sixteenth century that the restoration of doctrine to its legitimate place was brought about. When the bold Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to the door of the castle church at Wittenberg he set the whole world in a nervous state. The Gospel doctrine of salvation through faith alone by the grace of God without the works of the law was preached far and wide, and gradually the Word of God gained its rightful place of authority in religion. And it still occupies that place in the Protestant Church; wherein it is not only the heart and center of worship, but also the means used by the Holy Ghost for enabling believers to walk in the way of the Lord in a true and consistent Christ-like life. This fact makes Protestantism more Christian than Romanism, since her true function is to teach men of Christ and the life hid in him. And herein lies her power in uplifting humanity. May she always remain true to her mission; and

then the laws of God and man will be obeyed, and man's conception of the artistic will become more ideal and helpful in the true worship of the ever-living Triune God, Father, Son and Holy Ghost.

ARTICLE VI.

A DECADE IN OUR INDIA MISSION.

BY REV. JOHN ABERLY, A.M.

Our mission is still so young that a decade is not a small part of its entire history. Nor would a division of that history into decades be altogether an artificial one. Planted in 1842, the 40's may be regarded as the period of its founding; the 50's, the period of expansion and rapid growth; the 60's, the period of retrogression due to the ravages of our own Civil War; the 70's, the beginning of the large mass movements toward Christianity, which continue up to the present; the 80's, a period of external encroachment from the Baptists, and of unfortunate internal dissensions, which left the missionary staff low. In spite of this, however, the numerical growth of our converts during the period was the largest in its history, the membership increasing from about 5,000 to over 13,000 during the 80's. My personal contact with the mission dates from January, 1890. It extended uninterruptedly until the beginning of 1900. A retrospect of the work of these ten years—the 90's—is what is contemplated in this paper.

It may be well to begin with the missionary staff. On January 1, 1890, this numbered only five—two ordained men, two Zenana ladies, and one missionary's wife. It was a small circle indeed. During the ten years under review these were reinforced by the addition of twenty-four, of whom three had been on the field before. Of these, eleven were ordained men, seven Zenana ladies and six wives of missionaries. Of the twenty-nine, therefore, connected with the mission during this period, all but seven were in the field on Jan. 1, 1900. The decade began with a missionary staff of five; it ended with one of twenty-

two. One of the most gratifying things to record about this period is that our Church as never before sent laborers into the harvest. During these ten years more missionaries were sent by the General Synod to India than were sent during the first forty years of our mission's existence. And with gratitude ought it also to be recorded that not once during the entire period were our ranks invaded by death.

Similar gratifying progress has also been made in the better equipment of the mission. The year 1890 could show only four missionary bungalows, and all of them in Guntur. We had a college, it is true, but the entire plant could have been bought for \$500.00. Our boys' boarding school was kept in buildings that would not have realized so much. The girls' boarding school had no better accommodations. Then we had neither dispensary nor hospital. During the 90's two new stations were begun—one at Narasarowpet with two bungalows and one church, and one at Reutachmtala with one bungalow and a large schoolhouse. At Guntur itself, the Watts' Memorial College Building was erected at a cost of \$33,000; the hospital plant cost fully as much; the girl's boarding school now has a \$4,000 dormitory; the boys' boarding school has one not quite finished as yet, but on it about \$3,000 have already been expended. This building seems to me to deserve more than passing notice. It is in one respect a building that marks an epoch in our mission. It is the first effort on a large scale of our native Christians to help themselves. During 1893 we celebrated the jubilee of the founding of our mission. Then a special effort was made to raise a memorial to Father Heyer, the founder of the mission. As a result we have this building—the Father Heyer Memorial—costing only a little over \$3,000, it is true, but when translated into the language of the donors who can earn no more than six to eight cents a day, it was at least as great an undertaking for our infant Church in India as it would be for one of our synods in this country with a communicant membership of only 7,000, to erect a \$30,000 dormitory for one of our institutions. The decade might be called a building time in our mission. If in 1890 our property was

worth \$15,000, in 1900, it was worth at least \$100,000, and all of it in the line of much-needed equipment for more effective work.

Along with an enlarged staff of missionaries and better equipment come better supervision and better organization of both our work and native workers. There has been a salutary division of labor. At the beginning of this period one missionary was responsible for the college boarding school and Guntur congregation. Now the work is divided between two—one for the college and one for the other work in Guntur. Then one missionary practically had charge of the entire district of about one hundred miles square. Now we have four (and for some time we had five) who divide the district among themselves. Then all missionaries lived in Guntur, from which as a center the entire field was worked; now some live at Naras-arowpet, twenty-eight miles from Guntur, and one family at Reutachmtala, eighty-five miles from Guntur, in the center of their respective districts. The field is still inadequately supplied. We cannot call our district fully manned until we have at least eight missionaries in the district work, and three for the educational work in Guntur, constantly in the field. But we may well thank God and take courage as we contemplate the progress made toward this goal during the last ten years.

Better supervision, is, however, it must be confessed, partly responsible for the less rapid increase of our membership. From 1890 to 1900 the membership increased from 13,566 to 18,964 or about 40 per cent., while from 1880 to 1890 it increased 160 per cent. Our accessions by baptism during the 90's were 11,180 or an average of over 1,000 a year. It is safe to estimate that two-thirds of these were direct accessions from heathenism. Yet our net gain during the ten years was only 5,398. This was due in large measure to the more careful sifting of church registers, and to the enforcement of a more rigid church discipline. The encouraging feature in our statistical exhibit is that it shows regular, normal, healthy growth. It ought to be added that better supervision made possible the raising of the standard for admission to the Church and more

thorough examination of candidates for baptism. But for this, much larger numbers might have been baptized.*

The larger staff of missionaries has also made possible the more careful and systematic training of our native workers. Their number has not been increased during the decade under review. We began the 90's with 375 native workers; we end them with exactly the same number. From time to time we were compelled to close schools because of a reduction in our appropriations. Besides this, some workers, who were found inefficient, or unworthy, were dropped. Our course of instruction for our workers took definite shape during this time. We now require all our young men to read at least through the grammar school, and most of them take a few years in the high school. It may show the progress that has been made in the education of our boys that whereas at the beginning of the 90's we had only one or two reading in the high school, towards the end of this period from twelve to fifteen read there. Our standard may still seem very low. It must be remembered, however, that the boys are the descendants of generations of illiterates, and it is not possible for any but the exceptionally bright ones to pass a higher grade. And even so, they stand intellectually as far, if not farther, in advance of the congregations to whom they will be called to minister as does the average pastor in this country stand in advance of his people. After finishing their secular studies we give them a two years' course of special Bible training. Only after they have passed

* The following table shows the admissions by baptism in detail :

Year.	Total No. of Baptisms.	Net Increase.	No. of Baptized Members in Mission.
1890	843	125	13,566
1891	1,324	190	13,756
1892	756	507	14,263
1893	578	364	13,899
1894	983	275	14,174
1895	1,173	764	14,938
1896	1,158	761	15,699
1897	1,628	1,465	17,164
1898	1,195	647	17,811
1899	1,542	1,153	18,964

through this are they sent to work. Their training does, however, not end here. It continues after they have entered on their work. Annual courses of reading and study are prescribed, and these are followed by rigid examinations which our workers are required to attend and to pass. These examinations cover at least ten years, and it is only after finishing this extended course and after showing themselves workmen approved that they are thought fit candidates for ordination. At the South India Missionary Conference, held in January, 1900, it was interesting to observe the efforts that are being made by the various missionary organizations to develop an efficient native staff of workers, and to notice how generally they were feeling their way toward a system such as has been in vogue in our own mission. It revealed the fact that in this line few were in advance of us; very many were far behind us. And though we cannot claim that all in it was begun during these ten years, yet it was systematized and developed, and put on its present satisfactory basis during this time. The system of itself makes the indolent and inefficient drop to the rear and finally drop out. It develops our native workers and keeps them from stagnating. And though we started the 90's with two native pastors, and ended them with none, yet we have at least twenty-five workers who are the equals and a number of them the superiors of the pastors we then had. It is not because we are going backward that we have not been developing more native ministers. It is for two reasons: First, because we aim at keeping the standard for ordination high; secondly, because we are trying to develop self-support and a native ministry hand in hand.

And this brings me to the progress that has been made in the direction of self-support. And here I notice the general experience of missions, that at the beginning of the work local receipts are very meagre. We have the Apostle Paul's mission policy in support of the principle that Christianity ought not to make burdensome financial demands on new converts. In our mission work, we want teachers, school-books, preachers and churches, and for the few scattered converts to assume all the

financial obligations that these entail, would be enough to discourage them at the outset. Still we dare never lose sight of the great object of our work—that of developing self-supporting and self-propagating churches. Towards this goal the last ten years have been moving as no previous period has done in our mission. The people give a great deal in kind. They give meals to the teachers, houses to the preachers, and work in the building of prayer houses. This itself is no unimportant item, yet in the figures I quote I shall confine myself to cash contributions. In 1890 these amounted to Rs. 865; in 1899 to Rs. 3,793, or more than four and one-third times as much as in 1890. One of the most encouraging advances in this line has been made in our high school and college. In 1890 it cost Rs. 8,023 net; in 1899, Rs. 3,392, and that though the number of pupils increased during this time from 150 to 500. For the last three years at least seventy-five per cent. of the cost of the school has been met locally—from fees and government grants, and our college now is a drain on our foreign mission funds to the extent of only about \$1,000 a year, as against \$3,000 a year ten years ago. Similar reductions in expenses might be noted in other departments of our work. The boarding school must as yet be entirely supported from foreign funds. And yet though the number of students in this school increased from 90 to 140, the expenses have remained almost the same. These 140 boys cost us in 1899 about \$2,600. Were further proof needed that we are moving in the direction of self-help, I would point to the fact that in the beginning of the 90's our annual appropriations from the Board for the general work was \$16,000 a year, exclusive of missionaries' salaries. The annual appropriation for the last few years has been only \$12,000, or a reduction of \$4,000 per annum. In other words, with an ever-expanding work our demand for foreign funds has steadily decreased, the balance being provided for by the larger local receipts in India. The fair measure of success so far attained encourages the hope that a few more decades of faithful work along the same lines will make many of our congregations self-supporting. That college and seminary should pay their own

way there ought to be demanded of our Church in India no more than in this country.

As another item in the development of our congregations, we note the impetus that has been given to Sunday-school work during this period. The annual Sunday-school convention is one of the great events of the year in our mission. We have been publishing our own Sunday-school Lesson Book on the mission press since 1892. With it is incorporated a monthly journal which we call the *Mission News*. It is altogether Telugu, and our edition is 1,500 copies. One of the most pressing needs in India is that of supplying proper literature. Our mission has done little towards supplying this need. It is safe to say that this small attempt at journalism is the best service in this direction that our mission has yet rendered to the cause of supplying our part of India with much-needed, wholesome reading matter.

I have not, so far, touched specially on womans' work. It has been steadily extended. Hers is work not among churches already established, but almost altogether among the non-Christian women of India. There is not much room for self-help here. For woman's work, therefore, the appropriations from this country have steadily increased during these ten years from \$5,000 to \$9,500. The work here must largely yet be done by the Zenana ladies, and by wives of missionaries. They do not have the large staff of native workers that the general work has developed. The number of Zenana ladies increased from two to six during this period. I did not find figures available for a comparative statement, showing the progress that has been made during the ten years. I therefore content myself by giving some figures which show the work done at the close of the period under review. In 1899 there were in the girls' boarding school seventy-five pupils; in the Caste Girls' Schools 854 girls; in the Zenanas 170 pupils, all of whom were married women kept secluded; 172 patients were admitted to the hospital; 5,520 patients were treated in the dispensary, and 151 patients received medical attention in their homes. A few widows have been baptized as first-fruits of the hospital. Doors

have been opened, sick and suffering relieved, the story of the Cross told in the Zenanas, and in the schools. It has been a period of patient sowing, but as in the general work it seems to me the 90's did their greatest work in preparing workers and equipping hospital and dispensary for the work that yet remains to be done.

The work has enlarged in all directions during these ten years. As already stated, the number of pupils in the high school and college increased from 150 to 500; in the boarding school from 90 to 140; the number of villages in which we have Christians from 362 to 529; the baptized membership from 13,566 to 18,964. These figures tell much, but not all. Our mission has gained prestige during these years. Among the missions of South India we are accorded a place out of proportion to our size as a mission. Government officials give us equally generous recognition in all that pertains to educational work. But then, what is better, we have gained prestige among the Hindu and Mohammedan populations. Even making a fair deduction because of the abject servility of the East, which delights in nothing so much as in flattery, it counts for much that influential Hindus and Mohammedans in Guntur will in public meetings even acknowledge the benign influence of Christianity in India. They realize that Christianity has come to stay. It needs no longer to be on the defensive. All that those of other faiths ask of us is that we be equally tolerant with themselves and acknowledge the good in Hinduism and Mohammedanism, as they are ready to acknowledge the good in Christianity. This sentiment has gained strength and depth during these ten years.

But after all has been said I believe the greatest distinction of the work of the 90's will not be its immediate results but in the splendid equipment and thorough organization which these years have produced, and which will tell, and tell mightily, for the future spread of Christianity in that portion of India, which, under God, has been entrusted to us of the General Synod.

ARTICLE VII.

SOME OF THE WEAKNESSES OF DEMOCRACY.

BY T. B. STORK, ESQ.

A few years ago in one of our Eastern cities a worthy gentleman, whom for the sake of distinction we will call Mr. Brown, left a legacy of something like a half-million dollars to erect a triumphal arch, the details of which were very particularly set forth. It was to be erected in a prominent public spot. Upon it were to be placed statues of Generals McClellan, Meade, Hancock—I have forgotten all the distinguished men whose effigies were to adorn it—and last, but not at all least, in the very center, the apotheosis, the climax of all this greatness moral and magnificence physical, was to be placed—what can you imagine sufficiently worthy and appropriate! Nothing less than the bust of Mr. Brown himself, who, until then unknown and indistinguishable from the mass of his fellow-citizens, was thus at a single leap to spring into fame and immortality.

It is not necessary to draw the obvious moral or indulge in reflections such as will occur to all, but the incident may serve very well to direct attention to some of those weaknesses of democratic society which it so picturesquely illustrates. It reveals to us the truth that democratic society fails to furnish legitimate satisfaction to that human craving for distinction, that desire of a man to win from his fellows a recognition, public and universal, of his work and of his deserts and to have bestowed upon him some outward badge or symbol of that recognition. It is the craving that lies at the root of all the class distinctions and orders of honor in aristocratic societies.*

* Business enterprise has not failed to quickly mark and seize upon this craving for recognition and utilize it to its own profit. Thus we have publishers of *The Notable Men of Jonesville*, *Distinguished Americans of the Nineteenth Century*, *Men of Mark*, and similar books, in any one of which the thirst for reputation, public recognition, fame, may be

A pure democracy such as our own, lacking the means of satisfying this craving, lacks a very serious and important part of the social machinery. It is a lack that in primitive and simple societies may not make itself greatly felt, but as society grows complicated, advances in the arts and intricacies of civilization, it is sure to come more and more into evidence. Efforts to supply it by societies of Colonial Wars, Sons and Daughters of the Revolution and the like, are only pathetic in their inadequacy to the end proposed.

In every society there exists this desire for social esteem and appreciation. It is not so strong nor so insistent in its demands for satisfaction as that other great desire of men, namely, the desire for wealth, but it is a nobler and a better desire, and for that reason, and because it is feebler, and stands in danger of being utterly destroyed by its tremendous rival, the love of gold, it is vastly important that no means of strengthening it should be neglected. It stands for moral as contrasted with material good. It prompts men to worthy deeds and the avoidance of all that by common consent is held mean and base. Founded on it, deriving their vitality from it, rest all the distinctions of classes, the badges of honor, the titles and nicely graduated ranks invented by the leaders and controllers of men in early days, as rewards, first, of courage in battle, astuteness in council, and later of cleverness in invention, discoveries in science, and the arts, and later still of generosity in charitable gifts and all those other virtues which now confer as great or even greater benefits on society generally than the old virtues of courage and sagacity in war.

If we figure to ourselves the public esteem and approbation to be a great river of sentiments and opinions more or less vague and unformed, sometimes mistaken, but usually in all

slaked at prices to suit. A steel engraving, with notice of the subject written by himself, costs so much, wood cut ditto so much, and in this expeditious and mutually profitable way a rough-and-ready substitute is manufactured for the ancient orders of merit which we have abolished in America, without touching in any way their root deep down in human nature.

vigorous growing societies working for righteousness and goodness, we may figure these various ranks and orders, titles and badges of merit, as serving like so many dams or reservoirs that gather and concentrate, utilize and give to these sentiments and opinions direction, point and effectiveness.

How great their power may be was well illustrated by the strong influence which her late Majesty Queen Victoria exerted for good morals and upright conduct by her exclusion from her drawing rooms of all who violated the community's sense of decency and goodness. And she was nothing more in this sense but the embodiment of those sentiments and opinions in their highest form, that of the sovereign, the source of honor, of titles, of rank. And it is not impossible that those disgraceful acts of public plunder by officials, that are so common in the United States, would be given a check, if public sentiment and opinion were properly formulated by some outward recognition of honorable conduct and condemnation of the reverse.

We may be sure that these ancient contrivances of rank and class and badges of distinction were not mere empty toys, nor altogether mischievous. They had a useful and important part to play in the social economy, or they had not been so universal nor so long-lived, so that scarcely any society has ever existed that did not possess them in some shape. If for nothing else they were valuable as a counterbalance to that greed for wealth that is, we all know, the over-mastering passion of the modern man. To the vast majority of mankind this greed far outweighs the praise and esteem, of their fellows, symbolized, no matter how finely, by high-sounding titles, and recognizing, no matter what achievements in war, science, art or philanthropy. How many of our fellow citizens, think you, if offered the choice of being Lord Tennyson or Mr. Rockefeller would hesitate even one tedious minute? In the United States as elsewhere millionaire is a word of might to conjure with. Reverence for the rich because they are rich seems to be the only kind of respect remaining in this not over-respectful age and country. And yet notwithstanding all, what country is more responsive to every generous impulse; what people is more

richly gifted with noble feeling than the American? What enthusiasm greets every worthy deed, every heroic act; goes forth to meet them as the daughters of Israel went forth with song and dance to welcome the returning Saul. Recall the triumphant landing of George Dewey, the extravagant ovation to the brave Hobson. A thousand similar instances might be cited. There never was a nation that so eagerly rewarded merit of every sort, or is so quick in its response to all that appeals to what is high and noble and generous. What a boon to a nation so highly endowed, would be the creation of some legitimate tangible expression of these feelings, something that should symbolize to men righteousness, morals, goodness, as against the grossest and lowest of men's appetites, love of gold and the sensual pleasures for which it stands. This vast and deep ocean of national feeling and sentiment is a mighty power for good that only needs to be given definite form and shape to play its true and useful part in rewarding the deserving, not merely with gold, but with honor. It would be highly presumptuous to condemn democratic society for its defects in this regard, or to undertake to manufacture a remedy, as presumptuous as it is to sweepingly condemn aristocratic societies for their titles and class distinctions without appreciating the real social services which such "toys"—if you please to call them so—have rendered. Without them democratic society is poverty-stricken when called upon to honor its great men adequately and fitly; without them the whole system of society is left to be organized and managed on the degrading basis that the one desirable object of attainment is wealth. But gain this, the great god Mammon seems to say, and all other things shall be added unto you, social position, the esteem and friendship of your fellows, and so much of rank, fashion and class distinction, as human ingenuity can contrive to introduce into a purely democratic society, where by law all men are equal.

And so, philosophically considered, not altogether without their social uses are those commercial transactions whereby so much money is exchanged over the international counter for a

title more or less battered and shopworn. They suggest at least worldly objects of ambition other than mere pelf, they help to counteract in some perhaps very small measure the influence of the grossest ideals of happiness that even worldly men can cherish. They represent, be it ever so poorly and inadequately, a little higher and different ideals, they smack of romance, of antiquity, of ancient deeds of valor and heroism, and thus they have a value for social purposes that cannot be disregarded.

Granted a theoretically perfect community of highly trained men and women, and we may suppose them living well and acting nobly without outward incentive other than the respect of their fellows; but to ordinary men and women some symbol and sign of merit that appeals to the eye and touches the imagination is a powerful aid to right conduct. Human nature is weak and prone to yield to manifold temptations of the most sordid and gross kinds. Stealing, lying, fraud, indecencies and swindlings, great and small, are sure to present themselves in various guises to us all, and we can ill afford to spare any artificial safeguards however imperfect, against them.

Nor are the weaknesses and pettinesses that follow in the train of title and class distinction any greater than those which exist in their absence. Toadying and servility to rank are no meaner, no more degrading than toadying and servility to money. Is the hanging on the skirts of the rich for the sake of pecuniary advantages and stock gambling "tips" a more respectable employment for a man than the striving to be seen in the company of "My Lord," or to gain the smile of a Duchess, who, however base or ignoble in their proper person, yet represent often past achievements and services?

Or is the more edifying spectacle that of Mr. Brown and his triumphal arch striving with might and main against oblivion and an obscurity which he feels is undeserved, but knows not how otherwise to escape? Why should not a true social order say to the struggling Brown: Give your half-million legacy to the Home for Consumptives, the Universal Hospital, the Teach-Everything College, and you shall write before your patronymic that small but all-powerful word "Sir," and go down the stream

of time to posterity, not your triumphal arch, but as Sir A. B. C. Brown, Knight of the Charitable Order of St. John, etc., etc., or of whatever society may seem suitable?

Observe how neatly and cheaply society pays Brown, saves the waste and extravagance of his arch, which is of no earthly use to anyone except the architect and the stone masons, and pockets his half-million for a true public beneficence. And at the same time Brown himself is far better satisfied, his hunger for distinction receives its proper and appropriate food, and he is gathered to his fathers with the sense of a rounded and completed career.

Sufficient has been said to suggest the uses which titles, rank, badges of distinction, play in society by way of satisfying the craving of men for the esteem of their fellows, by way of paying also legitimate debts of society to its statesmen, artists, inventors, poets, and so on, and further, their services in utilizing and formulating that great mass of popular sentiment and opinion which exists in all healthy societies, and which, when properly formulated, is a mighty power for good.

In all such societies popular opinion and sentiment make for honesty, sobriety, clean living, honorable conduct, all that we characterize by the general name of goodness. Without, however, direction and some definite form to give them value they roll onward mighty as Niagara and as useless, or which is even worse, their great power undisciplined and unguided or misguided by that mighty organ, the newspaper, acts sometimes oppressively, often cruelly and always blindly.

There is no worse tyrant than public opinion and this is the tyranny to which democratic society is peculiarly subject. It may be startling, but it is nevertheless true, that because of it the Arcadian dream of freedom is no more realized in a great democratic society, like that of the United States, than in the aristocratic and monarchical societies with which it is so much the fashion to contrast it. We are all governed in our thinking by forms of expression, habits of thought, catching words and phrases, that capture our reason before we are aware of it. Many of these were true a century ago and we still accept

them as current, much as we do old coin, forgetting that they have become obsolete or depreciated by the change of circumstances.

A democracy certainly does make all men free and equal in that it frees them from the burdens of class distinctions, the oppression of rank and the tyranny of superiors, but it only substitutes a different rule for that which it destroys. Instead of the tyranny of the few we have the tyranny of the many. It is not here intended to compare, much less decide, the relative advantages of the two; all that is attempted is to portray that other side of the question which always exists and which is often neglected, and justly neglected, for the time because of the immediate necessities of the case. At the time of the American and the French Revolutions and the subsequent revolts of the masses throughout Europe down to 1848, the evils of class distinctions were the crying ones, but now that the crisis is past we may deliberate once more and contemplate the weaknesses and disadvantages of a society like our own with not a vestige of rank or class, level as our own prairies and with as little diversity. Above all let us not imagine that when we have written as the French did, in childish exultation, the words *Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite*, on every public space, we have revolutionized society and gotten rid of all social difficulties. There is no magic virtue in abstractions; whether liberty is a boon or a curse depends much on the use that is made of it. Equality is not of itself anything desirable, nor fraternity until we examine and see what the effect of these is on the happiness of the individual. We cannot look too closely into the beautiful and eloquent words with which glib-tongued orators present us, like so many prize packages gaily decorated and seductively wrapped, but which like them may turn out, when examined, to have very cheap and tawdry contents. There is a tyranny of the many as well as of the few, of the mob as well as of the aristocrat. And the instrument of that tyranny in pure democracies is that great mass of public opinions and sentiments which we have been discussing.

In democracies it is given shape and direction, if at all, by an

irresponsible and often worthless newspaper press. Public opinion, shaped by the press, tries and settles every question. To it the criminal at the bar of justice, the latest popular favorite, be he general, author, actor, statesman, what you will, appeal for final judgment. There they find their fate and future inexorably determined without appeal and without mercy. It is easy to understand whence comes that irresistible power of public opinion expressed and made effective by its formalization in the newspaper, It arises from the absolute equality which really exists between man and man. Each stands at the mercy of his fellows, defended by no panoply of sentimental regard, no badge of class distinction, no prestige of hereditary reputation. Stripped of every adventitious defence each man comes to the bar of public opinion simply and solely on his merits or rather on the community's opinion of his merits. To one so placed what the community thinks of him, how it treats him in business, in social relations, in all the complicated situations of civilized life is of pre-eminent importance. Eccentricity of thought or conduct is excused by no rank, no position, no ancestral title of respect. The common level must be sought by all who value safety or even comfort. His dress, his actions, his thoughts so far as he expresses them, must conform to the common standard or expose him to more or less disagreeable consequences.

It is not to be disputed that in all great communities of men there is this tendency to a common standard enforced by a public opinion more or less exacting, but in other societies there are counter tendencies which to a certain extent break its force, that surround the individual with barriers of rank or of position and thus partially at least protect him. The English country gentleman or noble, panoplied about with immemorial custom, secure in his social position, fortified with the esteem of his own class, can affect an independence of public opinion or prejudice that is all but impossible to the citizens of a democracy.

Instances of this subservience to public opinion, to fear of the neighbor, are continually revealing themselves in American social

life to the philosopher who has an eye for them. Not long ago in one large American city an application was filed for a liquor license, which required, according to local law, the endorsement of a certain number of the applicant's neighbors. One man, himself a total abstainer and property-owner, who considered the granting of the license an injury to his property, nevertheless endorsed the application. He explained his action by declaring that he could not avoid signing; it would be considered unfriendly in him to refuse.

In the same connection another neighbor, a tradesman in the vicinity, signed the application for the license to please one set of neighbors, and then signed a remonstrance against it to please another set.

In another case a man in search of employment produced a letter from his former employer recommending him in the highest terms. Within an hour after the presentation of the letter the employer appeared and declared the man totally unfit for employment, excusing his letter on the ground that he did not like to refuse the man's request for it.

In still another case a domestic presented a reference from her last mistress attributing to her all the virtues of the saints. Upon a personal interview the lady disavowed every assertion in her letter, explaining that she feared the servants' displeasure if she truthfully described her character.

Only the other day a prominent railroad man was quoted as saying that when he met his engine drivers and conductors in his tours of inspection he was careful not to allow his speech to be any better than theirs.

Thus the great averaging process goes on, penetrating and permeating every relation of life, depressing here, elevating there, relentlessly enforcing the democratic commandment: Thou shall be as thy fellow, no better, no worse.

A democracy is the paradise of the average man, the liberty enjoyed is his liberty, to do as he does. In the United States this average man is higher than anywhere in the world, so much so that it is notoriously difficult to obtain good American servants. Laborers, sailors, soldiers, mechanics of

American birth and breeding, grow rarer year by year. Democracy tolerates no differences either up or down. Its mandate is as imperative upon the man below as upon the man above, and the high average of the mass forbids to one man his being a servant as it forbids to the other his being a master; both are equally incompatible with assimilation to the type of the average man in the United States. Even the public men, the leaders and political bosses are many of them only the average man's spokesmen, they are the average man, let us say, raised to the n th power. The most successful are those whose leading consists in anticipating the desires and opinions of the led, and their success is measured by the skill displayed in studying and foreseeing what those desires and opinions of the average man are likely to be. The moment they take upon themselves the role of real leaders, display ideas independent or different from those of the crowd, the sentence is pronounced, so terrible in a democracy, "he does not agree with the party," or to use the newspaper phrase, "he is not loyal, he is a kicker." No matter how correct his views, his doom politically is sealed when these words are spoken, and it is known that he has refused obedience to the opinions of the crowd. Never was there more perfect formula for suppressing all individuality, all true leadership.

It is one of the dangers of democracy that by this leveling process, this averaging of all to a common standard, all independence of thought and character such as tends to create true leaders, may be destroyed. Already the more intelligent students of our political parties are complaining of the lack of real leaders. In a recent newspaper one of them said: "The apparent dearth of leaders is due mainly to our elaborate political machinery designed to make real leaders impossible. * * * Parties exist to furnish a program and leaders, but here in New York they have only killed off talent and destroyed initiative" (*N. Y. Evening Post*). Trees and men must have room to grow if they are to reach their full stature. For vigor and strength of character, isolation and solitude, are indispensable. The isolation may be physical or moral; it may be

the isolation of the far Western frontier, of the wilderness, of the hermit, or it may be the isolation of the privileged class in an aristocratic society, of the country gentry in England, or of the slaveholders of the Southern States of the Union before the war. It does not necessarily follow that such isolation will produce leaders, it is not the cause, but only one of the necessary conditions of their existence.

Goethe gave expression to one side of this truth when he said that all intellectual power perfected itself in solitude. And already we find leading authorities like President Schurmann of Cornell University, in a recent address complaining that the United States has produced no great creative minds such as Darwin and Shakespere, and the characteristic answer is made to him that the intellectual strength of a nation rests not upon a few geniuses, "but upon those achievements of mental force that distinguish the mass * * * * (America's) intellectuality rather aims and desires to be not sporadic, but general" (Boston *Evening Transcript*). This illustrates precisely the averaging process that is taking place, which makes all men Darwins and Shakesperes by proxy, but discourages that originality, that independence of thought, which alone can give us new Darwins and future Shakesperes.

Be assured it was no mere coincidence that the greatest modern leader of men, Napoleon Bonaparte, came from an island where individual initiative and individual independence existed to a degree that almost reached anarchy. George Washington was but an aristocrat of aristocrats, a great provincial land owner; Abraham Lincoln came from the wilderness; the list might be indefinitely extended with few and insignificant exceptions to the rule that the leaders of men come only from those moral or physical isolations and solitudes that allow full and untrammelled development of individual character. Assuredly they cannot be called the natural products of those great modern averaging factories, the crowded cities.

The absence of these conditions has always resulted in a dearth of great men. Examine that powerful and wonderful

society which might almost be characterized as the society for the suppression of the individual, the Society of Jesus.

Loyola, its founder, declares in his constitution of the order, that the members should be remarked for "their true and perfect obedience, for the abdication of their will and their own judgment." He exacts an obedience that, in his own words, "strips yourself completely of your own will, of that freedom which the Creator has given you, and which you must freely give back to him, and consecrate it to the person of his ministers * * * and not only his will, but his intelligence * * * (we must) imagine that all that is ordered by the Superior is the order and the will of God himself."

Here is exhibited the subjection of the individual to society carried to the highest point. It invokes for its authority not human opinion as a democratic society does, but divine command, and is consequently so much the more searching. To disobey the one may be merely eccentricity, unpopularity; to disobey the other is sin. Here, therefore, we may trace the effect produced on character with the more clearness by as much as the purpose is the more pronounced and undisguised. The avowed object of the society's discipline is to extinguish all individual character, will and intelligence, and to make the member the blind tool of the society, represented in the person of his superior.

Upon the results of this discipline the great historian Michelet remarks: "The mechanism of the Jesuits has been active and powerful, but it has done nothing that will live. It has lacked that which for all society is the highest sign of life; it has never possessed a great man, not one great man in three hundred years."

And the reformer Laménais, himself a priest, declares on this point his opinion that: "In intellectual matters, distinction is only attained individually, and all things being equal intellectual value increases in proportion with the facilities and freedom given to its development."

Of the difference in this respect between an aristocratic and a democratic society no sharper contrast, in modern times per-

haps is available than in the political history of our own country up to and including the Civil War.

Prior to that war it was the semi-aristocratic society of the South that gave to the United States in rich abundance the majority of its leading statesmen, generals and politicians. It was they that lent to the South a preponderance in the national councils to which it was entitled by neither its relative wealth nor population. And such leaders as the society of the North did produce came with few exceptions from the extreme West or Northeast, from the primitive societies and simple conditions of life, where the grinding wheels of democratic equality had not yet had the opportunity to do their work, the vast primitive forests and prairies of the West or the simple societies of the farming regions of New England.

The beginning of the Civil War but emphasized the contrast. How long and patiently did Lincoln grope and search in vain for a military leader while the North waited with bated breath.

The South had no such difficulty; on every hand were found capable and able captains that gave to its armies a marked advantage in the preliminary struggle.

The South in the days of slavery was essentially an aristocratic society; a society in which the slaveholders stood a distinct and privileged class, hedged about by the institution itself, with rights and a position that gave the utmost liberty, if not license, to the individual.

The vast plantations isolated the slaveholders geographically for part of the year, at least, from their equals, gave them a sort of petty kingdom of inferiors to rule and tyrannize over if they pleased. Here was a congenial soil for the development of the individual, the leader and ruler of his fellows.

The North presented the opposite social picture, an industrial as well as democratic society, just developing into wealth and prosperity, without a social barrier of any sort or description to protect the individual from the "averaging" process.

For democracy is the triumph of the average man, the apotheosis of the commonplace. Under the beguiling guise of

making all men equal, it strikes down with relentless hand all that is unusual, eccentric, individual. This disease of democracy that kills off the individual for the sake of the average, may some day present us with a serious problem, if by its crushing equality it destroys those conditions which are necessary for the production and development of independent character, of leaders of men.

Whether in the long run this society of the average man will be superior to that society which cherishes and encourages differences and gives play and room for the rise of leaders, is too far-reaching a problem for more than mention here. It is possible to conceive a society whose members are capable of taking care of themselves without leaders, whose every individual is a leader. Certainly the democracy of the United States has shown itself very capable in this respect. In every hamlet and village is found the nucleus of a state, for every social grievance and public necessity there are organized meetings, with chairmen, committees, speakers and resolutions, showing a marvelous aptitude for self-government, which is perhaps another name and phrase for dearth of leaders in the great sense.

ARTICLE VIII.

CURRENT THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

I.

ENGLISH AND AMERICAN.

BY REV. M. COOVER, A.M.

In *The Expository Times* for October the Rev. T. W. Hodge pleads for consistency in the translation of παράκλητος and its consistent use as "Advocate" in John's Gospel and First Epistle. The Paraclete is Christ's "Alter ego." "Christ came in His Father's name, and His work was to glorify the Father. The Spirit comes in Christ's name, and the Spirit's work is to glorify Christ." "Christ is the Advocate of disciples: the Spirit is the Advocate of Christ." In the Epistle Christ is the sinner's Advocate before God; in the Gospel the Spirit is Christ's Advocate before the sinner.

Christ pleads with God His saving grace for sinners; the Spirit pleads with man the truth about Christ. The Spirit convinces the sinner of his sin, vindicates Christ's righteousness, and brings to man's consciousness the divine judgment upon evil. "It is hardly adequate to say that this conviction of sin would secure the acquittal of the disciples, it would secure *the vindication of Christ*; neither is it sufficient to say that the Spirit 'pleads the believer's cause against the world' (Westcott); for *even in the world*, the Spirit is the *Advocate not of the disciples, but of Christ*. *The disciples are not first of all defendants but witnesses.*"

The confused, darkened mind of man finds its illumination in the Spirit. The Spirit brings to the sin-burdened soul the consciousness of redemption through a suffering and crucified Saviour, while this Saviour pleads the sinner's cause before God. "Christ is now man's Advocate with God. That is the teaching of the Epistle. The Spirit is Christ's Advocate with man.

"That is the teaching of the Gospel. Christ pleads the cause of those who did the wrong; the Spirit pleads the cause of Him who suffered the wrong. Christ pleads with the Holy the cause of the guilty; the Spirit pleads with the guilty the cause of the Holy."

It was not long since believed that the Egyptian race, if not the earliest historic race, was at least a race independent of Asiatic origin. The history of Egypt went back four millenniums B. C., to the dynasty of Seneferu or Khufu, the kings at the beginning of the fourth dynasty. But tradition, through Manetho, claimed a founder, Mena, long preceding the pyramid builders. This, however, was regarded even by Maspero as a fable of ancient peoples. Four years ago M. de Morgan, Director of the Service of Egyptian Antiquities, had his attention directed to a tomb on the west bank of the Nile near the town of Negada, about fifteen miles north of Thebes. The tomb built of bricks and buried in the sand contained about thirty chambers built against the wall, and a large central one containing the remains of some significant personage. The brick casement had been subjected to heat and the contents of the tomb calcined by fire. In a state of semi-cremation numerous objects were recovered, some fractured, some intact. Among the remains were portions of calcined bones, the carved foot of the ivory couch on which the body had been placed, a Babylonian seal-cylinder, some well-lathed obsidian vases, and a broken ivory plaque.

Several fragments of the plaque adjusted revealed the *ka* name of a king, the name of his "double" or spirit after death. The contents of the tomb were removed to the Museum at Giza, where from among the fragments the remaining portions of the plaque were recovered, and on the reverse side of the one bearing the *ka* name was the living name, MEN, "King of Upper and Lower Egypt." The manner of burial and the seal-cylinder told the tale of origin and source of culture.

The customs of the Euphrates valley had been transported to the Nile. It told the story of Babylonia where clay was

the writing material, where stones were valued as gems, where pebbles were neatly carved and hung to the wrist to be used as seals for registry and correspondence. Chaldaean culture and customs had found their way into the Nile valley where hieroglyphs could be chiseled in stone, and tombs cut from native rocks. The sandy loam of the Nile valley was ill adapted to receive the impress of a seal, and after the sixth dynasty this mode of writing disappeared from Egypt.

"The land of Shinar" is the mother of Egyptian culture, and the native home of her people. The obsidian vases showed commercial intercourse with the islands of the Aegean Sea, and the beginnings of culture among races dwelling on the islands and northern shores of the Mediterranean. "The island of Melos was the nearest source from which the obsidian could have been obtained, and at how early a date its mines of obsidian were worked has been made evident by the recent excavations of the British School of Athens in the island itself." "Long before the Mykenaeen period the Ha-nibu of Melos had been carrying their knives of obsidian to the other islands of the Aegean and receiving in return the marble that was found in them." "In the bloom of the Mykenaeen age, that is to say, in the Mosaic age of Hebrew history, the art of writing was thus known and practiced, not only in western Asia and Egypt, but throughout the eastern basin of the Mediterranean as well. And the script that was used by the peoples of Krete and Cyprus, of Asia Minor and Greece, was not the cumbrous hieroglyphic system of Egypt or the cuneiform syllabary of Babylonia; it was, on the contrary, a phonetic system of comparative simplicity, the pictorial beginnings of which had been so long left behind that the characters had become linear and conventional. It was, in fact, the precursor of the so-called Phoenician alphabet." The supposed illiteracy of the times of Moses is shown to be false by the dissemination of culture through western Asia, Egypt, and southeastern Europe. The early western incursions by Sargon of Akkad and his son Naram-Sin (3800 B. C.), the Tel-el-Amarna tablets, the neolithic culture of Mykenaeen art in Krete dating probably as early as

1700 B. C., manifest a wide-spread commerce with its attendant pictograph, hieroglyph, and even cursive scripts and literary forms. The antiquity of man is a study interesting, indeed, but Prof. Sayce has made the study of "The Antiquity of Civilized Man" still more so.

The American Journal of Theology for October.

Prof. J. Rendel Harris in the December number of *The Expositor* suggests a textual emendation of 1 Peter 3:19 to clarify the mystery of the preaching "unto the spirits in prison." Jude acknowledges his indebtedness to Enoch by quoting him in his Epistle. Peter shows his indebtedness to Enoch too, but does not make mention of his name. Prof. Harris thinks Enoch's name was embodied in Peter's Epistle, but accidentally has dropped out. 1 Peter 3:19 contains it. The uncial text ran thus: *ENO KAI [ENOX] TOIS * * **, but the similarity of *ENOX* to the particles preceding deceived the eye of the copyist and was overlooked. So it was Enoch and not Christ that preached to "the spirits in prison." The solution is found in Enoch XII: "And I Enoch was blessing the great Lord and the King of the world, when lo! the watchers called me—Enoch the scribe—and spoke to me. 'Enoch, thou scribe of righteousness, go, announce to the watchers of the heaven who have abandoned the high heavens and have defiled themselves with women,' etc. And Enoch went and said, etc.'"

The elimination of Biblical difficulties by the elimination or substitution of the text may secure good sense in rendering the original, but we cannot always be sure it is the sense of the inspired writer.

The emendation of the text is a legitimate critical procedure, but its dangers lie in the subjectiveness of the critic. A sympathetic and critical knowledge of the Greek tongue does impart a keenness of penetration into the language and offers fertile suggestions for the emendation of obscure and doubtful passages. The theological predilections for the traditional interpretation of 1 Peter 3:19 are not so great as to oppose probable proof of the accidental dropping of Enoch's name.

The quotation from the Book of Enoch is seemingly close and suggestive, but we wait for further evidence.

In the same number of *The Expositor* Prof. Ramsay discourses on "The Family and Rank of St. Paul." In his *St. Paul the Traveler* Prof. Ramsay sets forth the probable social and political position of Paul as a Tarsian citizen. The rank of his father indicates considerable wealth and influence. Paul's education at the feet of the distinguished Gamaliel in Jerusalem, his competency in sustaining a lawsuit in the highest court of the Empire by appeal to Caesar, the marked respect paid him at Caesarea and on the voyage to Rome, the distinguished interview and private conversation accorded him with the governor Felix and the Princess Drusilla, indicate influence by the command of money. "King Agrippa and his Queen Berenice also desired to see him. A poor man never receives such attentions, or rouses such interest. Moreover, Felix hoped for a bribe from him; and a rich Roman official did not look for a small gift. Paul, therefore, wore the outward appearance of a man of means, like one in a position to bribe a Roman procurator. * * * An appeal to the supreme court could not be made by everybody that chose. Such an appeal had to be permitted and sent forward by the provincial governor; and only a serious case would be entertained. But the case of a very poor man is never esteemed as serious; and there is little doubt that the citizen's right of appeal to the Emperor was hedged in by fees and pledges."

When Paul became a follower of the Nazarine he was probably renounced by his father's family and excluded from the enjoyment of his father's wealth. Hence we find Paul maintaining himself by the labor of his own hands. As a tent-maker he toiled through the day, and at night met people at his lodging place or in their homes and taught them the gospel of Christ. The strict Phariseism of his father's family would not countenance his alliance to the cause of Christ. But at his father's death he fell heir to his portion of the family estate and means. His costly journey to Rome, however, and the

legal expenses as well as self-maintenance in respectability incurred by his appeal to Caesar and the trial at Rome, exhausted his patrimony, and after several years we find him thankfully receiving gratuitous help from his converts in Philippi. Dr. Gilbert in his *Student's Life of Paul* seems to value but lightly these inferences which are drawn from the Tarsian citizenship and family patrimony of Paul. Mr. Ramsay calls to his aid in vindication of his position the distinguished historian, Prof. Mommsen, who writes: "That Paul, though a trained handicraftsman, belonged to a civilian family of good position, appears from the fact that he possessed the Roman citizenship from childhood; for only the prominent townsmen of the provinces were distinguished in this way." And Prof. Ramsay adds: "No one knew better than Augustus that this aristocratic position could not be maintained without money; and we may be sure that none were admitted to Roman citizenship except those who could support the Rank."

The manumission of a slave to the condition of a freedman was also not unusual, but this occurred mostly by reason of the talent and competency of the slave, or subject, which qualities made him more valuable to his master as a freedman than as a servant. "But, further, it must be observed that St. Paul's father was not a freedman; he was a Tarsian citizen. Now, although Roman law granted Roman citizenship to a slave manumitted with the full and proper legal formalities by a master who was a Roman citizen, yet Greek law was never so generous and enlightened in that respect. A manumitted slave in a Greek city did not acquire citizenship, even though his master was a citizen." If the possibility be admitted that citizenship had been secured by a purchase from some venal governor leaving in doubt the quality and character of the purchaser, yet the willingness and ability to pay a high price for the coveted honor countenances the probability of considerable material means. The educational advantages secured for Paul in his youth, and his costly career subsequent to his arrest in the temple where he was defraying at no small cost the expenses of vows of purification for four men, bear significant

testimony to the probability of the truth of Prof. Ramsay's opinion.

In the November number of *The Biblical World* the Rev. Dr. George H. Gilbert gives a dissertation on "Demonology in the New Testament."

Since to the consciousness of Jesus God was very near to men, angels were little needed as ministering spirits. They were regarded as inhabitants of heaven, whose activities did not much concern men. Bad angels, too, were of but small account. "The place and importance of demons, were, in the thought of Jesus, wholly incidental." Jesus held the popular view of demoniacal possession, which is regarded as a mistaken one. He was subject to the limitations of His times respecting psychological knowledge, and is not to be held as knowing better, yet practicing accommodation to popular superstitions.

The noteworthy attitude of the demonized toward Jesus was their recognition of Him as the Messiah. The explanation of the phenomena of demoniac possession is insanity, insanity on the subject of the Messiah. "If, now, we admit that the demoniacs had heard of Jesus, and like other men had been deeply moved by what they had heard, and that their cries on seeing Jesus were a result of what they had heard, perhaps in some cases the result of what they had seen with their own eyes, then the view that they were insane persons—insane at least on the subject of the Messiah's advent—becomes more easily tenable."

The expectation of the Messiah was wide-spread, and the announcement of His advent affected people of unbalanced mind brooding over the excitable subject and plunged them into monomaniacs on Messiahship. The intense feeling was confined to Judea and Samaria. "There is no instance of demoniac possession among gentiles, as far as the New Testament informs us. It is significant that the phenomenon of demoniac possession seems to have disappeared so soon after the resurrection of Jesus, and that it was confined to Jews and

Samaritans." Dr. Gilbert seems to have forgotten the daughter of the Syrophenician woman in his statement of prevalence; and this case with that of the boy afflicted from childhood, who was brought to the disciples at the hill of Transfiguration, presents two significant examples of children of immature minds who would not likely brood over, or be unduly excited, by the announcement of a Jewish Messiah.

Another form of evidence produced by Dr. Gilbert is his interpretation of the consciousness of sin on the part of the demonized confronting Jesus, and the ethical comprehension manifested in their exclamations. "Even the recluse on the east side of the lake of Galilee, in a section where Jesus had never been, ran to him from afar, and seems to have addressed him at once as Son of the Most High God." "In two instances the demonized are apprehensive that Jesus has come to destroy or to torment them. The narrative seems to attribute this sense of guilt to the demons themselves rather than to those who were possessed. This feature of the narrative is difficult of explanation on either theory of demoniac possession. For, in the first place, it is not easy to see why evil spirits should have volunteered a confession of their fear to Jesus; and, in the second place, assuming that the demoniacs were insane, it is not easy to account for their apprehension that the Messiah would torment them. It certainly was not characteristic of the Jews that they anticipated evil from the Messiah." There is certainly a difficulty here before Dr. Gilbert in the maintenance of his thesis based on the theory of insanity, though he should build on the saying of Dr. Bruce that "Insanity is much nearer the kingdom of God than worldly-mindedness." It is akin to the doctrine that the more a man is beside himself, the nearer he is to God. But mere insanity cannot explain the spiritual conception of certain demonized in respect of the Messiah. The popular expectation of the Messiah lacked the ethical content necessary to the proper apprehension of His mission. For this reason Jesus was compelled to hold back a public admission of His Messiahship, and request silence on the part of all so confessing Him.

The anticipation of a Messiah's advent was so far echoed that mention is made of it by the Roman historians, Tacitus and Suetonius. The announcement of His presence was followed by a wave of enthusiasm. But the conception of His mission was that of the political Zealot and the popular humanitarian deliverer, or Jewish king. And when Jesus refused to be made king, the people's opinion changed. When Jesus had escaped from their presence to the retirement of Caesarea Philippi He asked His disciples, "Who do men say that I, the Son of Man, am?" The people had come to recognize Him as the Messiah, but now that notion had fled when Jesus refused to become king after their appointment. The popular idea of Him now descended to that of leader, or prophet, or forerunner, but not Messiah. And Peter voiced the common opinion when he answered: "Some say John the Baptist; some Elijah; and others Jeremiah, or one of the prophets." A spiritual deliverer was not the expectation. The reticence of Jesus respecting His Messiahship was due to this popular misconception to which He would not accommodate Himself, and was not caused, as some suppose, by the indecision of His own consciousness. Clear and unvacillating was His Messianic consciousness manifested by the decisive choice of the means to be employed in founding the kingdom made at the time of His temptation in the wilderness, evidencing His unwavering conviction that He was the Messiah sent of God. But through all His ministry He was constrained to withhold a public declaration of the acceptance of this title because of the mistaken preconception of the people. Spiritual conceptions were so utterly lacking that Peter's confession elicited the declaration from Jesus that it was only from a supernatural source that Peter had been qualified to express it. "Flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven."

Brooding, or excitement of weak, unbalanced minds over the Messianic expectations so widely prevalent cannot account for the spiritual and ethical statements made by demoniacs upon confronting Jesus. The supernatural seems to be necessary here too for a confession of a spiritual Messiah.

*The December number of the same magazine contains a suggestive article by Prof. Bosworth on *What the Nazareth Years did for Jesus*.

We scarcely appreciate the fully-developed character with which Jesus came forth from Nazareth. The town of His youth had its influence in forming His unique personality and equipping Him for His career. Nazareth did not make Jesus. It "profoundly influenced, but did not dominate Him." It had sufficiency to make Him become known significantly as Jesus of Nazareth. It is here that He won His education and His knowledge of the Jewish Scriptures. From Nazareth's elevation He gazed upon historic places which stirred His enthusiasm and patriotic feelings. He marked the path which Elijah took from historic Carmel across the plain of Esdraelon leaping in advance of Ahab's chariot, fast-driven before the advancing storm. There within sight was the Shunem of Elisha; Gilboa with its sad tragedy of the fallen Saul and Jonathan; and the curtained valley of Gideon's midnight march with his famous three hundred. The great trunk roads of commerce between the Far East and Egypt twined their way in the distance with their long processions of wearily-marching soldiers, caravans of truculent aspiring traders, and sickly travelers seeking health from distant warm baths. From such scenes possibly were quickened those feelings which voiced themselves in the sympathetic call, "Come unto me all ye that weary and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." In His walks on the heights He saw the ravens in their flight; the wild crocus and the lily at His feet; and in the stillness found His joy in prayer and conference with His God. In the home He experienced the grace of social ties, in contrast with the austere and ascetic John the Baptist. His toil at the carpenter's bench gave Him an understanding of the task of family maintenance and the social problem of earning a living. At His mother's knee He witnessed the selecting of a full-shrunken patch to mend a well-worn garment; and at vintage time experienced the disaster of the economic attempt to preserve the new wine in old wine-skins. And at midnight as He lay upon

the rug that hedged the swinging door and forbade its opening, He may have heard the shamelessly-reiterated knock of the borrowing neighbor, and the drowsy reply of the father, "My children are with me in bed; I cannot rise and give thee." Full many a vital experience trained Jesus in sympathy with, and interest in men, and in personal self-control. And yet, all this, however stimulating, and natural, is supposititious, and we cannot claim to have discovered the psychology of Jesus' development, nor the key to His self-consciousness.

II.

GERMAN.

BY REV. S. GRING HEFELBOWER, A.M.

Prof. Gunkel's Commentary on Genesis, Nowack und Gunkel's *Handkommentar zum Alten Testament*, which has just appeared, is of special interest, because it is the first attempt at a complete critical study of Genesis, in the form of a commentary, from the standpoint of the history of religion. In his preface he says that textual and literary criticism, as well as archeological and grammatical explanations, which have heretofore formed the content of Old Testament commentaries, must be considered only a preparatory step for the true Old Testament exegesis, which should seek a "true understanding of the men of the Old Testament, and especially, of their religion." Though this is not a new method for studying this part of the Bible, the emphasis that Gunkel lays upon it, and the fact that his application of it to the entire book of Genesis is the first that has ever been made, have led some Old Testament students to call this commentary "an epoch-making work."

In the text the sections from the several primitive sources, and from the redactors, are distinguished by different type. In the quest of sources, which seems to be the exclusive work of many Old Testament students of to-day, Gunkel has been more richly rewarded than many of his fellow-students. There are, of course, the Elohist and Jahvistic sections. Then he

not only finds two sources in the Jahvistic sections (Budde *et al.*), but concludes that they were two complete and wholly independent primitive collections (the claim of mutual independence is new). When these were worked into one account, "aside from other additions," a third source was introduced, giving us a complex from three different sources, with "other additions," in that which has been known as "the Jahve sections" of Genesis. Even the Jahvistic account of Abraham (the early account) proves to be a literary composite of three previous accounts, Ja, Jb, Jc. Ja was a collection of stories or sagas covering the events of Abraham's life, which gradually grew into the form in which it was when the editor incorporated it into the account that we have now. It has no parallel in the Elohist document of Genesis. Jb has parallels in the Elohist sections and was added later. Then certain parts, that do not fit this theory, are collected under the head of Jc. Even in the Jahve section of the story of Jacob, Chap. XXVI, because it breaks the connection, is "probably" a later addition. The account of Joseph is, of course, made up of the Jahvistic and Elohist sources woven into our present narrative. But chaps. 38 and 49, v. 1 to v. 27 are later additions to the Jahvistic text. However, the primitive Elohist source is a uniform account, with only traces of former combinations. Gunkel recognizes no literary relation between the Jahvistic and Elohist texts; neither one is in any way dependent on the other.

But this analysis of the text is of importance only as a necessary preliminary step for that which is to follow. From these primitive sagas, thus discovered, Gunkel gathers rich material for studying legends, in the form of oral tradition, before they were put into literary form. In this way he claims to reach sources from which he can reconstruct the history of culture, religion and morals, in a prejahvistic age, and to a certain extent, in a prehistoric age.

There are four steps in the process by which he arrives at his conclusion: 1. By the analysis of the composition (see above) he secures the primitive sagas; 2. By reconstructing

the older saga forms from those which we have, by noting and eliminating the little changes that have been made in them when they were collected and committed to writing; 3. By classifying the sagas according to their style; 4. By comparing these sagas, *a*, when the same sagas are given more than once in Genesis; *b*, when also found in other books of the Old Testament; *c*, when found in extra-biblical writings.

By these means Gunkel essays to go back to the very genesis of the sagas and to read from them the contemporary religion and life of the people. Certain of these stories (likely not all of Israelitish origin) are really myths, accounts of the gods, and are older than the real sagas. But the Israelitish religion, which was from the beginning inclined to Monotheism, was not at all favorable to these stories of the gods; hence they had to be changed in the process of adaptation. The real origin of some of these sagas were the phenomena of nature. Creation is represented as a great Springtime, and the deluge is from the great inundations of Mesopotamia. Other myths of Genesis are attempts to answer the questions, Whence is heaven and earth, reason in man, and his death, the differences in languages, etc.? Thus myths are "the beginnings of theology and philosophy."

It is different with the sagas of the patriarchs. They are not myths, though Sarah and Laban and, possibly, Abraham may have been deities. These sagas are classified as follows: Historical; Ethnographical; Aetiological. The last class is subdivided into, Ethnological; Etymological; Geological and Cult sagas.

Many other conclusions of Gunkel are interesting, but this is sufficient to give a good idea of his position. It is reported as the most extreme production of the negative criticism of the Old Testament that we have seen in the last seven years. Even a laymen in Old Testament matters can see that it is a veritable labyrinth of finely-spun theories, through which Gunkel must pass in order to arrive at that knowledge of primitive conditions, which he considers the most important result of the study of Genesis. And yet Steuernagle, a young

Professor in Halle, agrees with almost everything that is claimed, and is very profuse in his praises of the wonderful scientific value of the book. We regret that we are not able to give the opinion of Prof. Rothstein, his senior colleague in Old Testament work at Halle. Judging from recent declarations he has made concerning the Wellhausen school (See this vol. of *QUARTERLY*, p. 446.), we think that in all probability he would regard it as only another sign of the certain dissolution that threatens the left wing of Old Testament criticism.

A suggestive incident occurred in Leipzig University in November, 1901. Prof. Guthe, of the theological faculty, probably its most liberal member, declared unconditionally that Polytheism was the primitive religion of Israel, from which they developed to Monotheism, and proceeded to establish it from Old Testament passages. The next day Prof. Linder, of the philosophical faculty, in lecturing on *Introduction to the History of Religion*, said: "Students of the Old Testament are wont to claim that the Israelitish religion developed from Polytheism. There is no proof for it. They find such development in contemporary and adjacent religions, and simply assume it for Israel."

The question of inspiration, in its relation to Old Testament Prophecy, has been treated frequently within the last five years, in commentaries, works on Old Testament Introduction and Old Testament Theology, and in a number of pamphlets that have appeared from time to time. The tendency seems to be toward a more conservative estimate of the prophetic office and the value of its productions as the revelation of God. The division of the prophetic books, as we know them, still continues. But the critics, as a rule, merely claim that a greater number of prophets were used by God, in giving us the prophetic parts of the Old Testament, than we have believed. At present the dating of some of these sections is the most negative element in the work of the critics. Certain parts are assigned to dates so recent that most of their supernatural

character and religious value is lost. Last year Prof. Kittel, of Leipzig, delivered a lecture on *Profetie und Weissagung*, in which he stated his position as to the relation of the human and divine elements in prophecy. It is essentially the same as that of Giesebrecht. The prophets were patriots, reformers, preachers, but above all "men of God," who had an "immediate revelation," which, worked out in their lives and personal experience, became "mediate revelation." Thus, though they could be certain that the resulting message that they had for the people was God's word, they added to it a large human element. Kittel regards the fulfilling of this prophecy as concerning only the "kernel" and not the "shell." "We can easily see how Kittel strives to vindicate the divine character of Prophecy, and at the same time to lay proper emphasis upon the human side, and to give a psychologically mediated explanation of the phenomenon." In his evident attempt to stand between the extreme left wing of Old Testament critics and the conservative party, he is forced to hazy conclusions (like others with similar ambitions) which satisfy neither class.

On the other hand, Prof. Koenig, in his address delivered about the same time at Wupperthal on the *Offenbarungsbegriff des Alten Testaments*, gives a clear and unequivocal statement of the supernatural character of the office of the prophets. Their messages cannot be the result of the observation of nature, the course of history or their own inner experiences, or of the teachings concerning the future in the so-called schools of the prophets, or of their thoughts in moments of "ecstasy." The source is to be sought "exclusively" in a "supernatural sphere." In the religious history of Israel the unseen world projected into the visible world.

Cornill is inclined to prefer Kittel's position to that of Koenig.

Dr. Rietschel, Professor of Practical Theology in Leipzig University, discusses, in a recently published pamphlet, the question of a union or federation of the Evangelical Churches

of Germany. He gives a brief history of the movement, from the Reformation to the present, as a foundation for treating the necessity of such a movement, and then exposes the weaknesses of the previous attempts. The federation dare not be effected by placing over the several state Churches a central legal authority, after the pattern of the Empire. Proposed plans that have had this in view have remained unrealized creatures of the imagination (Dorner, Brückner, Lechler, Hofmann, Beyschlag, *et al.*). Rietschel does not think that altar fellowship among the Evangelical Churches should be considered a means for attaining this end, because it simply has nothing to do with common church interests and rights. Yet it is the duty of the Lutheran Church "to admit to the Lord's Supper such Evangelical Christians as come hungering and thirsting—to the table of the Lord, even when they have not formally come over to the Lutheran Church." "A confession that is to stand over the several confessions is and remains, nevertheless, a union confession, and such a union by consensus must be excluded from such a confederation." The organization must be a simple federation, into which the several state Churches enter voluntarily. All the machinery of the Empire is to be rejected, save a central committee, which shall attend to business matters coming up when the general body is not in session. All questions within the Churches, confessions, theological science, polity, in brief, everything that touches the independence of the state Churches, is excluded. "The meaning of the alliance consists in having a protection for the general evangelical interests against Rome, civil legislation and the sects, and at the same time in possessing a common field of work in the positive care of evangelical Germans in foreign lands."

It is now more than fifty years since the question concerning the reform of evangelical confirmation began to be agitated in Germany. In the last decade the general interest has increased greatly, as is proved by the extensive literature on the subject, in pamphlets and magazine and newspaper articles, and by the numerous assemblies of preachers and religious teachers that

have discussed the subject. In the September and October numbers of the *Theologische Rundschau*, Professor Achelis, who lectures on Practical Theology in Marburg University, gives a resume and critique of the publications that have appeared. "Confirmation, even in its present form, enjoys such a high esteem, and is so deeply rooted, that only the very best reasons can awaken the hope that the need of a renewal can succeed. For the pastors it is the crown of their catechetical work, often the very blossom of their pastoral labors in the growing congregation; and even the voice of conscience with many an earnest pastor does not avail to dim the glory that surrounds confirmation. Throughout the congregation it is valued above baptism. Not to mention the frequent very worldly degeneration of the ceremony in family celebrations and the like, for the consciousness of the evangelical people, confirmation is the passing from the unripe age of childhood into the riper age of youth. For most children it means the end of school days and the beginning of life as a citizen with an occupation, and the attaining of a series of churchly privileges, through which confirmation surrounds the young Christian with a religious consecration, the like of which it really does not have. The adherence to confirmation and the power of the custom are so great that in the first decade after the introduction of the new civil law (not requiring confirmation and baptism and the religious ceremony in addition to the civil ceremony at marriages), in Berlin, Koenigsberg, Stettin and Magdeburg, four-fifths of the marriages were without religious ceremony, two-fifths of the children were not baptized, but almost without an exception every fourteen-year-old child was confirmed. This general estimate of confirmation explains, at least in part, why the holiday humor is allowed to influence people too easily to neglect to study the origin, manner and purpose of confirmation. Of course everywhere it stands in some relation to baptism and the Lord's Supper, but so many different conceptions of that relation prevail. Simons examined a large number of these opinions, and found that a number of the defenders of the present practice admitted, not only that great confusion pre-

vails as to the conception of confirmation, but also that there is perfect option as to the plan of teaching, material, method and purpose of catechisation. Among the numerous voices that have been heard on the question recently, scarcely one is to be found who would have the present condition, at least of catechisation, remain untouched."

Achelis finds three chief viewpoints, from which confirmation is criticized and change is advocated. The ecclesiastico-political, the pedagogical and the religious and moral. These can be distinguished but not separated.

1. "We call that plan ecclesiastico-political which would train up out of the mass of the baptized and the confirmed a nucleus of faithful Christians, to whom the administration of the Church can be trusted. They feel that it is a great impropriety, that, according to the prevailing presbyterial and synodical order, every person confirmed, in the course of a certain number of years, attains the privilege of voting and being a candidate in the churchly corporations, although, especially in the larger cities, scarcely ten per cent. participate in the Lord's Supper or the divine services of the Church. 'The present method of confirmation is the organized devastation of the Church.' (Stoecker)." Certain advocates of change classed here recommend a double confirmation (Hoeftling, v. Zeschwitz), one admitting to the sacramental privileges of the congregation, and the other admitting, after four years of voluntarily received instruction, to the exercise of the administrative rights in the congregation. Others of this class (Schleiermacher, v. Hofmann, K. Buckrucker, Theodosius Harnack and, to a certain extent, Adolph Stoecker), with differences in details, would limit the exercise of the privileges and responsibilities of administration to those who partake of the Lord's Supper regularly.

2. The second class of writers deal with the problem chiefly from the standpoint of catechetical instruction in the schools, and its relation to confirmation. Much has been published on the question and a number of meetings have been held. The following are some of the changes suggested: Children should

be older when confirmed (one writer advocates the opposite); Full confirmation; No confessional obligation; No vow; A better understanding between Church and schools as to the matter and method of teaching; Simplification of confirmation, etc.

3. "In order to bridge over the recognized deep chasm between the requirements of confirmation, and the religious and moral life of the confirmed, W. Caspari and H. Cremer would like to see the universality of baptism and confirmation set aside. Because the baptism of children assumes a subsequent Christian training, the children of such parents, as the Church cannot trust with their Christian training, should be excluded from baptism and subsequent confirmation." Achelis finds here the free Church, but *in pessima forma*, and the dangerous assumption of a sort of infallibility on the part of the Church in claiming to know the hearts of the parents. He justifies fully the attacks made on the incongruity of unripe fourteen-year-old children using the present forms of confessional obligation and vow. In order to avoid the difficulty, some writers advocate the simplest forms. Those which are found in the new Prussian "Agende" are severely criticized because they are beyond a child, and express assensus to a dogma rather than the faith of the heart. Almost all religious teachers and many pastors advocate, in addition to simplification of forms, a change of the age for confirmation from the fourteenth to the sixteenth year. But Achelis sees many difficulties in the way of this innovation.

The cardinal question of the entire reform movement is this: "Can we, religiously and morally, justify joining to a confirmation that is obligatory for all an obligatory confession and vow and an obligatory first reception of the Holy Sacrament? The answer to the question cannot be doubtful. Every confession of faith that is worthy of the name, and every vow of faithfulness to the confession and to live a Christian life that is worthy of the name, and the partaking of the Holy Sacrament, are not only worthless, when they are the result of coercion, instead of being born of a free personal decision, but are to be rejected.

This dare not raise any objection in the Lutheran Church." Achelis here reviews the defenses of the present practice, and concludes that they show clearly that coercion is present and that it is intolerable.

He concludes thus: "Accordingly confirmation must be freed entirely from the confession and vow, from connection with the Holy Sacrament and the rights of Church administration, and must get a simpler and clearer catechetical character, as that act in which the presupposition for infant baptism, namely, the succeeding Christian training, is set down as completed, so far as it lies in the hands of the organ of the Church and is a matter of instruction." "This is one condition for the reception of the Holy Sacrament. The other is the voluntary decision, the free desire of the confirmed." Religious instruction should not cease with confirmation; it should merely cease to be obligatory. This post-confirmation instruction will mean more pastoral work and a great change in the life of the pastor.

Almost everybody who has treated this question sees a great and pressing need for a thorough reform in religious instruction. The plans suggested vary greatly. It is not time to speak of the attainment of definite and marked results. But a great advantage has been gained, in that a wide interest has been awakened. The problem is only in the stage of discussion. However, there is almost absolute agreement as to the need of smaller classes, an understanding with the schools as to the matter and method of instruction and as to the practical religious character of the instruction.

Perhaps the most striking thing in these articles by Achelis concerning this discussion is the unconscious, and therefore eloquent, confession of the weakness of the state Church in this respect. In a number of the articles that he condenses and quotes, the "free Church" is mentioned as something to be feared and avoided.

The theological stir, caused by the appearance of Harnack's *Das Wesen des Christentums*, has subsided, but the book is by no

means forgotten. Its influence can be estimated, but not known. The demand for it has exceeded that for any book published in many years. It is now in the fifth edition, between 21,000 and 25,000. Some admirers of the book claim that it is the most important work that has appeared since Schleiermacher's *Reden ueber die Religion* of 1799. A learned conservative pastor, who, in addition to his pastorate, occupies a position that brings him into contact with many professors of many universities, made the following observations concerning Harnack's lectures: Among the theological professors it is comparatively fruitless. I have not heard any one speak of the book as profound, and nearly every one, liberals as well as conservatives, note a marked lack of thoroughness in it. Its influence among the teachers of the schools is great, more so among men than among women. It has also had great influence on the student body of Germany. But that is natural; youth is critical and ready for new theories. This accounts, in part, for the popularity of the book. Speaking from the largest city and from a chair in the largest university in all Germany it was easy to get a hearing elsewhere. One Professor, not noted for his conservative tendencies, said: "We must acknowledge that even Harnack can go mad at times." A very conservative noted professor of history said: "I consider Harnack a great historian in the early Church. But in dogmatics, where this book properly belongs, he is nothing." All the professors whose opinions are known to us, conservative as well as liberal, recognize a great service that the book has done and is doing among the cultured classes who have had little or no practical interest in Christianity. They are not in a condition to bear much positive truth. And Harnack does not offer them much. But that little which he does offer has a religious warmth and enthusiasm about it, the influence of which they cannot help feeling. Though, in a certain sense, this book can be considered a polemic against that which is generally called orthodox, it is, nevertheless, a powerful advocate of a living Christianity. The professors who have expressed themselves in regard to the matter, are glad that the lectures were pub-

lished. The published replies have been very numerous, and generally considered weak. That of Prof. Walther, of Rostock (now in 5th. ed.) is considered the best by nearly everybody. Prof. Cremer's attack (Griefswald) is the only one to which Harnack replied. He strikes at Walther very sharply in the preface to the 5th edition. He says that he has not been able to learn anything from his antagonists. At present the book is being criticized as a theological exercise in one of the theological Vereins at Leipzig. Prof. Seeberg, of Berlin, is lecturing on *The Fundamental Truths of the Christian Religion*. Like Harnack's lectures, they are public for the students of all faculties. Rev. Tressler writes that he lectures with great power, and has about 400 hearers. Prof. Lasson, of the philosophical faculty of Berlin, is also giving a *publice* on "Faith and Knowledge." His position is pronouncedly conservative. It is understood that these two courses of lectures are intended as replies to Harnack, though thus far in Seeberg's room no reference has been made to him.

ARTICLE IX.

REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE.

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND CO., BOSTON AND NEW YORK.

Life Everlasting. By John Fiske. The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1901. Price \$1.00.

Special interest attaches to Dr. Fiske's brief discussion of this great subject because of his thorough acceptance of the evolutionist theory of man's origin from brute ancestry and his eminent ability and sincerity as an interpreter of it. Against the skeptical tendencies developed by the theory, he has maintained a high appreciation of the value of man's religious interests and aspirations. His broad scholarship and independence as a thinker, as well as his whole relation to the thought of our times, give peculiar interest to his expression of views on this profound and vital theme of a future life. "The faith in immortal life," he declares, "is the greatest poetic achievement of the human mind, it is all-pervasive, it is concerned with every moment and every aspect of our existence as moral individuals, and it is the one thing that makes this world inhabitable for beings constructed like

ourselves. The destruction of this sublime poetic conception would be like depriving a planet of its atmosphere; it would leave nothing but a moral desert as cold and dead as the savage surface of the moon."

The discussion is the Ingersoll Lecture for 1900, delivered at the request of Harvard University, and published as delivered. In the first part the author seeks the probable genesis of the idea of life after death, and concludes that belief in it was "not only coeval with the beginnings of the human race, but also coextensive with it in all its subsequent stages of development—in short one of the differential attributes of humanity." He notes the immense advance over all Gentile and even Hebrew views by "the glorious and inspiring Christian development of the belief in immortality," and recalls the grotesque and hideous perversions introduced into mediaeval scholasticism and Dantean poetry. In enumerating the occasions of modern skepticism on the subject Dr. Fiske notes the discovery of the correlation and equivalence of the physical forces, the connection of mental phenomena with the various degrees of complexity of nerve organization, and especially the doctrine of evolution. His method of discussion is an examination of these forms of teaching as maintained by recent science, with a view to a critical verdict as to their bearing on the question of a future life, or the natural immortality of man. His examination discovers no new impediment to belief in it. In respect to the correlation of force, after tracing the metamorphosis of motions within the body, from the sense organs to the brain, and thence outward to the muscular system, he finds the *physical* circuit complete in itself, the "consciousness" being neither the cause nor the effect, neither the producer nor the offspring, but "simply the concomitant." "As for our conscious life, that forms no part of the closed circle, but stands entirely outside of it." He rejects the materialistic explanation of mind. To the materialistic claim that the relation of intelligence to the brain is like that of music to the harp, and that when the harp is broken there can be no more music, Dr. Fiske opposes the "view long familiar to us, that the conscious soul is an emanation from the Divine Intelligence that shapes and sustains the world, and during its temporary imprisonment in material forms the brain is its instrument of expression. Thus the soul is not the music but the harper." And he adds: "Obviously this view is in harmony with the conclusions which I have deduced from the correlation of forces. Upon these conclusions we cannot directly base an argument sustaining man's immortality, but we certainly remove the only serious objection that has ever been alleged against it. We leave the field clear for those general considerations of philosophic analogy and moral probability which are all the guides upon which we may call for help in this arduous inquiry."

After the same manner he treats the difficulty alleged in the Darwinian theory of man's origin—when and how could immortal man have

been produced from an ephemeral brute?" This he holds as essentially simply an appeal to our ignorance of the mode—not necessarily a confutation of the fact. And he holds that the analogy of "leaps," even prodigious leaps," in nature after long preparation, well suggests a way in which all the higher spiritual attributes may have been bestowed. And he maintains that since "this belief in an unseen world, especially associated with the moral significance of life, was coeval with the genesis of man, and has played a predominant part in his development ever since, that belief must be based upon an eternal reality, since a contrary supposition is negatived by all that we know of the habits and methods of the cosmic process of evolution." Dr. Fiske's claim is, thus, not simply that modern science has not nullified the rational grounds of faith in man's immortality, but rather strengthened them.

M. VALENTINE.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

The Early History of Syria and Palestine. By Lewis Bayles Paton, Ph.D., Professor of Old Testament Exegesis and Criticism in Hartford Theological Seminary. Pp. xxxvi and 302. Price, \$1.25 net.

This is Volume VIII of what is known as the Semitic Series. The entire series embraces thirteen volumes. Under the announcement of this projected work we are told that "Recent scientific research * * * has provided us with a picture of hitherto unknown civilization, and a history of one of the great branches of the human family. The object of the present series is to state its results in popularly scientific form. Each work is complete in itself. * * * Each contributor is a specialist in the subject assigned him, and has been chosen from the body of eminent Semitic scholars both in Europe and in this country."

Our author fulfils these promises very well. His style is clear and concise. He avoids technical terms and his work covers the entire ground indicated by the title. The opening chapter begins with chronological tables of the early Babylonian, the Egyptian, the later Babylonian and the Assyrian dynasties, and of the Kings of Judah and Israel. The author is quite conservative in his time estimates, dropping several milleniums of years and adopting the views of recent German writers on this subject. Then follows a chapter on Bibliography which is very full and of great value to the investigator. In the succeeding chapters the history of Syria and Palestine is presented, as this history may be gathered from the inscriptions of surrounding nations and from the Old Testament. Who the original dwellers of these two lands were, whence they came and what their character, our author professes not to know. The Canaanites are the product of the Amorites carried hither by successive waves of immigration and the expelled Hyksos of Egypt. The proofs adduced for this view are not convincing.

The Hebrews are the next invaders. The varying fortunes of these people from the establishment of the monarchy to the final captivity,

the influence of the Egyptian, Hittite, Assyrian and later Babylonian supremacy, are fully described. When drawing upon the Bible, however, for facts for his history, our author feels called upon to reconstruct the Old Testament. In doing so he follows along the lines of the most extreme rationalistic criticism. This is a pity; nay, more, it is a blot on an otherwise fair page. It mars the book. If the author deals as violently with other documentary evidence that he uses in making up his history, his book is not above suspicion. Moreover, it is altogether unnecessary to pursue such a method when writing a history of Syria and Palestine. Such a history can be written without tearing the Old Testament into fragments. Such histories have been written. It has not been shown that the Old Testament is in conflict with any archaeological discoveries that have been made.

T. C. BILLHEIMER.

The Messages of the Prophetic and Priestly Historians. By John Edgar McFayden, M.A. (Oxon). Pp. 350. Price, \$1.25 net.

It is fortunate for the great body of Christians that neither the Bible nor the Church in her ecumenical creeds, has attempted to define inspiration. Theologians and certain denominational confessions have ventured to give a categorical definition of the phenomenon, but the Scriptures themselves and the Church do not insist upon any theory of Biblical inspiration. That the Spirit of God aroused and guided certain great prophetic souls to action and rebuke, to sing, and to write laws of councils, is beyond dispute. But primarily it was persons that were inspired and not their writings. All this is becoming more and more clear as we study critically the Old Testament.

The Messages of the Prophetic and Priestly Historians aims at presenting the essential, that is, the religious messages of the historical books of the Old Testament, as those messages are reached and interpreted by the scholarship of to-day. One of the greatest difficulties that besets, for the general reader, the scientific study of the Old Testament, is the absence of any easily accessible criterion to distinguish the original sources from the later redactional material. These are two of the purposes of Mr. McFayden's book. The third is to present in paraphrase the outlines of Jewish history in the light of its great dominant theological ideas.

The origin of Hebrew literature he finds in poetry—a poetry rugged and celebrating great victories. War ballads form the earliest type of Hebrew writing, such as Book of the Wars of Jehovah (Num. 21 : 14; Num. 10 : 35, 36); The Book of Jashar (Josh 10 : 13). Formal literature was hardly possible before David. Every student of the Old Testament is driven to consider the question of a Hexateuchal analysis. The Book of Joshua, which deals, among other things, with the campaigns and the ultimate settlement in the West, is the necessary complement to the Story of the Pentateuch. Together they make one

theme. When to this is added the fact that the literary features which characterize the Pentateuch reappear in the Book of Joshua, it will be seen that we are justified in regarding as our unity not the Pentateuch, but the Hexateuch.

Our author points out that the unity of the first six books is not a unity of authorship, for there are many incoherencies. Take, for example, Exodus 32. Here is a really dramatic incident—an apostasy and an intercession. So much is clear; but the detail is not only obscure—it is conflicting. In verse 14 the apostate people are forgiven by their God. In verses 19 and 20 they are punished by Moses. In verses 25 to 29, three thousand of them are slain by the tribe of Levi at the command of Moses in execution of the express command of God, who had pardoned them but a few verses before. Nay, in verse 35 God actually punishes them himself after having in verse 34 suspended the punishment for the second time. Other contradictions are pointed out by our author. Chronological difficulties, duplicates, etc., all drive us to an analysis. Mr. McFayden's presentation of the clew as found in the names for God—Jehovah and Elohim—the characteristics of each group of documents, the appearance of the Jehovist-Elohist are as clear and satisfactory recital of the results of modern criticism as we have read. He declares that the Elohist and Jehovistic documents belong to the Northern and Southern kingdoms respectively; that each document is the work of a school. The Jehovist he thinks is the earlier. Neither could be earlier than the time of David or later than Amos or Hosea. His sketch of the national history as given by the prophetic historians is necessarily scrappy by reason of paraphrase. He thus characterizes the historical quality of these earlier writers: "The history is not written for its own sake, but as the vehicle of great religious ideas. In other words, it is written in the prophetic spirit, and by men to whom ideas meant more than facts. * * * Gleaming through the gray tradition are bright and indisputable facts which historically cohere and are of high historical value; but of more value than the facts are the divine ideas which they suggest and partially illustrate." The two later sections of the book treat of "The Prophetic-Priestly Histories" and "The Priestly Historians." The same didactic value of history appears in the work of the writers of Deuteronomy, which was discovered 621 B. C., and which marked an epoch both in the history of Israel's religion and literature. The exile gave impetus to the study of ritual practice. That study was encouraged by the course of history after the return. It expressed itself in the effort to write the history of the origin of the theocracy. It idealizes the past by ignoring all scandal. Priestly interests have marked prominence even in ordinary narrative. It has a more exalted conception of God.

By the use of various styles of type the author presents what the great body of conservative critics consider the original story, the additions, and the redactions of the text.

One feels grateful that the editors of this series—*The Messages of the Bible*—selected such a clear and careful writer to present the consensus of opinion upon the historical study of the Old Testament from the view-point of modern criticism. As we said in the beginning of this sketch—It is fortunate for the great body of Christians that neither the Bible nor the Church has attempted to define inspiration. The new era of historical Biblical study certainly demolishes many of the older theological assumptions concerning the present text of the Old Testament. The history of Israel becomes far clearer and more vital under the guidance of such leaders in sane criticism as Mr. McFayden.

E. H. DELK.

THE MACMILLAN CO., NEW YORK.

The Teaching of Jesus. By Geo. Barker Stevens, Ph.D., D.D., Dwight Professor of Systematic Theology in Yale University. Pp. 190. 75 cents.

The ever-increasing literature on the words and works of Jesus testifies to His supremacy in the world's best thought. Until recently, however, the specific department of Biblical theology has been somewhat neglected by American authors. Dr. Stevens is probably the leading contributor. His *Johannine* and *Pauline Theology*, and his more recent *Theology of the New Testament* have given him a very high place in Biblical scholarship.

The Teaching of Jesus is a reproduction of the substance of the first two parts of his *Theology of the New Testament*; yet it is practically a new work. The matter has been rearranged and rewritten to bring it into somewhat narrower limits. In point of clearness and freshness the new work excels the old. The aim of the volume is "to aid in clarifying the meaning of Christ's life and work by setting forth the principles of His teaching in a clear, succinct and systematic form. The effort has been made to translate the thought of Jesus into modern terms, and so to correlate the different elements of his teaching as to exhibit its inner unity."

Dr. Stevens makes use of the best results of exegetical and historical criticism. But his conclusions are practically in harmony with the old faith. The divinity of Christ, the universality of sin, and indeed all the cardinal doctrines of the Church are found in his *Teaching*. He denies "total depravity" in the sense that the fall left no good in man. The old dogmatists certainly were wont to overstate this matter. Perhaps the principal point of hesitation in approving Dr. Stevens will be found in his treatment of those portions of the gospels which are explanatory of Christ's own sayings. He does not find absolute inerrancy in the interpretations of the evangelists.

The volume belongs to the excellent series of *New Testament Handbooks*, edited by Shailer Matthews. It is designed as a text-book for schools and Bible classes, and as a manual for private study. The

teachings of Jesus in the synoptic gospels and in John are presented together, and not separately, as in the larger work. We believe that this is the better way in such a treatise. We commend also the marginal statement of the topic of each paragraph as a decided help to the student and the general reader.

J. A. SINGMASTER.

MORNING STAR PUBLISHING CO., BOSTON, MASS.

New Wine Skins. Present Day Problems. Lectures De ivered before the Maine Ministers' Institute, at Cobb Divinity School, Lewiston, Me., September 3-8, 1900. Pp. 457.

As is at once evident, the title of this volume of interesting discussions is drawn from the phraseology of Matt. 9 : 17 (Revised Edition), and advises us of the progressive trend of the contents. However, the "new vintage" here preserved, being gathered by seven different lecturers, is not all equal in the type and flavor of newness. Of the ten lectures given, three treat of Sociology, two of the Problem of Philosophical Interpretation, two of the Problem of Biblical Interpretation, one of the Problem of Practical Work, one of Methods of Evangelization, and one of Opportunities before the Church of To-day.

The first three lectures, by Dr. J. H. W. Stuckenberg, on the Meaning and Scope of Sociology, The Nature of Society, and The Social Forces, respectively, are worthy of the highest commendation. Though the presentation of the great subject is necessarily brief, filling only seventy-five pages, simply marking out the aim and bearing of the social problem, fixing the elemental conceptions involved in the term Society, and noting the different forces whose adjustment is to give us the solution of the problem—a mere synopsis of the science to be investigated—the author's wide range of view, thoroughness of investigation, mastery of resources, and discriminating judgment are everywhere evident. It is a well organized and valuable introduction to the science of human society. The seriousness and difficulties of the whole problem are brought strongly into view. The learned author, instead of attempting an elaborate solution, in his small space, limited himself to making a plea for earnest study of the subject and simply sketching out the fundamental principles that must determine that solution.

Prof. F. C. Robinson's paper on Science and Religion is able and valuable. His view-point is that of evolutionist science. But he argues well against materialism and for the spiritual essence of the human mind. Following this up he finds, after the manner of John Fiske, some support for the belief in its natural immortality. His evolutionism is distinctly theistic, finding a Divine Intelligence to be a necessary pre-supposition as the First Cause of nature, as nature exhibits itself to scientific inspection. From like scientific facts he maintains that the relation of God to the evolutionary progress and the providential

direction of the world is such that he can efficiently help or guide the movement without disturbing the fixed laws of matter and force. God does not simply let nature alone. The lecture of Dr. A. T. Salley on Advantages of the Historical Method in Studying the Old Testament, and also that of Prof. Alfred Williams Anthony on the Historical Setting of the New Testament Evangel, are temperate and impressive presentations of important subjects. The latter, however, in connection with the fact of Christ's making no provision whatever for leaving a written record of His teaching and work, seems to be justly open to criticism for the one-sided and repeated emphasis with which that fact is credited simply to His embounded trust in man, "supreme trust in humanity." "He trusted men," after He had left His life in them. Surely He had not found even His disciples infallible in themselves. Would it not be nearer the full truth, had the professor counted the Divine Providence as meant to be a factor in the future of Christianity, and as furnishing at least in part an explanation of this "trust"? "Lo, I am with you always." "The Spirit shall bring all things to your remembrance."

The new wine skins offered in Rev. C. S. Patton's lecture on Herbert Spencer and the Christian Faith are not to be commended. Its pantheistic identification of God and man and new evolutionary Trinity show alien vintage, not to be accepted for conservation in Christian theology.

M. VALENTINE.

PERRY MASON COMPANY, BOSTON, MASS.

If we were asked to recommend a weekly periodical for young people we should unhesitatingly name *The Youth's Companion*. It is clean, entertaining, full of interesting and useful information. A boy or girl that reads it a year will want it the next and will continue to want it long after age matures. Its management keeps it on a high plane of excellence. Among its contributors are leading writers of national and international reputation. Manifestly no expense is spared in maintaining its rank as a model paper for the young, and it well deserves to lead in circulation as it leads in every other respect. Its price is reasonable, \$1.75 a year. No. 201 Columbus Avenue, Boston, Mass.

ATLANTIC MONTHLY, BOSTON.

Those who know and love what is best in literature will not miss the *Atlantic Monthly* for 1902, for, while it has never failed its readers in the past, it has an unusual list of attractions for the coming year.

The Hon. John W. Foster, ex-Secretary of State, will contribute a paper upon "The Latin-American Republics." Mr. Ambrose Winston will furnish three articles dealing with the history and present characteristics of American Labor Organizations. Miss Vida D. Scudder will furnish a group of papers upon the Present Social Movement, and Prof. Barrett Wendell has promised the *Atlantic* some essays dealing with the American of to-day. There will be articles on Golf, Sailing,

Going into the Woods, and another one on the far-reaching influences of outdoor sport as followed in Great Britain and America, by John Corbin. Two anonymous papers which are sure to attract attention are "The Confessions of a Provincial Editor" and "Our State University." There will be papers on the most timely subjects, fiction by the most popular writers of the day, and indeed almost all of the contributions for the new year are from those writers who have won undisputed places in the field of literature. The *Atlantic Monthly* presents features superior to those offered by any other magazine.

R. NEUMAN, BURLINGTON, IOWA.

Der Zionsbote, Christlicher Volks Kalender für 1902. Pp. 96.

This annual, published for the German Literary Board of the Lutheran Wartburg and Nebraska Synods, besides the calendar material usually found in publications of this kind, abounds in valuable historical matter, paragraphs of excellent religious reading and interesting church statistics. It contains a list of the General Synod Church Boards; clerical register; educational institutions; postal information, and a history of the German Wartburg Synod, with portraits of Revs. J. D. Severinghaus, D.D., F. W. Steffens, R. G. Lenker, W. Schuelke, W. Rosenstengel, and Bruno Garten, and cuts of the Lutheran church, Pittsfield, Ill., and Fontenelle, Iowa.

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